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Preface
The discipline of behavioral economics has challenged the standard assumptions
behind the neoclassical Homo Oeconomicus – an unboundedly rational and selfish de-
cision maker. The ideas that human behavior in economic situations can be driven by
other forces than rationality and optimizing are not new to the economic literature. In
fact, they appeared in the economic thought as early as the work of Adam Smith, Irving
Fisher and John Maynard Keynes (see Ashraf et al., 2005, Pech and Milan, 2009, Thaler,
1997). Starting in the early 1950s, an American economist and cognitive psychologist
Herbert Simon has planted the seeds for the field of bevavioral economicswith hiswork
on bounded rationality and heuristic decision making. The deviations from rational
choice theory were further investigated and incorporated into choice models in the
1970s by two psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. They popularized
the ideas of an “irrational” decision maker and are considered to be the fathers of mod-
ern behavioral economics. Since then, the field has grown and been widely recognized
in research, teaching and policy advice.
Nowadays, behavioral economics does not conflict with neoclassical economics as
much, but rather provides the latter with additional insights and serves as a part
of all economists’ toolkit (see Chetty, 2015). In fact, Levine (2012) asserts that due
to this symbiosis behavioral economics “is doomed” as a standalone research field.
On the other hand, some researchers criticize behavioral economics for the lack of
empirical realism in modeling the decision making processes and being too close to
the neoclassical “as-if” paradigm (Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010). With hundreds of
discovered behavioral biases, behavioral economists are accused of oftentimes seeing
a bias when there is none (Gigerenzer, 2018). Thus, an important point on the current
research agenda of a behavioral economist is not detecting yet another deviation from
selfish-rational behavior, but rather investigating inwhich contexts it plays an important
role, how it affects the well-being of the involved parties, and what decision making
processes stand behind this behavior.
This dissertation describes three behavioral aspects in three different contexts.
Chapter 1 highlights the differences in the bidding behavior of individuals and teams in
different types of auctions. Although neoclassical economics typically models decision
makers as individuals, it has long been acknowledged in social sciences that people can
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behave differently when they make decisions in teams (refer to Kugler et al., 2012, for
a review of the literature). One of the contexts where team behavior is widespread is
bidding on both traditional brick-and-mortar and online auctions. Chapter 1 analyzes
team and individual bidding behavior in a series of experimental auctions ofmost com-
mon formats: first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions and ascending-price (English)
auctions.
The next behavioral aspect discussed in this dissertation is social preferences –
one of the most prominent concepts in behavioral economics. It has been shown to
matter in an ample spectrum of contexts, both in the lab and in the field (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002, List, 2009). The study presented in Chapters 2 and 3 applies social
preferences to markets and studies third-degree price discrimination when consumers
have reciprocal preferences. According to traditional microeconomic theory, third-
degree price discrimination – the practice of selling the same product at different
prices to different customers – is always better than uniform pricing since it allows the
firm to extract more consumer surplus. However, in practice this pricing policy can
backfire: consumers tend to become angry when they find out that they pay higher
prices than somebody else. Chapter 2 introduces a model of a monopolistic market
where consumers have preferences for reciprocity and describes optimal third-degree
price discrimination schemes under these conditions. The model is complemented
by a laboratory experiment in Chapter 3, which tested reciprocal reactions to price
discrimination and allowed to assess the optimal pricing strategy empirically.
Finally, Chapter 4 proposes an experimental design for the identification of gender
bias in student evaluations of teaching. Gender differences were empirically doc-
umented in numerous economic contexts. A broad strand of literature claims that
these differences can be partly attributed to gender discrimination, or gender bias –
the propensity of a decision maker to perceive men as superior to women, or vice
versa, even if their observable characteristics are comparable. In particular, gender
bias is claimed to affect student evaluations of teachers (Boring, 2017, Mengel et al.,
2019). These evaluations often influence hiring and promotion decisions at universities
and thus indirectly affect the academic career of the faculty. Chapter 4 describes an
experiment that varies the gender identity of the teacher and the quality of teaching
exogenously, thereby allowing to identify how the gender bias shapes the differences
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in student evaluations, if at all. On top of that, the design includes a non-suggestive
intervention to mitigate potential gender bias on the side of the students.
All three studies rely on the same methodology – laboratory experiments. Though
frequently criticized for the lack of external validity, laboratory experiments offer a
unique opportunity of tight control over the treatment variations, as well as beliefs and
incentives of the participants. In Chapter 1, the laboratory environment allowes for
the valuations of the bidders to be fixed and the differences between individual and
team decision making processes to be minimized. It provides the only possible way
to impose payoff functions and identify the optimal pricing strategy in Chapter 3. It
makes it possible in Chapter 4 to vary the gender of the teacher without deception,
minimizing the differences in teaching style and ensuring that the subjects trust that
their feedback will reach the teachers. Being an indispensable tool to identify causality
and disentangle different mechanisms of decision making, laboratory experiments
constitute the methodological core of this dissertation. The detailed summary of the
four chapters is provided below.
Two Heads are Better than One: Teams and Individuals in Standard Auction For-
mats. Chapter 1 is joint work with Martin Kocher. In this experiment, we study the
differences in individual and team bidding behavior. It has been shown that teams
differ from individuals on a variety of dimensions, including risk-taking, the ability to
solve complex problems and moral behavior (Shupp and Williams, 2008, Maciejovsky
et al., 2013, Kocher et al., 2018). In the context of auctions, it is often small teams of ex-
perts rather than individuals who decide on the bidding strategy (including oil and gas
lease auctions, spectrum autions, etc.). However, empirical evidence on team bidding
behavior is scarce and delivers mixed results. Our experiment was the first to compare
teams and individuals in most common auction formats: first-price and second-price
sealed-bid auctions, and English auctions.
In a laboratory experiment, our subjects participated in a series of repeated auctions
with independent private values: either first-price or English auctions. Depending on
the treatment, subjects either bid individually or in teamsof three,with thepossibility to
communicate anonymously in a chat. The members of a team had the same valuations
and thus the same amount of information and the same incentives as the individual
bidders. After the repeated auctions ended, everyone participated in one second-price
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auction (we considered the behavior in this round to be a proxy for bidder’s rationality).
In addition, we elicited risk preferences in an investment task and retrieved a measure
of cognitive abilities with the help of Raven’s progressive matrices test. All parts of the
experiment were incentivized. During the experiment we videotaped the subjects in
order to analyze their facial expressions and estimate the effect of emotions on bidding
behavior.
We found that in first-price auctions teams achieved higher profits than individuals,
but therewas no difference in English auctions. In our settingwith independent private
values, the optimal bidding strategy in English auction was very simple – staying in
the auction until the current bid hits the valuation threshold. Both individuals and
teams coped with this strategy equally well. In contrast, the optimal bids in first-price
auctions are not that straightforward since they involve risk preferences and beliefs
about the bidding strategies of the other bidders on the market. We observed that
individuals overbid in comparison to teams and, as a result, achieved lower profits.
It suggests that teams were more successful in understanding the complex optimal
bidding strategy. Our speculation is corroborated by the correlation between the bids
and proxies of rational behavior, such as bids in second-price auctions and scores on
the Raven’s test. This finding is in line with the literature asserting that teams are more
rational decision makers than individuals (Maciejovsky et al., 2013).
In addition, we were able to explore the role of emotions in auctions. We observed
that in first-price auctions subjects in teams experienced on averagemore positive emo-
tions than subjects who bid individually. Naturally, winning an auction was associated
with more positive and less negative emotions. Interestingly, emotions also had an
effect on the future bids: sadness made subjects bid less in the next auction, while the
feeling of fear increased their bids.
Optimal third-degree price discrimination and reciprocity: A theoretical model.
From every textbook in microeconomic theory, an economics undergraduate learns
that amonopolist always prefers to practice price discriminationwhenever it is possible
since thiswayhe can effectively redistribute consumer surplus. However, there is ample
evidence that consumers are disturbed by third-degree price discrimination when they
become aware of it (Englmaier et al., 2012, Leibbrandt, 2020). Nevertheless, to this
day theoretical literature incorporating behavioral reactions of consumers to prices is
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scarce.
In Chapter 2 I developed a model of a monopolistic market with two consumers
who have preferences for reciprocity by applying the behavioral model of Falk and
Fischbacher (2006). The consumers have linear demands1 satisfying Spence-Mirrlees
conditions, thereby one consumer always has a higher willingness-to-pay and is better
off, or “richer” than the other consumer. Both consumers evaluate their well-being rel-
ative to a reference point, which includes both the price charged to the other consumer
and his material payoff. If the consumer’s actual payoff falls below his reference payoff,
he considers the firm as unkind and is willing to punish it by lowering his demand.
Analogously, if the consumer’s payoff exceeds the reference payoff, he is willing to
reward the firm by buying more. Each consumer puts certain weights on the price and
the payoff of the other consumer in his reference point; this allowed me to model a
situation when a lower price for the “poorer” consumer was deemed acceptable by the
“richer” consumer.
Mymodel has aunique equilibrium ina sensible rangeof parameters. It predicts that
preferences for reciprocity put a constraint on price discrimination. The attractiveness
of price discrimination decreases in the magnitude of reciprocal preferences of the
“richer” consumer: the stronger he reacts to differential pricing, the less profitable it is
to charge a higher price for him, with uniform pricing becoming optimal at some point.
This reaction ismitigated if the consumer putsmoreweight on the “poorer” consumer’s
payoff when evaluating his reference point. On the other hand, positive reciprocity
of the “poorer” consumer positively affects the profitability of price discrimination.
Finally, price discrimination is more profitable when consumers differ strongly in their
willingness-to-pay. When consumers are similar to each other, the benefits of price
discrimination do not outweigh the costs imposed by the negative reciprocal reactions.
Optimal third-degree price discrimination and reciprocity: Experimental evidence.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Florian Englmaier, Markus Reisinger and Katharina
Schüßler. It introduces a laboratory experiment designed to test the predictions of
the model in Chapter 2 and estimate its parameters. We simulated a monopolistic
market by matching the subjects into groups of three consisting of a firm and two
consumers with different payoff structures. The firm had a choice between a price
1According to neoclassical approach without reciprocal preferences.
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discrimination scheme and a uniform price, and the consumers decided how much of
a virtual good they buy from the firm. The market interaction was repeated for 20
periods, allowing us to structurally estimate the model for every individual. We had
three treatments in our experiment. No Info treatment served as a control group: the
subjects in the role of consumers learned neither the price nor the payoff of the other
consumer on the market. In Part Info treatment we provided the consumers with the
information about the price charged to the other consumer on the market, but not his
payoff; and in Full Info treatment consumers learned both the price and the payoff of
the other consumer. Under plausible assumptions themodel predicted largest negative
reciprocity and therefore lowest price discrimination rates in Part Info treatment, fol-
lowed by Full Info treatment, followed by the highest frequency of price discrimination
in No Info treatment.
Somewhat surprisingly, our results could not replicate consumer antagonism to
price discrimination reported in the previous literature. We found no treatment dif-
ferences in consumer demands, all of them being rather close to the selfish-rational
benchmark with only minor deviations. The firms anticipated the consumer behavior
accordingly: their pricing choices were not different from the best response to actual
consumer demands in all treatments. The estimated parameters of the model were
also very close to the neoclassical theory: the reciprocity parameters of the consumers
were estimated to be very close to zero. The small deviations from selfish-rational
behavior could not be captured by the model and were absorbed by the error term. We
speculate that this result is a side effect of our experimental design. Repeated market
interactions and the strategy method might have induced our subjects to make more
rational decisions instead of producing emotional reactions to price discrimination. We
also discuss the possibility that the reference price in our experiment was shaped by
self/self comparisons rather than by self/other comparisons.
The determinants of gender bias in student evaluations of teaching. Chapter 4 is
joint work with Francisco Blasques and Artem Duplinskiy and builds on the fact that
university students consistently evaluate their female teachers lower thanmale teachers.
The gender gap in evaluations is robust to controlling for such proxies of teaching
effectiveness as student grades and self-study hours (Mengel et al., 2019). However,
observational data do not allow us to infer whether this discrepancy stems from a
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behavioral bias on the side of the students, or there are unobservable characteristics of
teachers that account for the difference in evaluations.
We designed an experiment that exogenously varies the perceived gender of the
teacher without deceiving the subjects. We aim to recruit male and female teachers
to make a videolecture on a mathematical topic; the lecture takes the form of a short
video with self-introduction and narrated slides. The subjects in the laboratory need to
watch the lecture, take an incentivized quiz on its content and subsequently evaluate
their instructor. This design minimizes verbal and non-verbal differences in teaching
style, allowing us to make causal inference about the presence of gender bias in student
evaluations. On top of that, we will present two versions of the lecture content: one
of high quality and another one of intentionally degenerated quality. This attempt to
exogenously manipulate the quality of teaching will be the first to shed the light on
the response of gender bias in evaluations to variations in the true effectiveness of the
teacher.
Finally, we propose a transparent communication of teachers’ incentives to the stu-
dents as an intervention to overcome potential gender bias in evaluations (if any). An
average undergraduate student is unlikely to be aware of the incentive structure in
academia, including the fact that his evaluation might affect the teacher’s future career.
We hypothesise that communicating these incentives might make students evaluate
their teachers more carefully, potentially making the evaluations of the female teachers
less emotional and more objective. In our experiment, the subjects in the role of the
teachers compete for a monetary prize given to the teacher with the highest evaluation
scores in our experiment. Depending on the treatment, this prize will either be not
mentioned or explicitly stated to the students before they proceed to the evaluations.
This kind of intervention is much less suggestive than the previous attempts to ask the
students to avoid gender discrimination.
Chapters 1 and 4 of this dissertation are self-contained and can be read indepen-
dently. Chapters 2 and 3 represent the theoretical and the empirical parts of one study.
Every chapter has its own appendix. All appendices and the bibliography can be found
at the end of the dissertation.
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1 TwoHeads are Better thanOne: Teams and Individuals
in Standard Auction Formats
1.1 Introduction
Auctions are a very important allocation mechanism. In the theoretical and empiri-
cal literature, bidders in auctions areusually assumed tobe (representative) individuals.
However, often, small groups or teams (henceforth used interchangeably) determine
bids or bidding strategies together (see, e.g., Börgers and Dustmann, 2005). Teams
may be organized formally, potentially including a hierarchy, or informally such as it is
usually the case with families or teams of experts without a formal structure.
Examples of bidding in teams readily come to mind. Think of a family that decides
about their bid in an online auction. However, also on the level of corporate auctions,
teams play a crucial role. In spectrum auctions (Abbink et al., 2005) or auctions for
offshore oil leases, teams of managers or experts (geologists) formulate strategies for
bidding (Capen et al., 1971, Hoffman et al., 1991). Interestingly, we know very little
about the extent to which existing knowledge from bidding behavior of individuals can
be transferred to auctions that involve team bidders. One reason is that the existing
evidence, mostly from laboratory experiments, is not fully conclusive. We discuss the
relevant literature in greater detail below.
This paper, therefore, compares individual and team bidding in a systematic design.
We implement three commonly used auction formats: a first-price auction, a second-
price auction, and an ascending English auction. Using a laboratory experiment, we
systematically vary the type of decision maker by having either individuals or small
unitary teams deciding about the bids. Our focus is on unitary teams, i.e. teams that
do not face an internal conflict in terms of monetary outcomes and that have to come
up with a joint decision after some deliberation. Obviously, team decision settings are
quite diverse outside the laboratory. However, unitary teams seem to provide a good
first impression of potential differences between individual decisionmakers and teams,
and more involved teams settings follow immediately as potential extensions.
It is well-known that individuals and small unitary teams differ in several respects
(Charness and Sutter, 2012, Kugler et al., 2012). First, individuals and teams differ
in their ability to avoid mistakes (Bornstein et al., 2004, Blinder and Morgan, 2005,
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Cooper and Kagel, 2005, Sutter, 2005, Gillet et al., 2009, Feri et al., 2010) or in their
learning ability and pace (Kocher and Sutter, 2005, Kocher et al., 2006, Maciejovsky
et al., 2013). According to the economists’ definition, teams are thus usually more
rational decisionmakers than individuals. Applying results from existing studies using
different decision making games would lead to the expectation of fewer instances of
overbidding in first-price auctions and of fewer deviations from the dominant strategy
of bidding one’s own valuation in second-price auctions.
Second, individuals and teams might potentially differ in the risks they take. There
is a long discussion starting in the early psychological literature about whether there is
a “risky shift” from individuals to teams (Stoner, 1961) or whether the shift is actually
“cautious” (Moscovici andZavalloni, 1969). Recent evidence fromcontrolled laboratory
experiments in economics provide inconclusive results (Baker et al., 2008, Shupp and
Williams, 2008, Masclet et al., 2009, Zhang and Casari, 2012). Obviously, a difference
in revealed risk attitudes from individuals and teams would affect equilibrium bids in
first-price auctions, not in second-price auctions.
Third, there could be a difference in the emotional reactions to events during an
auction or between auctions.2 Auction fever describes a non-rational immersion into
an auction that might lead to overbidding. There is large literature in social psy-
chology showing that team decision making might go out of hand and lead to even
disastrous consequences. This literature that is often summarized under the heading
“groupthink” (Janis, 1972, 1982, 1989) has looked at (often spectacular) misjudgments
or failures that followed deliberation within teams. Usually, groupthink goes hand in
hand with some deficiencies in the group decision making process such as the exis-
tence of a strong group leader togetherwith the suppression of deviant opinions. While
there is no evidence yet, it is conceivable that groupthink could be related to emotional
reactions or over-competitive attitudes in auctions. Does auction fever perhaps affect
individuals and teams differently? Potential differential effects of auctions fever should
be observable in ascending English auctions.
Our list of potential influences on bidding in auctions that lead to differences be-
tween individual bids and team bids is not exhaustive. There might be additional
relevant aspects, but those mentioned above are probably the most important ones. So
2See, for instance, Breaban and Noussair (2018) for an application of emotion measurement in exper-
imental asset markets.
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far, the existing experimental literature on bidding in auctions has almost exclusively
focused on individual bidders. To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few
exceptions. Cox and Hayne (2006), the first paper on the difference between individ-
uals and teams in auctions, focus on the effect of information on team bidding and
less on a controlled comparison between individual and team bidders. They find that
more information in a common value auction environment makes teams less rational
bidders than individuals – an effect that they call “curse of information”. Indeed, such
a curse could be related to groupthink or over-competitiveness. Interestingly, Sutter
et al. (2009) find a similar result in a different framework. Their focus is on an ascending
sealed-bid English auction with a private and a common value component (with some
resemblance to spectrum auction designs). They show that teams stay significantly
longer in the auction and that they also pay higher prices. As a consequence, they
make smaller profits and fall prey to the winner’s curse more often.3
We are not aware of any study on the differences between individual and team
bids in the most straightforward auction designs: sealed-bid first- and second-price
auctions. We also implement an ascending English auction. An important feature of
our design is that we keep all aspects equal across the individual treatments and the
team treatments – hence, the bids in the auctions formats can be compared directly.
Our teams consist of three members that remain anonymous and can only interact
through a real-time chat in order to reach a joint decision. We elicit cognitive abilities
and risk attitudes on the individual and on the team levels, alongside a set of other
background measures. We also analyze the emotions of our decision makers as an
additional control. Individuals always bid against individuals on a market consisting
of three bidders, and team always bid against teams on a market consisting of three
bidder teams, and this is common knowledge among participants of the experiment.
We find that individuals are more prone to overbidding in first-price auctions and
less likely to bid their own valuation in second-price auctions. This is in line with our
first expectation that teams aremore rational decisionmakers than individuals. Indeed,
we can show that the significant treatment effects vanish, as soon as we control for both
cognitive ability and risk attitudes, in line with our second expectation. Taken together,
3Casari et al. (2016) look at a company takeover experiment that reports less overbidding by teams
than by individuals. Similarly, Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) study Tullock-contests, finding again less
overbidding by teams.
10
in these simple formats, teams are the better decision makers in maximizing profits,
which is in contrast to the existing results for more complex formats (Cox and Hayne,
2006, Sutter et al., 2009). Our results provide a rationale for reconciliation of the existing
evidence for team decision making in auctions with the general picture that is painted
regarding team decision making. Teams are more rational decision makers, but there
might be forces such as increased complexity or strongly competitive environments in
which teams fareworse than individuals, potentially due to inherent problems of teams
as decision makers such as groupthink. Interestingly, we do not find any difference
between individuals and teams in the ascending English auction. However, our design
is such that it was slightly tilted against auction fever and groupthink, because we use
a private value setup and a relatively slow-paced decision making environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we describe the details
of the experimental design. Section 1.3 reports the results of our experiment. Section
1.4 discusses our findings, and Section 1.5 concludes the paper. Regression tables and
instructions for the experiment can be found in Appendix A.
1.2 Experimental design
1.2.1 General structure and treatment variation
The experiment consisted of four parts. In the first part subjects participated in
a series of auctions (either first-price sealed-bid auctions or English auctions). In the
second part they bid in one round of a second-price sealed-bid auction. In the third
part of the experiment subjects completed a risk elicitation task, where they had to
make an investment into a risky asset. It was followed by a Raven’s matrices test in the
fourth part to measure cognitive ability. Finally, we concluded the experiment with a
short questionnaire.
We varied our treatments in two aspects in a 2×2 factorial design. The first treatment
difference concerned the type of the auction in the first part of the experiment. In part 1
of the FPA treatments, subjects participated in repeated first-price sealed-bid auctions.
In part 1 of the EA treatments, participants bid in repeated English auctions. The
detailes of the rules of both auction formats are explained in detail below.
The second treatment variation was the type of the decision-making entity. In IND
treatments, all subjects made their choices individually. In TEAM treatments, subjects
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madedecisions in teams of three. These teams stayed the same throughout all four parts
of the experiment, but subjects did not know the identity of the other team members.
The decision making process within teams was the same throughout all parts of the
experiment: first, all three members of a team made an individual proposal for their
team’s bid in an auction (or an investment in part 3, or a test answer in the Raven’s
test in part 4). Afterward, if the individual proposals did not coincide within a team,
its members had to agree on a joint decision within a limited time. During this time,
team members could discuss their choices in a real-time chat. Once an agreement was
reached within each team, the experiment proceeded. If some team failed to agree on a
joint decision within the specified time frame, its members did not earn anything in the
respective auction (or the respective task in part 3 or part 4). To make the treatments
more comparable in terms of deliberation, we asked subjects in IND treatments to
write a short explanation of their choice after they had made it. While writing the
explanation, individuals could also change their decision if they wanted so.
1.2.2 The rules of the experiment
Part 1: repeated first-price and English auctions. In the first part of the experiment,
bidders participated in a finite number of repeated auctions. We use the term “bidder”
with respect to both individual bidders in IND treatments and team bidders consist-
ing of three subjects in TEAM treatments. In the beginning of each auction, bidders
were randomly matched into markets of three to bid for a virtual good. Bidders had
independent private values for the good, drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 100]
experimental currency points.4 After learning their private values, bidders submitted
their bids for the good. As described above, the bid submission process corresponded
to individual bid proposals followed by a discussion in TEAM treatments, and an in-
dividual bid choice followed by an explanation in IND treatments. In the following,
different auction rules in the FPA and EA treatments applied:
(1) In FPA treatments, bidders submitted their bids only once per auction. After all
three bidders on a market submitted a bid, the auction ended. The bidder with
the highest bid on the market won the auction and paid his own bid for the good.
4The members of the same team in TEAM treatments had the same values for the good so that teams
did not have more information than individual bidders in IND treatments.
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The payoff for the winner was thus the difference between her own value and her
bid. For teams it means that each member of a team received the same payoff equal
to the difference between the team’s value and the bid, thereby facing exactly the
same monetary incentives as bidders in IND treatments. Bidders who did not win
the auction got 0 points.
(2) In EA treatments, each auction consisted of several bidding rounds. In each round
bidders could either submit a bid higher or equal to the minimum bid in the
respective round or quit the auction (equivalent to submitting a bid of zero). The
minimum bid in each round amounted to the highest bid on the market in the
previous round, referred to as current price, plus an increment. The increment
decreased with the current price level as laid out in Table 1.1. The auction ended
when only one bidder was left on the market. This bidder won the auction and
received a payoff equivalent to the difference between her valuation and her own
bid from the last round. In TEAM treatments this payoff was received by each
member of the winning team. As for the first-price auction, bidders who did not
win the auction got 0 points.
Table 1.1: Increment rule in EA treatments
Conditions Increment Minimum bid
current price ≤ 30 10 current price + 10
30 < current price ≤ 45 5 current price + 5
45 < current price ≤ 90 3 current price + 3
current price > 90 2 current price + 2
When an auction ended, the participants received feedback about winning or not
winning the auction and the price at which the good was sold. Then, the next auction
started with exactly the same rules as before. The markets were randomly re-matched,
and the new valuations were drawn (note that in TEAM treatments the composition
of the teams remained the same). There were 12 auctions in FPA treatments and 8
auctions in EA treatments.5 Only one auction was selected as relevant for payment
at the end of the entire experiment. In the instructions we explicitly hinted at the
5We conducted a different number of auctions in FPA and EA treatments merely due to time consid-
erations. English auctions on average took longer than first-price auctions.
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possibility of making losses if the winning bid exceeds the winner’s private value. The
highest possible bid in all treatments was 110 points.
Part 2: second-price auction. After finishing the first part, subjects participated in
a one-shot second-price sealed-bid auction. Since the optimal bidding strategy in
the second-price auction is relatively straightforward and boils down to bidding own
private value, we consider bidding behavior in this part of the experiment as a potential
proxy for a bidder’s rationality.
Like in the first part of the experiment, bidders were matched into markets of three
to bid for a virtual good. In TEAM treatments subjects were bidding in the same
teams as before. The values were private, independent and uniformly distributed over
[0, 100]. After all bidders submitted their bids, the auction ended. The bidder with
the highest bid on the market won the auction and received her private value net of
the second highest bid on the market. To avoid potential income effects, we gave the
participants feedback about the outcome of part 2 only at the end of the experiment.
We also explicitly hinted at the possibility of making losses if the second highest bid
on the market exceeds the winner’s private value.
Part 3: risk elicitation task. In this part of the experiment subjects made a decision
about an investment into a risky asset, based on the approach of Gneezy and Potters
(1997). As before, in IND treatments participantsmade their choices individually, while
in TEAM treatments they agreed on a common investment within the teams.
Each decision-maker - individual or team - received an endowment of 100 experi-
mental currency points and could invest any amount R ∈ [0, 100] into a risky asset and
keep the rest 100 − R. The return from the investment was either 2.5R or 0 with equal
probabilities. When the decision makers chose their investment R, the outcome was
randomized and participants learned how much they earned. As before, subjects in
teams shared the same payoff, having exactly the same incentives as subjects in IND
treatments.
Part 4: Raven’s matrices test. The last part of the experiment was a short version of
Raven’s progressive matrices test, aimed at obtaining a measure of decision makers’
reasoning abilities. The test consisted of eight tasks to identify a symbol that fits the
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given pattern (see Appendix A.2). The time for solving each problem was limited to
90 seconds. If a decision maker managed to solve a problem correctly within this time
frame, she got 50 euro-cents for the solution (also implying 50 cents per team member
in TEAM treatments). If she submitted no answer or the answer was wrong, she did
not earn anything for the respective problem. Once the subjects went through all eight
problems, they learned how many of their answers were correct and how much they
earned.
Finally, the participants filled out a short questionnaire and received feedback about
their earnings from the four parts of the experiment.
1.2.3 Laboratory protocol
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory MELESSA at the
University of Munich, Germany, using the experimental software zTree (Fischbacher,
2007) and the organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). A total of 252 subjects,
mostly undergraduate students, participated in 14 sessions with 18 subjects each. Ses-
sions in FPA treatments lasted about 90 minutes, sessions in EA treatments took about
two hours. Average earnings in the experiment amounted to 21.10 euros, including
the show-up fee of 4 euros. Subjects received written instructions (see Appendix A.2)
for each part of the experiment, after the previous part was finished. They knew that
there would be four parts from the beginning. We videotaped the subjects during the
experiment and used FaceReader emotion recognition software. All participants had
to sign an extra consent form for the video; there were no dropouts.
Since in TEAM treatments subjects were matched into teams of three, in part 1
and 2 there were two markets with three team bidders each. In each round, six team
bidders in one session were randomly rematched into two markets, leaving us with
one independent observation per session. In IND treatment sessions there were six
markets with three individual bidders. We reshuffled the markets after each period
within matching groups of six to keep the probability of facing the same people on a
market equal across treatments. Thus, in IND treatments we had three independent
observations per session. The subjects were aware of the matching protocol. We
conducted two sessions each in IND FPA and IND EA treatments, and five sessions
each in TEAM FPA and TEAM EA treatments.
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1.3 Results
In this section we analyze the profits earned by bidders, different characteristics
of bidding behavior specific to first-price and English auctions, and market outcomes
such as prices and the efficiency of the auctions.
1.3.1 Realized profits
We start with analyzing actual profit that bidders earned in the auctions. By design,
winner’s profits in the first-price auction amount to the difference between their private
values and their bids. If a bidder did not win an auction, the profit was zero. Our data
show that in first-price auctions teams earned on average twice as much as individ-
uals: 3.95 and 1.91 experimental currency points, respectively (p  0.0446; two-sided
Wilcoxon rank sum test; N  11). Figures 1.1a and 1.1c show the average profit in
first-price auctions and its dynamics over the twelve periods for individuals and teams.
What could be a possible explanation for this difference? We attempt to answer this
question by analyzing the effect of team membership on profits in first-price auctions
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Figure 1.1: Profits earned by bidders
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the matching group level. We use the bidding behavior in the second-price auction, the
amount invested into the risky asset, the Raven’s test score and several demographic
characteristics as control variables. It can be seen in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1 that
being an individual bidder reduces the profit by more than 2 points on average com-
pared to team bidders. However, profit increases over time for individuals, implying
that individual bidders might learn and start to close the gap. Profit is highly cor-
related with the performance in the second-price auction: if an average bidder bids
closer to the optimal strategy in the second-price auction, she earns significantly more
in the first-price auction as well. Bear in mind that the second-price auction takes place
after experiencing the first-price auctions; hence, causality cannot be established for
this statement. There is a weakly significant correlation of profits with risk attitudes
(relatively less risk averse subjects earn more) and, interestingly, gender also has a
strong effect on profits: female participants on average earned 2.6 points less then male
participants, controlling for everything else.
In contrast, in the English auction we find no difference between the profits earned
by individuals and teams. An average individual bidder in the English auction earned
6.23 points compared to 6.90 points in the TEAM EA treatment. This difference is
clearly not statistically significant (see Figures 1.1b and 1.1d). Regression analyses in
Table A.4 in Appendix A.1 also show that there is no significant treatment effect on
profits in our English auctions. However, like in first-price auctions, there is weak
evidence of individual learning and a strong correlation between profits earned in the
English auction with bidding behavior in the second-price auction. In addition, profit
is positively correlated with the self-reported high school math grade.
1.3.2 Bidding behavior
Bid shading is an important characteristic of bidding behavior in first-price auctions.
We define bid shading in FPA treatments as the difference between the private value
and the submitted bid. Thus, for the winners of the auction, bid shading is equivalent
to the realized profit, while it also provides information about the behavior of the
bidders who did not win the auction. Figure 1.2a shows that individuals on average
bid 6.98 points below their valuation, and teams shade their bids more – by 9.41 points.
Using the most conservative test – a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test on the level of
17
independent observations – the difference is not significant due to the small number of





































Figure 1.2: Bid shading in first-price auctions
This changes when we look at parametric results. We estimate regression models of
bid shading in Table A.2, where the actual bid in the first-price auction is the dependent
variable, regressed on the private value of the good. The coefficient associated with the
value of the good can be interpreted as bid shading, which turns out to be slightly below
18% of the value in all specifications. The regression specifications (1)-(3) show that
there is a difference between bidding behavior of individuals and teams, that vanishes
when we control for variables from other parts of the experiment in specifications (4)-
(8). In line with the results from subsection 1.3.1, bid shading is negatively correlated
with the deviation from rational behavior in the second-price auction. Moreover,
bidders with higher Raven’s test scores and better math grades submit lower bids,
suggesting that general intelligence matters for bidding strategy. Subjects with longer
past experience of participating in economic experiments also submitted lower bids in
the first place. Risk aversion is associated with slightly higher bids: more risk-tolerant
bidders submit lower bids, thereby increasing potential profit, but lowering the chance
of winning. Finally, specifications (6)-(8) reveal that bids increase over time in TEAM
treatments, suggesting that teams might become more competitive over time. Figure
1.2b shows that until period 7, average bid shading was higher in teams, but from
period 7 on, there is little difference.
We have seen how bid shading differs across treatments, but how far away are
the actual bids from the optimal strategy in the first-price auctions? To answer this
question, we predict optimal bids using a simple parametric model with risk averse
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bidders. In this model, we assume that bidders have a constant relative risk aversion
utility function u(x)  x1−r/(1 − r), where x is the monetary payoff and r is the risk
aversion parameter ranging from 0 to 1 (a higher r corresponds to higher levels of risk
aversion). We get a proxy for this parameter from the choices in the risk elicitation task
in part 3 of the experiment. The estimated average levels of risk aversion are r  .07321
for individuals and r  .1721 for teams: teams were more risk averse than individuals,
but the difference is not significant.6 Using these estimates and the realized values
for the good, we predict optimal bid shading (value minus bid) for every bidder in
every single auction. The optimal bid shading is presented together with the actual
bid shading in Figure 1.3. We observe that both individuals and teams shade their
valuations less, i.e. overbid compared to the prediction. This is a common finding
in the auction literature. However,the deviation from the rational bidding strategy is
more pronounced for the individuals (p  0.1003; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test;
N  11). A regression with individual bid shading as the dependent variable gives
very similar results as those in Table A.2. Again, bidding in the second-price auction
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Figure 1.3: Deviation from the estimated optimal bid shading in first-price auctions
In contrast to the FPA treatments, we find no difference in bidding behavior of
individuals and teams in English auctions. One characteristic of bidding behavior
specific to English auctions is the average number of rounds that bidders spend in an
auction before they drop out. We observe that teams stay slightly longer in English
auctions: team bidders were on average active in 4.06 rounds per auction compared
6In fact, this difference was purely due to a higher number of teams that chose to invest zero points
into the risky asset. We assumed r  1 for those who did so, creating discontinuity in the parameter.
Four out of 30 teams invested nothing in this task, compared to one out of 36 individuals. If we exclude
these observations, the difference in risk preferences goes away.
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to 3.27 rounds for individual bidders. However, this difference is not significant on
conventional levels. Another characteristic of bidding behavior in the EA format is the
relative bid in each round. We define it as the ratio of the actual bid to the minimum
bid in the respective round. The average relative bids were not significantly different:
they are 1.48 for individuals versus 1.29 for teams.
1.3.3 Market outcomes: prices and efficiency
Given that the valuations were assigned randomly and independently, lower prof-
its observed among the individuals in FPA treatments implies that individuals paid
higher prices than teams. Indeed, in first-price auctions the average price for the good
amounted to 65.34 points in IND treatments compared to 59.32 points in TEAM treat-
ments (p  0.0679; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test; N  11). Average prices and
their dynamics are depicted in Figures 1.4a and 1.4c. The regression analysis (Table
A.3) lacks power to capture the treatment effect since the data have to be collapsed on
themarket level; however, we still find the correlations between prices and control vari-
ables. In line with the observed bidding behavior described above, prices are positively
correlated with the deviation from rational bidding in the second-price auction and
risk aversion, and negatively correlated with the score in the Raven’s test, high school
math grade and previous experience of participating in experiments.
In English auctions, individuals and teams paid almost exactly the same price,
slightly above 50 points (see Figure 1.4b). Although there is no difference on aver-
age over all periods, the development of the prices was different in IND and TEAM
treatments. As one can see in specifications (5)-(7) in Table A.5, prices paid by teams
increased over time, while prices paid by individuals decreased. This pattern is also
reflected in Figure 1.4d.
Finally, we look at efficiency, which is an important variable for auction design. An
auction is defined as efficient if the bidder with the highest private valuation obtains
the good. In FPA treatments with individual bidders 78% of all auctions were efficient,
while in TEAM FPA treatments this share was 89%, the difference being not significant
on conventional levels. Efficiency in English auctions was almost the same in the two
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Figure 1.4: Realized prices
1.3.4 Emotions
Our experiment was recorded on camera and the facial expressions of the subjects
were analyzed using the facial recognition software FaceReader. We focus here on
investigating the role of emotions in FPA treatments because of the relatively simple
structure of first-price auctions. In particular, we were interested in the emotions
experienced when the subjects saw their feedback screens at the end of each period, on
which they learned whether they won the current auction or not and how much they
earned. We expected the expressed emotions to have an effect on the future decisions
of the bidders in subsequent auctions.
Apart from a neutral facial expression, the software detects six basic emotions:
anger, happiness, surprise, disgust, sadness, and fear. Their magnitude was measured
as a number between 0 and 1, captured multiple times per second. For each subject in
each period, we took an average over those measurements within the first ten seconds
that the subjects saw their feedback screen and used these measures for our analysis
(synchronization between zTree and FaceReader was achieved by employing the soft-
ware µCap by Doyle and Schindler, 2019). An additional composite variable “valence”
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amounts to the difference between measured happiness and the strongest negative
emotion (anger, disgust, sadness, and fear). It reflects how positive or negative the

















Figure 1.5: Valence of the emotions experienced by the subjects seeing their feedback
screens in FPA treatments
Our first interesting observation suggests that subjects in TEAM treatments experi-
enced on average more positive emotions than subjects in IND treatments (see Figure
1.5; p  0.1003; two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test; N  11). This could possibly be
explained by the fact that teams earned more on average and thus were more positive
about the outcomes of the auctions. Another potential reason could be an inherent pref-
erence for interaction in teams (Kocher et al., 2006). Our TEAM treatments were likely
to be more interesting for subjects due to the interaction through the chat messages
and the challenge of agreeing on a joint bid. This experience could have influenced the
overall satisfaction with the experiment.
To test whether the measured emotions reflect plausible reactions to the outcome of
an auction, we checked whether different emotional states are correlated with winning
or losing an auction in the current period. Table A.6 shows that winning an auction
is associated with more happiness and less anger, and respectively, a greater valence.
Thus, we may conclude that facial recognition of emotions worked properly in our
experiment. Interestingly, individuals seem to experience a bit more sadness than team
members when not winning the auction.
The most interesting question lies in the potential impact of emotions on future
bidding behavior. We evaluate this effect by estimating our regression models of bid
shading with emotions experienced in the previous period as control variables. The
results are reported in Table A.7. We observe that two emotions are significantly
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correlated with bidding behavior in the next period. First, if subjects experienced
sadness, it had a negative impact on their next bid, i.e. they bid, on average, closer to
the rational prediction. One channel could be that winners were sad about the small
profit they made despite winning the auction; in the next round, they would adjust
their bids downwards to increase the expected profit. Second, the feeling of fear was
positively correlated with the bids in the next period. If a subject was afraid of losing
the next auction and ending up with zero profit, she might have overbid even more
to increase the chances of winning at least something. This logic is similar to risk
aversion, supporting the literature that claims an association between fear and risk-
taking (Nguyen andNoussair, 2014). While the effect of sadness would becomeweakly
significant when controlling for the number of emotions covered (multiple hypotheses
testing), the effect of fear is robust. Interestingly, sadness and fear are emotions that one
would not associatewith auction fever. Bear inmind, however, that a seal-bid first-price
auction is ex antemuch less prone to auction fever than a fast-paced ascending English
auction or a descending Dutch auction.
1.4 Further analyses and discussion
The results of the experiment have shown that teams bid closer to the rational
prediction in first-price auctions, paying lower prices and earning larger profits than
individuals, but we observe no difference between team and individual bidding be-
havior in ascending English auctions. Why do teams perform better in only one of
the auction types? Although both auctions in our experiment were implemented in
the simplest setting with independent private values, there seems to be a difference in
the complexity of the optimal bidding strategies. In the English auction, the dominant
strategy is rather straightforward: a bidder should stay in the auction, as long as the
minimum bid does not exceed her private value, and drop out otherwise. In first-price
auctions, however, a bidder needs to figure out the best level of bid shading, taking into
account the distribution of the values, her own risk attitude, and risk attitudes of the
competitors on the market.
We see that teams outperform individuals in this relatively complex decision-
making environment. Our analysis suggests that this effect can be explained by dif-
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Figure 1.6: Absolute deviation from rational strategy (value minus bid) in SPA
auctions is correlated with the choices in a second-price auction, i.e. smaller deviations
from the dominant strategy in the latter lead to less overbidding in the former. We con-
sider the choices in the second-prices auction a measure of reasoning ability, but we get
similar results for the scores in a Raven’s test, the high school math grade, and the pre-
vious exposure to laboratory economic experiments. Among those, the deviation from
rational bidding in the second-price auction is themost robust predictor of overbidding
in first price auction. Indeed, average second-price auction bids in TEAM treatments
are closer to the values than in IND treatments, see Figure 1.6. Non-parametric tests
lack power to render this difference significant, but the discrepancy in this proxy for
rationality can predict the treatment difference in FPA treatments, while it does not
play a role in the relatively simple decision-making environment of EA treatments.
One could ask whether the observed difference in first-price auctions could be
partly attributed to the fact that teammembers adapt their choices when they agree on
a common strategy. In that case wewould see a difference between final bids and initial
bid proposals thatwere submitted individually before entering the discussion in TEAM
treatments. Figure 1.7 depicts initially proposed bid shading along with actual bid
shading (asmentioned in section 2, individual bidders also had the possibility to change
their first choices). We see that the initial proposals are not different from the final
choice of both individuals and teams, suggesting that communication and agreeing on
a common strategy cannot fully account for the observed difference in behavior. There
seems to be a component in team decision making that makes individuals change their
revealed preferred decision already prior to the team interaction. Perhaps anticipated
peer observation makes them think harder about the optimal strategy in first-price
auctions. It could also be the case that team members agreed on a common strategy
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Figure 1.7: Proposed and final bid shading in first-price auctions
supported by the observation captured in Figure 1.7b: the initial proposals of individual
and team bidders were very close in the first period, but followed different patterns
from period 2 on.
Since auction experiments are inherently complex, we want to make sure that our
results are not driven by lack of understanding of the experimental setup. To tackle
this issue, we check whether there are bidders that consistently bid above their valua-
tions, despite a clear statement in the instructions that losses are possible in this case.
Remarkably, in both TEAM treatments we do not observe a single bid above the private
values. Only in the IND FPA treatment there are two subjects who always overbid and
do not learn throughout the course of the experiment. If we exclude those observations
from the analysis, it does not qualitatively change our results. However, the fact that
we observe these outliers only in IND FPA treatment is interesting itself, supporting
our claim that individual bidders have a harder time to cope with complex auction
environments.
Apart from observing the realized profits and prices, unfortunately, there is not
much more to say about the bidding behavior in EA treatments. Typically, in a setting
with independent private values, both relative bids and the number of active rounds
could be considered as a proxy for rational behavior. The more subjects bid relative to
theminimumpossible bid, and the longer they stay in an auction, themore competitive
and the less rational their behavior often is. We observe no significant difference
between teams and individuals with respect to relative bids and the number of active
rounds, but in our experiment these potential measures of rationality turned out to be
very noisy. Our EA treatments lasted about two hours, on average, and subjects might
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have become a bit tired during the experiment, making this clear in the discussion
stage. Thus, there was a potentially perfectly rational motivation for both teams and
individuals to bid higher than the minimum bid and drop out faster in order to finish
the experiment more quickly. This property of our experimental setup might partly
account for the absence of evidence for auction fever on the side of the teams, contrary
to the previous findings.
If a seller had the possibility to choose between the two auction types in our setting,
first-price auctions would be more profitable than English auctions, and vice versa for
the bidders. The revenue equivalence principle holds neither in IND nor in TEAM
treatments, and realized prices in first-price auction are significantly higher than in
English auctions, as once can see on Figure 1.4 (p  0.0014; two-sided Wilcoxon rank
sum test; N  22). This is partly explained by bidders’ risk aversion that makes them
bid higher in first-price auctions. However, as mentioned above, both individuals and
teams overbid in comparison to the theoretical prediction that takes risk aversion into
account, boosting the difference in profitability between FPA and EA treatments.
Finally, some specifications of the regression models allow us to draw inferences
on the dynamics of bidding behavior and auction outcomes. On the one hand, in
both auction types we find that the performance of individuals improves over time:
for instance, individual profits increase in both first-price and English auctions. We
interpret this as learning, which is more pronounced among individuals, since their
average performance is poorer, than in teams and, therefore, there is more room for
improving the bidding strategy over time. On the other hand, in contrast to this pattern,
the bidding behavior of teams became less rational over the course of the experiment:
team bids in first-price auction and prices in English auction increased with the time.
This deterioration in performance supports the strand of the literature that shows that
teams tend to behave more competitively than individuals (as in Cox and Hayne, 2006,
Sutter et al., 2009).
1.5 Conclusion
We have conducted an experimental study that systematically compares the bid-
ding behavior of individuals and unitary teams in different auction formats. Our
results show that individuals deviate more from the optimal strategy in first-price and
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second-price auctions than teams, while there is no difference between individual and
team bidders in English auctions. The difference in overbidding in first-price auctions
between individuals and teams is strongly correlated with bidders’ ability to make ra-
tional decisions, whichwe consider to be reflected in their bids in second-price auctions
and in their Raven’s cognitive ability test scores. In other words, teams outperform in-
dividuals in first-price auctions, because they are more rational decision makers. This
finding challenges the results from the existing literature that showed that teams per-
formworse than individuals in auctions (Cox andHayne, 2006, Sutter et al., 2009) and it
is in linewith the studieswhere teams outperform individuals in other decision-making
environments (e.g., Casari et al., 2016, Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010, Sutter, 2005). We
argue that the complexity of the decisionmaking environmentmatters for the observed
difference in individual and team behavior: since the optimal bidding strategy in first-
price auction is more complex relative to our English auction format, better reasoning
abilities of the teams play a role in determining the difference in first-price auctions,
but not in our simple version of the English auction. Also contrary to our expectations,
we find no evidence for auction fever among teams in English auction, with this result
possibly being an artifact of our experimental setup with independent private values
and without time pressure.
Our paper is the first that systematically analyzes different auction formats with
individual and team bidders. Obviously, there are choices to make, when it comes to
the experimental design, and thus there is room and need for more research. First, one
could investigate whether more systematically varying the complexity of an auction
affects the performance of individuals and teams in a different manner. In our setting
we found that teams outperformed individuals inmore complex auctions; however, the
previous studies that observed teamsperformingworse than individuals hadevenmore
complicated auction rules. How team and individual bidders respond to exogenous
variations in complexity of an auction, keeping everything else constant, and whether
thedifference in biddingbehavior ismonotone in complexity, remains anopenquestion.
Second, it would be interesting to learn about which auction features could potentially
lead to groupthink and over-competitiveness among teams, which were documented
in some of the previous studies. Our setup was clearly tilted away from groupthink
phenomena. Introducing some (natural) hierarchy could be an interesting avenue for
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future research. Our experiment also shows that an ascending price is not enough
for teams to exhibiting anything close to auction fever. Finding the characteristics of
an auction (potentially time pressure, face-to-face interaction, etc.) that trigger those
reactions in teams and, hence, potentially deteriorate their performance, would be an
important aspect for auction design that we think requires more attention.
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2 Optimal third-degreepricediscriminationand reciprocity:
A theoretical model
2.1 Introduction
Third-degree price discrimination, or charging different prices for the same product
to different consumers, is one of the tools for firms to increase their profits. According
to classical industrial organization, price discrimination is always more profitable than
uniform pricing (see Armstrong, 2006). Third-degree price discrimination has been
observed on different markets, including markets for cars (Verboven, 1996), gasoline
(Borenstein, 1991) and obstetric services (Amin et al., 2004). Due to the rise of the
Internet and e-commerce in the past decades, firms are able to price discriminate today
more than ever. Consumers can get differential prices based on their past purchasing
behavior, web browsing history, demographic characteristics and other information
that can be retrieved online. Personalized pricing, which can be seen as an extreme
form of third-degree price discrimination, can substantially boost firm’s profit (Dubé
and Misra, 2017, Shiller, 2020).
Despite the fact that price discrimination theoretically allows a firm to extract addi-
tional surplus from the consumers, in practice it can backfire. Perhaps the most famous
example is the price testing done by Amazon in 2000, during which the same DVDs
were offered at different prices to different users, with the discounts ranging from 20%
to 40%. After multiple complaints from the customers who noticed price discrimi-
nation, Amazon had to issue an apology and refund thousands of the disadvantaged
customers7, also suffering a damage to its reputation that is difficult to quantify. An-
other scandal emerged around Adobe, Apple and Microsoft in 2013 as they offered the
same digital products to their Australian customers at much higher prices compared
to the US market. The three tech giants were called to explain their pricing policy in
front of a parliamentary committee, leading Adobe to eventually cut their prices in
Australia8. On the one hand, third-degree price discrimination can apparently seem
7T. R. Weiss, “Amazon apologizes for price-testing program that angered customers” (2000).
Accessed at https://www.computerworld.com/article/2588337/amazon-apologizes-for-price-
testing-program-that-angered-customers.html on 09-07-2020.




unfair; on the other hand, it is widely accepted in other contexts. For instance, various
discounts for students, elderly and people with lower income are typically perceived
as fair (Wu et al., 2012).
Having said that, when is differential pricing still profitable for the firm? This paper
investigates optimal third-degree price discrimination on themarketswhere consumers
have preferences for fairness. I developed an application of the behavioral model by
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) to a monopolistic market with two types of consumers
withdifferent demandelasticities. Consumerpreferences involve reciprocity: thereby, a
consumerwho is charged a higher pricemight bewilling to punish the firmby lowering
his demand; and vice versa, reward the firm for being charged a lower price. I assume
that consumers evaluate the fairness of a price by comparing it to the price charged to
the other consumer on the market, while also considering the other consumer’s payoff
– the latter allowed me to model the acceptance of price discounts for consumers with
lower income.
The main finding of this model is that the fairness preferences of the consumers put
a constraint on price discrimination. The equilibrium price charged to the consumer
with a lower demand elasticity (the “richer” consumer) is decreasing in the strength
of his preference for reciprocity. Since this price is higher than that charged to the
“poorer” consumer, the “richer” consumer might negatively react to it, making price
discrimination less attractive. The stronger he reacts, the closer the two prices get, with
uniform pricing being optimal at some point. This restraint is mitigated if the payoff of
the other consumer is also taken into account, e.g. the “richer” consumer can consider
the lower payoff of the “poorer” consumer as a justification for the price disparity.
Finally, price discrimination is more attractive if the difference between consumers is
large,while potential consumer antagonism topricediscriminationmakes it suboptimal
to uniform pricing when the two consumers are similar.
Themost important contribution of this study is the investigation of optimal pricing
on the markets where consumers have fairness preferences. Relatively few theoretical
models have incorporated fairness concerns into the profit maximization problem of
the firm. For instance, Destan and Yılmaz (2020) derived optimal non-linear pricing
(second-degree price discrimination) under inequity aversion; Selove (2019) studied the
impact of fairness concerns on dynamic pricing in a setting where travel is costly for the
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consumers. Li and Jain (2016) showed that fairness concerns can soften the competition
between firms that practice behavior-based pricing. Themodels closest tomy approach
were developed by Okada (2014) and Rotemberg (2011). Okada (2014) assumed that
consumers care about the difference in their prices and found that a monopolist prefers
uniform pricing over price discrimination if the fairness concerns are strong enough.
However, without additional assumptions this model cannot explain why consumers
would perceive price discounts for people with lower income as fair. I was able to
deliver this prediction by incorporating the payoff of the peer into consumer’s utility
function. The model by Rotemberg (2011) also predicts that firms practice third-degree
price discrimination based on income differences, but avoid discrimination based on
differences in the elasticity of demand. The key assumption of this model is that a
fraction of the firms are benevolent, i.e. some firms have inherent social preferences
towards consumers. Thus, the avoidance of price discrimination can be attributed
to non-benevolent firms trying to signal their type as benevolent. I abandon this
assumption in my model and show that price discrimination can be suboptimal for a
firm even from a purely selfish-rational perspective.
This study also contributes to the debate about the relevant reference price. Several
studies have attempted to answer what constitutes this reference price. In some cases,
consumersmay compare a price to the prices they get for competitors’ products (Bolton
et al., 2003). Another important reference point is the prices faced by the same consumer
in thepast, or the so-called self/self comparison (Bolton et al., 2003,Herz andTaubinsky,
2018,Xia et al., 2004). Finally, theprices charged toother consumers canbe consideredas
reference prices (self/other comaprison), leading the reader to the empirical literature
on the perceived fairness of third-degree price discrimination, which is reviewed in
detail in Chapter 3. I chose to model the reference price as the price charged to the
other consumer on the same market, following Xia et al. (2004) and Ho and Su (2009)
who claim that comparison between peers is stronger that self/self comparison or
distributional fairness between a consumer and a firm.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model,
its equilibrium and comparative statics, and section 2.3 concludes. The proofs of all
propositions in this chapter as well as the Mathematica program for calculation of
equilibrium prices can be found in Appendix B.
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2.2 The model of a monopolistic market with reciprocal consumers
2.2.1 Model specifications
In this section I present a model of third-degree price discrimination among con-
sumers with reciprocal preferences. Consider a monopolist who sells a good to two
consumers with linear demands satisfying Spence-Mirrlees conditions. The payoff
function of the first consumer is normalized to u1(q1, p1)  q1− 12q
2
1− p1q1, and the pay-
off function of the second consumer is u2(q2, p2)  a2q2 − 12a2q
2
2 − p2q2, with a2 ∈ (0, 1].




could also be interpreted as two markets with a unit mass of consumers with unit
demands, where the valuations for the good are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] on the
first market and on [0, a2] on the second market. For simplicity I assume that there
are no production costs, so that firm’s profit is the sum of the revenues from the two
markets: π  p1q1 + p2q2.
Throughout the section, I will consider two pricing options for the firm: either to
charge the same price for both consumers (uniformpricing) or to set two different prices
that maximize firm’s profit (third-degree price discrimination).
Under the standard approach, consumers would care only about their payoff. If the
firm charges the same price for both consumers, the optimal uniform price will amount
to pUNI  a21+a2 , and the corresponding profit is π
UNI 
a2
1+a2 . If the firm engages in price






2 , and the corresponding
profit is πPD  1+a24 . In the standard setting, uniform pricing yields less profit, therefore
the firm always prefers price discrimination.
My version of consumer preferences is an application of the reciprocity model by
Falk andFischbacher (2006). I assume that consumer i has the followingutility function:
Ui (qi , pi , p j)  ui (qi , pi) + ρi∆i (pi , p j , γ)σi (qi , pi , p j), (1)
where
- i , j ∈ {1, 2}; pi and p j are the prices the firm charges to consumers i and j
respectively.
- ui (qi , pi) is consumer i’s quadratic payoff function.
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- ρi ≥ 0 is the parameter capturing the strength of consumer i’s reciprocity prefer-
ences.
- ∆i (pi , p j , γ) is the term representing the kindness of the firm towards the con-
sumer, which amounts to the difference between consumer i’s maximal possible
payoff given his price pi and a reference payoff:
∆i (pi , p j , γ)  ui (q̄i (pi), pi) −
[
γui (q̄i (p j), p j) + (1 − γ)u j (q̄ j (p j), p j)
]
.
q̄i and q̄ j correspond to the linear demands predicted by the standard theory. The
reference payoff in square brackets is a weighted average of consumer i’s maximal
possible payoff given the other consumer’s price p j and the other consumer’s
maximal possible payoff given p j . The weight γ ∈ [0, 1] reflects how much
consumer i cares about the other consumer’s payoff. If γ  1, the consumer
would care only about his own potential payoff if charged the other price. For
instance, with pi > p j and γ  1, the kindness term would constitute a negative
difference between consumer i’smaximal payoffs under both prices, meaning that
consumer i envies consumer j. If γ < 1, the other consumer’s payoff also matters
for the decision making. For computational feasibility, I assume the same γ on
both markets.
- σi (qi , pi , p j) is the reciprocity term, or the difference in firm’s actual profit and
firm’s maximal possible profit on market i:
σi (qi , pi , p j)  piqi − pi q̄i (pi).
Thus, depending on the sign of the kindness term, the consumer may be willing
to punish or to reward the firm.
This modification of the original model has a specific structure: while a consumer
considers the other consumer (his price and payoff) as his reference point, he recipro-
cates towards another agent – the firm. This structure was motivated by the observed
examples of negative reaction to price discrimination. Consider a buyer on Amazon
who notices that his price for a good is higher than some other buyer’s price, becomes
angry and decides not to buy this good. This is unlikely that at themoment of this deci-
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sion the buyer compares his well-being to the profits earned by Amazon. He probably
pays attention to the prices that other buyers get, and his punishment goes towards
the firm that set these prices. A horizontal comparison between consumers’ prices
and payoffs seems more intuitive than a vertical comparison of consumer’s and firm’s
payoffs. In the rest of the section, I present the important properties of this model.
2.2.2 Equilibrium and comparative statics
Proposition 2.1. Consumers with reciprocal preferences defined by (1) have the following
demand functions:






































These functions are third-degree polynomials in prices. In the firm’s optimiza-
tion problem, profit becomes a fourth-degree polynomial in prices, making the model
intractable. I solved the firm’s optimization problem numerically with the help of
Wolfram Mathematica 9 software. Parameters a2, ρ1, ρ2 and γ ranged on a grid
(0, 1] × [0, 5] × [0, 5] × [0, 1] with over a million datapoints. The Mathematica code can
be found in Appendix B.2; the proofs of all propositions in this section are provided in
Appendix B.1.
Proposition 2.2. For over a million parameter combinations such that a2 ∈ (0, 1], ρ1 ∈ [0, 5],
ρ2 ∈ [0, 5] and γ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique price pair (p1, p2) that maximizes the firm’s
profit.
The firm’s maximization problem has a unique solution for all datapoints on the
chosen grid. I interpolated the resulting prices as functions of parameters. All further
propositions in this section are based on the properties of these numerically estimated
functions p1(a2, ρ1, ρ2, γ) and p1(a2, ρ1, ρ2, γ). They allowme to examine comparative
statics for this model.
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Proposition 2.3. For the following range of parameters, equilibrium prices are weakly decreas-
ing in the reciprocity parameters on the same market and at least weakly increasing in the
reciprocity parameters on the other market:












As an illustration for this proposition, let us consider an equilibrium where the
monopolist charges the first consumer a higher price. The first condition on the pa-
rameters states that (a) the consumer is not completely altruistic when forming his
reference payoff, i.e. considers at least some fraction of his own payoff that he could
get given the lower price; and (b) his preference to reciprocate is not too much stronger
than that preference of the other consumer. If these assumptions hold, an increase in
the reciprocity parameter ρ1 would imply that the consumer will lower his demand
in response to a higher price. Thus, the firm would decrease the price for the first
consumer and increase the price for the second consumer, shrinking the magnitude
of price discrimination in order to mitigate the negative reciprocal response of the
disadvantaged consumer 1.
While it is relatively straightforward why γ should be positive for this to hold,
I need to elaborate on assumption (b). If the reciprocity parameter ρ1 becomes too
large, the negative response of consumer 1 becomes so dramatic that it is not profitable
for the firm to charge him a higher price. An example in Figure 2.1a shows that at
some point firm sets a uniform price on the two markets. Moreover, if ρ1 exceeds this
threshold, the optimal price for the first consumer will be lower than the price for the
second consumer. In this case, the first consumer will exercise positive reciprocity by
rewarding the firm with an additional increase in demand. As ρ1 grows, the price p1
continues to decrease until some pointwhen the firm’s benefit from the first consumer’s
positive reciprocity cannot compensate for the foregone benefit from charging a higher
price on a larger market anymore. At this point, the price would actually start to
increase in the reciprocity parameter. This situation seems unlikely to happen on a real
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(a) Prices as functions of reciprocity parameter
ρ1, with a2  0.75, ρ2  1.5, γ  0.8.













(b) Prices as functions of reciprocity parameter
ρ2, with a2  0.75, ρ1  3, γ  0.8.
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium prices depending on the reciprocity parameters
market, so a boundary on ρ1 does not sound implausible.
The same logic applies to the comparative statics with respect to the reciprocity
parameter on the smaller market. Let us return to an example where the monopolist
would charge a lower price for consumer 2. With an increase in ρ2, the firm could
expect a reward from the increased demand of the second consumer. If this consumer
has stronger reciprocal preferences, the firm has an incentive to exacerbate price dis-
crimination by lowering p2 and increasing p1. The latter only holds if a2 ≥ 0.55: if the
second market is too small, the benefits from positive reciprocity of consumer 2 do not
outweigh the benefits of harvesting the larger market. An illustrative example is given
in Figure 2.1b.
As I already mentioned above, as paradoxical as it sounds, it is theoretically pos-
sible that it is optimal for the firm to charge a higher price on the smaller market. If
the first consumer has very strong reciprocal preferences, his negative response to a
higher price would destroy the additional profit of charging him that price. Another
interesting observation is that the magnitude of price discrimination can even extend
that predicted by standard theory (see Figure 2.1a). This can happen when consumer
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1 has weak reciprocal preferences and consumer 2 has strong reciprocal preferences.
Thus, the incentive to inflate the price differential because of second consumer’s pos-
itive reciprocity would outweigh the incentive to shrink it because of first consumer’s
negative reciprocity. Both situations are probably rare on the real markets, but it is
worth for any firm with sensitive customers to think about.
Proposition 2.4. For a range of parameters, the equilibrium price on the larger market is weakly
increasing in the size of the second market. The price on the smaller market is always strictly
increasing in its size:






















Figure 2.2: Equilibrium prices depending on the size of the smaller market a2, with
ρ1  3, ρ2  1.5, γ  0.8.
Just as with the standard approach, the price on the secondmarket always increases
when the market grows. More interestingly, now the optimal price on the first market
also depends on the size of the second market. Intuitively, since a larger a2 always
comeswith a larger p2, it creates a higher referenceprice for thefirst consumer,making it
possible for thefirm to increasehis price aswellwithout any loss of profitdue tonegative
reciprocity. An example is depicted in Figure 2.2. For the latter to happen, consumer
1 must be substantially selfish in forming his reference payoff, and his reciprocity
preference should be stronger than that of the other consumer. Otherwise, the incentive
to increase the difference in prices to reap the benefits of the second consumer’s positive
reciprocity could override the previous argument. Note that this is is only important
for relatively small secondmarkets; if the size of the secondmarket is at least half of the
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first market, p1 increases in a2 regardless of the reciprocity parameters. As depicted in
Figure 2.2, the difference in prices shrinks as the markets get closer.
Proposition 2.5. For the following parameters, the equilibrium price on the larger market is
weakly decreasing in γ, while the price on the smaller market is weakly increasing in γ:








To understand the intuition behind Proposition 2.5, let us recall the example with a
higher price for consumer 1. If γ increases, his own potentially higher payoff becomes
more salient for the reference point than the other consumer’s lower payoff. All else
being equal, consumer 1 will retaliate more by lowering his demand, and the firm will
decrease his price in response. A sufficient condition for this to happen is the existence
of reciprocal preferences on the side of consumer 1 (positive ρ1) and at least some
difference in size of the two markets.












Figure 2.3: Equilibrium prices depending on the selfishness parameter γ, with a2 
0.75, ρ1  3, ρ2  1.5.
Similar logic applies to the price on the second market: increasing γ means that
the second consumer pays more attention to the fact that his price is lower and is
more willing to reward the firm for this, creating room for an increase in his price.
The assumptions are stronger though: the second market should be large enough;
consumers should not be too altruistic when thinking about their reference points;
consumer 2 shouldhave reciprocal preferences; and, finally, the reciprocityparameter of
the first consumer should not be too high (an upper bound slightlymore restrictive than
in Proposition 2.3).The intuition behind these assumptions has largely been explained
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above. In addition to this, if γ happens to be low and the reciprocity preferences on
both sides strong enough, the incentive to shrink the price differential might fade. That
is, for instance, an altruistic first consumer could see a higher price as an advantage
because the second consumer has much lower payoff anyway. In this case he could be
willing to reward the firm instead of punishing it, making the effect of γ on his price
obscure. Figure 2.3 provides an example illustrating Proposition 2.5.
2.3 Conclusion
In this study, I developed a model of a monopolistic market with two consumers
with reciprocal preferences and derived the optimal third-degree price discrimination
strategy. I showed that fairness concerns can have a negative impact on the profitability
of price discrimination, with uniform pricing being optimal if the consumers’ attitude
to (negative) reciprocity is strong enough. If the consumers are aware of each other’s
payoff, thismightmitigate their reaction topricediscrimination andgive themonopolist
more room for the extraction of consumer surplus. On top of that, the attractiveness
of third-degree price discrimination shrinks if the markets are of similar size: in this
case, the costs imposed by negative reactions of the consumer who gets a higher price
outweigh the benefits associated with differential pricing.
This model is a parsimonious setup aimed only at modeling consumer antagonism
to third-degree price discrimination in a one-shot market interaction. It remains an
open question how optimal price discrimination evolves in a dynamic environment
with fairness-concerned consumers. Another interesting direction for future research
ismodeling competition on suchmarkets: in that case, an angry customer could punish
the firm not only by lowering his demand, but also by switching to the competitor’s
product. Last but not least, apart from third-degree price discrimination, there are other
pricing policies that allow to extract consumer surplus, but are still largely perceived as
fair: consider, for instance auctions and non-linear pricing. It would be interesting to
learn how fairness preferences of the consumers shape the firm’s choice between these
different pricing options.
The simplicity of this model makes it easy to test its predictions. The next chap-
ter introduces a laboratory experiment designed to test this model and provides the
estimates of the model’s parameters.
39
3 Optimal third-degreepricediscriminationand reciprocity:
Experimental evidence
3.1 Introduction
When is a price fair? A vast strand of empirical literature in marketing research was
dedicated to the determinants of price fairness or unfairness. Kahneman et al. (1986b)
were the first to establish the “dual entitlement” principle: while consumers are entitled
to their reference price, firms also have an entitlement to their reference profit. The
latter implies that it is fair for firms to raise prices following an increase in costs (see
also Bolton et al., 2003, Gielissen et al., 2008, Urbany et al., 1989); however, a firm is
not obliged to lower its price if it faces a decrease in costs (Kahneman et al., 1986a).
Otherwise, if there are no cost fluctuations, the perception of price fairness crucially
depends on the motive of the firm. For instance, consumers see it as unfair if the firm
increases prices to take advantage of an increase in demand (Campbell, 1999, Frey and
Pommerehne, 1993). On the other hand, higher prices might be deemed fair if the
firm engages in charity (Campbell, 1999) or corporate social responsibility (Habel et al.,
2016). Lower prices for students, elderly and poorer agents are also widely accepted
(Gielissen et al., 2008, Wu et al., 2012).
One of the pricing policies that provokes fairness concerns especially strongly is
third-degree price discrimination. Due to the social comparison among the consumers,
third-degree price discrimination in its many forms can be perceived as unfair and even
become detrimental to firm’s profit. A number of survey studies from marketing re-
search detected this phenomenon in various contexts. Huppertz et al. (1978) examined
adverse effects of geographic price discrimination: if an itemwas sold at higher price in
an on-campus store compared to off-campus store prices, students were willing to leave
the store. Darke and Dahl (2003) discovered antagonism to price discrimination in the
formof price discounts. A specific type of discounts, targeting pricing, or offering lower
prices to new or regular customers, has also been observed to affect fairness judgement
and purchase intentions of the customers (Feinberg et al., 2002, Tsai and Hsiao-Ching,
2007, Wang and Krishna, 2012). Various forms of third-degree price discrimination
on the Internet, such as dynamic posted pricing, online couponing, random discount-
ing, price discrimination based on price sensitivity and other Internet-enabled buyer
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identification techniques have also provoked consumer antagonism, questioning the
profitability of these practices (Garbarino andMaxwell, 2010, Grewal et al., 2004, Haws
and Bearden, 2006, Huang et al., 2005, Shor and Oliver, 2006).
Although survey studies deliver valuable insights into the perceptions of fairness of
price discrimination, the generalizability of their results is limited. We tested consumer
antagonism to third-degree price discrimination in a laboratory experiment and esti-
mated the model of price discrimination introduced in Chapter 2. The subjects were
matched into markets of three (two consumers and a firm), and made their respec-
tive choices: firms could choose between price discrimination or a uniform price, and
consumers decided how much to buy from the firm. We had three treatments in our
experiment. In the control group (No Info treatment), consumers learned neither the
price nor the payoff of the other consumer on themarket, thusmaking it optimal for the
firm to choose profit-maximizing price discrimination. The price charged to the other
consumer was made observable in Part Info treatment, designed to trigger reciprocal
responses to differential prices. Finally, in addition to the price, in Full Info treatment
consumers were aware of the other consumer’s payoff. The model in Chapter 2 pre-
dicted negative reciprocal reactions of lower magnitude in this treatment, imitating the
phenomenon of student/elderly discounts. We estimated the parameters of the model
in all three treatments and discussed the optimal pricing choices of the firms.
Contrary to previous experimental studies (Englmaier et al., 2012, Leibbrandt, 2020),
we find no effect of information treatments on consumer behavior. The subjects in the
role of consumers showed no reciprocal reactions to price discrimination and were
on average selfish-rational, with only minor deviations from this benchmark. This
somewhat surprising resultmight be attributed toour experimental design: weused the
strategy method and repeated games in order to get enough data points to structurally
estimate the model. Such an environment might have led our subjects to make more
rational decisions instead of acting emotionally, while it is known that emotions play an
important role in perceived price fairness (Bougie et al., 2003, Campbell, 2007,Wu et al.,
2012). The estimated reciprocity parameters of the model were close to zero, and all
deviations from selfish-rational demandwere absorbed by the error term. Interestingly,
the firms anticipated consumer behavior fairly well. The share of price discriminating
firms ranged between 63 and 71% in different treatments and was not significantly
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different from the best response to actual consumer demands.
Our research adds to the few experimental studies of consumer reactions to third-
degree price discrimination. The earlier laboratory experiment by Englmaier et al.
(2012) showed that consumers buy less that predicted by standard theory if they are
charged a higher price compared to another consumer. The same effect was observed
by Leibbrandt (2020) in a lab experiment, while at the same time consumers increased
their demand in response to lower discriminatory prices. Allender et al. (2020) also
established disadvantaged peer-induced fairness concerns in response to personalized
prices in the lab. Finally, Anderson and Simester (2008) investigated consumer reactions
to higher prices for larger sizes of women’s clothing in a field experiment. They found
that the consumers decreased their demand in response to the price premium, leading
to a decrease in gross profit of the firm.
We also add to the empirical literature searching for optimal price discrimination
schemes. Leslie (2004) was one of the first to quantify the benefits of third-degree price
discrimination in a field experiment, estimating the profit gain from discrimination
to be about 5% relative to uniform pricing. More recent studies estimated the addi-
tional profit associated with personalized pricing on the Internet to be between 10 and
13% (Dubé and Misra, 2017, Shiller, 2020). The consumers in these experiments were
presumably unaware of the price differences, otherwise the estimates could have been
different. In fact, a laboratory experiment by Allender et al. (2020) revealed that sellers
are willing to obfuscate price discrimination to avoid the negative consumer reactions.
Several field studies have focused on consumer antagonism to price variation and report
mixed results (Anderson and Simester, 2010, Courty and Pagliero, 2010, Sonnabend,
2016). In two laboratory experiments similar to our setting, Englmaier et al. (2012) and
Leibbrandt (2020) investigated the attractiveness of third-degree price discrimination
for the subjects in the role of the firms. In their earlier experiment, Englmaier et al.
(2012) found that the theoretically optimal9 price discrimination scheme isworse for the
firm than a a weaker price difference and even uniform pricing. By design, in this ex-
periment the firms did not have a real choice between the different pricing schemes, and
it was not possible to track whether they anticipated optimal prices on their markets.
Leibbrandt (2020) reported that in a similar setting sellers tended to avoid price dis-
9According to the standard approach without social preferences on the side of the consumers.
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crimination; however, its overall attractiveness was partly sustained due to consumers’
positive reciprocal responses to lower discriminatory prices. Neither of the above two
experiments allowed to quantify the exact benefits of price discrimination. Our study
is the first one to estimate the optimal pricing strategy for the firm given the behavioral
attitudes of its consumers, and to observe whether the subjects in the role of the firm
follow this strategy.
The rest of thepaper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces thepredictions of
the model for our experiment. Experimental design is described in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 presents the empirical results, including treatment comparisons and structural
estimation of the model. It is followed by the discussion of the results in Section 3.5,
and Section 3.6 concludes. The theoretical foundations for the hypotheses, instructions
for the experiment, screenshots of the subjects’ computer screens, and the details of our
estimation strategy can be found in Appendix C.
3.2 Hypotheses
The model in Chapter 2 provides several predictions for the behavior of consumers
and firms in our experiment (algebraical proofs of the hypotheses stated in this section
can be found in Appendix C.1). Recall that the experiment consists of three treatments.
In Full Info treatment, consumers know everything about the other market except for
the actual quantity that the other consumer decides to buy. In Part Info treatment,
the information about the other price is available, but the other payoff function is not
revealed. Weassume that in this case γ  1 since theotherpayoff isunknownandcannot
play a role for decision making. InNo Info treatment, consumers learn neither the price
nor the payoff of the other consumer. We assume that in this treatment the reciprocity
parameters ρi are equal to zero for both consumers, as if they behaved completely
selfish-rationally. We acknowledge that these assumptions on the parameters might be
restrictive, however, they are the only plausible assumptions within the framework of
the model.
In all treatments in our experiment, the firm cannot set the prices arbitrarily, but
has a choice between two options instead: either to set a uniform price pUNI for both
consumers or to set two different prices (pPD1 , p
PD
2 ) – a higher price for consumer 1
and a lower price for consumer 2. Each of the two pricing schemes is optimal given
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the standard selfish-rational preferences and the size of the smaller market a2. More














For optimal price and demand functions to satisfy the properties claimed in this
section, the market size parameter a2 was drawn from [0.5, 1) in the experiment. Let
us now explore what treatment differences the model predicts.
Hypothesis 3.1. When the firm practices price discrimination, the average demand of
consumer 1 in Part Info treatment is lower than in both No Info and Full Info treatment.
The average demand of consumer 1 in Full Info treatment is lower than in No Info
treatment if the consumers are selfish enough in forming their reference point:
qPD1 (Part In f o) ≤ q
PD
1 (Full In f o) ≤ q
PD




In the price discrimination scheme available in the experiment, the price for con-
sumer 1 is always higher than the price for consumer 2. It triggers negative reciprocity
on the side of the first consumer. In Part Info treatment he learns that his price is
higher and he could get a better payoff with the other lower price, so he punishes the
firm by lowering his demand in comparison to No Info treatment rational benchmark.
This difference increases in the magnitude of his reciprocal preferences represented
by parameter ρ1; if an average ρ1  0, we would observe no treatment effect. In Full
Info treatment the first consumer additionally learns that the payoff of the second con-
sumer is low. If he cares at least a bit about the other consumer’s well-being (reflected
in parameter γ), the magnitude of his reciprocal reaction would shrink and thus the
demand would be higher in comparison to Part Info treatment. If γ  1, consumer 1
would not care about the lower payoff of consumer 2, and we would not observe this
treatment difference. Finally, let us compare the behavior of the first consumer in Full
Info and No Info treatments. When given complete information, on the one hand, he
might be angry about the lower payoff that he gets with his higher price. On the other
hand, he might feel satisfied because he is aware that the other consumer gets a lower
payoff even when given a lower price. If consumer 1 cares about the other payoff a
lot, he could even reciprocate positively towards the firm and increase his demand in
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comparison to No Info treatment. Otherwise, if he pays enough attention to his own
payoff (γ ≥ 14−a2 ), the demand in Full Info treatment will be lower than in No Info treat-
ment. The difference between Full Info and No Info treatments is again powered by the
magnitude of reciprocal preferences; if consumers tend to be selfish-rational, we would
observe no treatment effect.
Hypothesis 3.2. When the firm practices price discrimination, the average demand of
consumer 2 in Part Info treatment is higher than in both No Info and Full Info treatment.
The average demand of consumer 2 in Full Info treatment is higher than in No Info
treatment if the consumers are selfish enough in forming their reference point:
qPD2 (No In f o) ≤ q
PD
2 (Full In f o) ≤ q
PD




This hypothesis represents analogical reasoning behind the behavior of consumer
2, who is triggered to engage in positive reciprocity when given a lower price. As
before, theoretically it might happen that his demand in Full Info treatment is lower
than in No Info treatment: if he thinks about the other consumer’s higher payoff a lot,
he might want to punish the firm even though it is not the firm’s fault. However, if
consumer 2 pays more attention to his own payoff (γ ≥ a24a2−1 ) or, in other words, the
price comparison is more salient to him than the payoff comparison, his demand in Full
Info treatment should be higher than inNo Info treatment. Treatment effects would also
exist only if consumer 2 has any preference for reciprocity, or ρ2 > 0.
Hypothesis 3.3. When the firm chooses a uniform price, there is no difference between
the average demands of consumer 1 in Part Info and No Info treatments. The average
demand of consumer 1 in Full Info treatment is higher than in Part Info and No Info
treatments:
qUNI1 (No In f o)  q
UNI
1 (Part In f o) ≤ q
UNI
1 (Full In f o).
Hypothesis 3.4. When the firm chooses a uniform price, there is no difference between
the average demands of consumer 2 in Part Info and No Info treatments. The average
demand of consumer 2 in Full Info treatment is lower than in Part Info and No Info
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treatments:
qUNI2 (Full In f o) ≤ q
UNI
2 (Part In f o)  q
UNI
2 (No In f o).
If the firm decides to set the same price on both markets, it would not provoke
reciprocity in the absence of the information about the payoffs. Thus, the demands of
both consumers should not differ between Part Info and No Info treatments. However,
the model predicts that alone the information about the other consumer’s payoff in
Full Info treatment might trigger a response even in the absence of difference in prices.
Consumer 1 has a higher payoff and therefore might feel advantaged, rewarding the
firm with a higher demand; and vice versa for consumer 2. The size of this effect
depends on how much consumers care about each other’s payoffs. If γ  1, there
would be no treatment differences whatsoever. However, if any difference is observed,
we would not expect it to be large since the firm is not responsible for the difference in
consumer payoffs, and consumers would probably anticipate it.
Hypothesis 3.5. The share of the firms that prefer price discrimination over uniform
pricing in Part Info treatment is lower or equal to that in Full Info treatment. The share




(Part In f o) ≤
NPD
N
(Full In f o) ≤
NPD
N
(No In f o).
We expect the firms to anticipate the potential reciprocal reactions of the consumers
and adjust their pricing strategies accordingly. The model predicts no consumer reac-
tion to price discrimination inNo Info treatment, thereby all rational firms would prefer
it over the uniform pricing, and the expected rates of price discrimination would be
highest in this treatment. Due to reciprocal reactions in Part Info treatment, price dis-
criminating firms can expect lower demands on the firstmarket and higher demands on
the second market. If we assume that consumer 1 has stronger reciprocal preferences
(ρ1 > ρ2), the effect of negative reciprocity will prevail, and thus price discrimination
will be strictly less profitable in Part Info treatment than in No Info treatment. This
assumption is warranted since previous studies have found that negative reciprocity is
(at least weakly) stronger than positive reciprocity (see, for instance, Al-Ubaydli et al.,
46
2010, Baumeister et al., 2001, Ordóñez et al., 2000).
In Full Info treatment, available information about the payoff of the other consumer
mitigates their reciprocal reaction to price discrimination. If consumers pay at least
some attention to the other payoff (γ < 1), price discrimination would turn out more
profitable for the firm than in Part Info treatment, all else being equal.
Finally, themodel delivers no clear statement about the difference in the profitability
of price discrimination in Full Info versus No Info treatment. While negative reciprocity
on the first market decreases attractiveness of price discrimination, positive reciprocity
on the second market and potential altruism on the first market increases its attractive-
ness. Which of these effects beats the others, is an empirical question. However, note
that the frequency of price discrimination in Full Info treatment can be at most equal to
that in No Info treatment since the latter is equal to 1.
3.3 Experimental design
Our laboratory experiment modelled a monopolistic market with a possibility of
third-degree price discrimination. In the beginning of the experiment, each subject was
randomly assigned one of the three roles: consumer 1, consumer 2 or a firm. This role
was retained until the end of the experiment. Subjects interacted on markets of three
consisting of a consumer 1, a consumer 2 and a firm.
As the reader already knows, the experiment had three treatment variations. In No
Info treatment, the subjects in the role of consumers did not have any information about
the other consumer on theirmarket. InPart Info treatment, prior tomaking the decision,
the consumers learned the price that the firm could set for the other consumer. In Full
Info treatment, the consumers were aware of both the price and the payoff function of
the other consumer on the market. Each subject participated in only one treatment.
Before the beginning of the experiment, subjects received paper-based instructions,
which were the same for everyone within each treatment (instructions can be found
in Appendix C.2). They were followed by on-screen instructions providing a detailed
description of the screen at the moment of making the decision. The on-screen instruc-
tions were specific for each role; for the appearance of the screens, refer to Appendix
C.3. When all subjects were finishedwith the on-screen instructions, they started a trial
period of market interaction. The structure of this period was identical to the market
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interaction in the main part of the experiment and served the purpose of familiarizing
the subjects with the decision making environment. There was in fact no interaction
between the subjects in the trial period since the decisions of the other two market par-
ticipants were randomly generated for each subject. The payoff earned in this period
was not relevant for payment in the experiment.
After the trial period, the main part of the experiment began. It consisted of 20 re-
peated periods ofmarket interaction. In every period, subjects in the role of consumer 1
and consumer 2 decided howmuch of a virtual good they wanted to buy from the firm
on their current market. The subjects in the role of a firm chose one of the two available
price pairs that they could charge the consumers on their market. The decisions were
made simultaneously. The detailed procedure is described below.
Decision of the consumers. Each consumer was imposed a payoff function that
determined his potential earnings in the experiment. The payoff functions were given
by the following formulas:
u1  max
{





100a2q2 − 0.5a2q21 − p2q2, 0
}
,
rounded to thenext integer,where q1 and q2 are thequantities consumer 1 andconsumer
2 buy from the firm. The payoffs were presented to the subjects in table form (see
Appendix C.3). Consumers could pick the quantities from 0 to 80 with a step of 5.
The market size parameter a2 was randomly drawn from [0.5, 1). We used the strategy
method and asked the consumers to make their purchasing decision for both prices
that the firm could currently charge them.
On his decision screen, each consumer had two tables corresponding to his payoffs
depending on his demand quantities 0, 5, ..., 80 and the two prices the firm could set
for him.
- In No Info treatment, this was the only information available.
- In Part Info treatment, the two prices that the other consumer could get, were also
displayed on the screen.
- In Full Info treatment, in addition to the prices of the other consumer, his payoff
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tables were visible on the screen.
Both consumers were aware of the payoff structure of the firm.
Decision of the firm. Every firm chose a price pair (p1, p2) from two available
options. These options correspond to the optimal uniform price and the optimal price




















all prices rounded up to the next integer. Depending on the quantities the consumers
actually decided to buy for these prices, the payoff of the firm was determined by the
sum of the expenses of both consumers:
π  p1q1 + p2q2.
When making the decision, the firm observed four payoff tables on its screen, corre-
sponding to the two consumers on the market and the two pricing schemes the firm
could choose from. An assisting calculator for estimating the profit was also available
on the screen.
Feedback. When all three market participants made their decisions, the payoffs
were calculated and a short feedback was provided. On the feedback screen, con-
sumers saw which price the firm decided to charge them and what their own resulting
payoff is (the respective entry in their own payoff table given their chosen quantity).
They learned neither howmuch the other consumer on themarket decided to purchase
nor how much he earned. The firm learned the consumer quantities for the price
scheme it chose, and the resulting profit. It did not learn how much the consumers
would have bought if the other price pair was chosen.
After one period had ended, a new period began with the same rules. The roles
of the subjects remained unchanged. The payoff function of consumer 1 stayed the
same throughout the experiment. The parameter a2 was randomly drawn in every
new period, so the payoff of consumer 2 and the prices changed accordingly. By
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construction, the payoff of consumer 1 was always higher than the payoff of consumer
2, given the same prices and quantities. Respectively, pPD2 < p
UNI < pPD1 . The markets
were randomly rematched within matching groups of 12 subjects (stranger matching
protocol). There were 20 identical periods in the experiment, only one of them being
relevant for payoff to avoid income effects. The period to be paid out was randomly
chosen in the end of the experiment. The subjects were aware of this procedure as it
was explained in the paper-based instructions.
In the end of the final period, we elicited the beliefs about other prices and payoffs
on the market in that period. Finally, the experiment was completed with a short ques-
tionnaire on sociodemographic characteristics, current major, some school outcomes,
mood during the experiment, the experience of participating in economic experiments,
etc.
The experiment was conducted in May and June, 2018 at the economic laboratory
MELESSA (Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences) at
the University of Munich, Germany. The experiment was computerized using zTree
software (Fischbacher, 2007). We conducted 4 sessions in each treatment, with 24
subjects each. Thus, we had 288 participants in 12 sessions, mostly undergraduate
students at the University of Munich. The sessions lasted around 90 minutes, and the
average earnings amounted to 20.8 Euros including 6 Euros show-up fee.
3.4 Data analysis
3.4.1 Treatment effects
We start our analysis by comparing the behavior of consumers and firms across
different treatments. Our claims are supported by nonparametric statistical tests, which
were carried out on the data collapsed on matching group level. Thus, there were 8
independent observations in each treatment and 24 independent observations in total.10
Result 3.1. When facing a higher price than the other consumer, the subjects in the role
of consumer 1 purchased approximately the same amount of the virtual good in all
10Due to a technical error, in one session in No Info treatment subjects saw on-screen instructions two
times. The instructions were type-specific, and some subjects happened to receive the instructions for
two different types of players. These subjects could have inferred something about the other market
participants. Whenwe exclude this session from the analysis (2 independent observations), the outcomes
of the statistical tests remained unchanged.
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(b) Demand of consumer 2 given pPD2 .
Figure 3.1: Consumer demands under price discrimination across the three treatments.
The black line corresponds to the demand as predicted by standard theory.
We expected that our treatment variations would trigger antagonism to price di-
crimination on the side of consumer 1 (see Hypothesis 3.1), but there is no treatment
difference to support this hypothesis. We observe neither a reaction to the revelation
of the other price nor a reaction to the information about the other consumer’s payoff.
The average demand of consumer 1 is depicted in Figure 3.1a.
Note that the demand in all three treatments was significantly lower than the stan-
dard theoretical prediction in the absence of other-regarding preferences (Wilcoxon
signed rank test; p  0.0355, p  0.0117 and p  0.0117 in No Info, Part Info and Full Info
treatments, respectively). The disadvantaged consumers lowered their demand equally
strong in all three treatments – a somewhat surprising result forNo Info treatmentwhere
the other price on the market was not revealed.
Result 3.2. When facing a lower price than the other consumer, the subjects in the role
of consumer 2 purchased approximately the same amount of the virtual good in all
three treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test; p  0.5257).
Our expectation that price discrimination would provoke positive reciprocity in
consumer 2 was not met either: his demand at a lower price was the same across
the treatments (see Figure 3.1b). Moreover, the demand in all three treatments was
not different from what the standard approach predicts (Wilcoxon signed rank test;
p  0.7765, p  0.3264 and p  0.8885). Consumers with lower payoff thus did not
seem to be willing to reward the firm for setting a lower price.
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Result 3.3. The demand of consumer 1 was lower in Full Info than in Part Info treatment
when the price was the same for both consumers (Mann-Whitney U Test; p  0.0352).
We find no other treatment differences in purchasing behavior of consumer 1 under
uniform pricing (Mann-Whitney U Test; No Info vs. Part Info p  0.5984, No Info vs. Full












































(b) Demand of consumer 2 given pUNI .
Figure 3.2: Consumer demands under uniformpricing across the three treatments. The
black line corresponds to the demand as predicted by standard theory.
Hypothesis 3.3 stated that, if any, the difference between the demand of consumer
1 in Full Info treatment and other treatments should be positive since he might perceive
his relatively high payoff as an advantage attributable to the firm. However, we observe
an opposite effect: the provision of additional information about the second consumer’s
payoff had a negative effect on the first consumer’s demand.
The demand of consumer 1 is higher than the rational benchmark in Part info treat-
ment (Wilcoxon signed rank test; p  0.0497), but not in the other treatments (No Info
p  0.3270, Full Info p  0.4008). The average demands are presented in Figure 3.2a.
Result 3.4. The demand of consumer 2 was the same in all three treatments when he
got the same price as the other consumer (Kruskal-Wallis test; p  0.3090).
In line with Hypothesis 3.4, provision of additional information does not have an
effect on the demand of consumer 2 under uniform pricing.
Interestingly, consumer 2 purchased less than predicted by standard preferences in
Part info and Full info treatments (Wilcoxon signed rank test; p  0.0173, p  0.0207).
In the treatments with at least some information about consumer 1, uniform pricing
has provoked a significant negative response by consumer 2. In No Info treatment, the
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demand was also lower than rational, but not significantly so (p  0.1824; see Figure
3.2b).
Result 3.5. The share of the firms practicing price discrimination was not significantly




















Figure 3.3: Share of price discriminating firms across the three treatments. The gray
bars correspond to the actual frequencies of price discrimination, the blue ones – to the
expected optimal frequencies given actual consumer demands on each market.
Recall that under standard assumptions about consumer preferences it is always
rational for the firm to engage in price discrimination. While we observe no differ-
ences in price discrimination rates across treatments, in all treatments its prevalence
is significantly lower than 100% (Wilcoxon signed rank test; p  0.0117, p  0.0115
and p  0.0116). Is this behavior optimal given the preferences of the consumers in
the experiment? We calculated the optimal response of the firms to the demand of the
consumers on every market and plotted it along with the actual frequencies of price
discrimination in Figure 3.3. The actual behavior of the firms is not significantly dif-
ferent from the optimal behavior in any of the treatments (Wilcoxon signed rank test;
p  0.5754, p  0.0929 and p  0.6744), suggesting that the firms anticipated consumer
reactions fairly well.
Finally, we check whether our findings are robust to regression analysis with addi-
tional control variables from our experiment. The dependent variables in our models
included the demands of both consumers under both pricing schemes as well as the
binary firm’s choice. As explanatory variables we selected treatment dummies, the
market size parameter a2, current period in the experiment and the following self-
reported characteristics from the questionnaire: gender, age, math grade in school,
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understanding of the experimental rules, major and mood during the experiment. The
results are reported in Table 3.1.
First, the regression coefficients are consistent with the outcomes of the comparison
tests reported earlier in this section. Weobserve no treatment differences in the behavior
of consumers and firms, apart from the demand of consumer 1 at the uniform price:
it is lower in Full Info treatment than in both No Info and Part Info treatments (models
3 and 4 in Table 3.1). This observation is also consistent with Result 3.3, although
the nonparametric comparison between Full Info and No Info did not reach statistical
significance probably due to the small amount of independent observations.
Second, let us examine the effect of the market size parameter a2 on the demands
of both consumers. If the consumers were completely selfish and rational, they both
would buy 50 units at the discriminatory price regardless of the size of the second
market. The demand of consumer 2 at a lower price indeed does not depend on a2; we
also observed in Result 3.2 that his demandwas not different from the standard rational
benchmark in all three treatments. However, this is not the case for consumer 1 when
he faces a higher price: his demand increases in a2. When a2 is lower, the difference
in prices becomes more pronounced, thus consumer 1 is more likely to punish the
firm by lowering his demand. Remarkably, this relationship is observed also in No Info
treatment, where the consumers were not informed about the other market at all. It is
in line with our observation that in all treatments the demand of consumer 1 was lower
than the standard prediction (see Result 3.1). Now consider the relationship between
themarket size a2 and thedemands at theuniformprice. Theuniformprice is increasing
in a2. In the absence of other-regarding preferences, the demand of consumer 1 would
therefore decrease in a2, while the demand of consumer 2 would increase in a2. We
can see in Table 3.1 (models 3-5) that this relationship holds. The effect is quite strong,
suggesting that the subjects were fairly rational when making these decisions. The
magnitude of the effect is weaker for consumer 1 in Full Info treatment – in line with
Result 3.3.
In addition, the size of the second market affects the probability of the firm to
choose price discrimination. While it should not be the case in the absence of so-
cial preferences, in our experiment firms often preferred uniform pricing over price
discrimination. Model 6 in Table 3.1 shows that the probability to engage in price
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Table 3.1: Consumer demands and firms’ pricing
q1pd q2pd q1uni q1uni q2uni firmpd
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
partinfo -2.387 1.300 2.578 -3.075 0.737
(3.542) (2.053) (2.538) (2.431) (1.095)
fullinfo -7.240∗ 2.206 -8.620∗∗ -11.20∗∗∗ -1.483 0.965
(4.257) (2.702) (3.964) (3.630) (2.376) (1.004)
noinfo -2.578
(2.538)
a 3.670∗∗ 0.000274 -33.26∗∗∗ -36.59∗∗∗ 33.88∗∗∗ -3.109∗∗∗
(1.492) (1.823) (2.180) (1.817) (0.698) (0.939)
partinfo*a 1.792 -0.575 -3.332 2.789 -1.000
(3.896) (2.255) (2.841) (2.765) (1.397)
fullinfo*a 8.834∗ -2.458 9.059∗∗ 12.39∗∗∗ 0.304 -1.596
(4.518) (2.894) (4.237) (3.997) (2.802) (1.266)
noinfo*a 3.332
(2.841)
period 0.0443 0.0706∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ -0.0359 0.0362∗∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0304) (0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0351) (0.0106)
male -0.670 2.314∗∗∗ 1.310 1.310 -1.645 0.303
(0.920) (0.550) (0.859) (0.859) (1.068) (0.301)
age -0.0265 -0.0238 -0.142∗∗ -0.142∗∗ 0.0757 -0.0580∗
(0.0752) (0.0363) (0.0685) (0.0685) (0.0482) (0.0335)
mathgrade 0.108 -0.128 0.907∗ 0.907∗ -1.081∗∗ -0.0426
(0.319) (0.351) (0.518) (0.518) (0.490) (0.128)
understanding 1.481∗ 0.660∗ -0.725 -0.725 -0.0499 0.489∗
(0.874) (0.345) (0.801) (0.801) (0.631) (0.250)
experience -0.322 -0.549 0.571 0.571 0.355 0.267∗
(0.503) (0.377) (0.355) (0.355) (0.704) (0.143)
major_econ -1.143 0.307 0.335 0.335 -1.069 -0.184
(1.416) (0.711) (0.739) (0.739) (1.278) (0.378)
mood_exp 1.061∗ 0.464 -0.680 -0.680 0.165 0.131
(0.618) (0.422) (0.459) (0.459) (0.766) (0.142)
Constant 41.31∗∗∗ 48.38∗∗∗ 82.35∗∗∗ 84.93∗∗∗ 16.81∗∗∗ 2.500∗
(3.278) (2.309) (3.643) (3.437) (2.356) (1.295)
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.0454 0.0712 0.320 0.320 0.297
Panel regressions with random effects (models 1-5: OLS; model 6: logit).
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (matching group level).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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discrimination decreases in a2. Given that consumers on the first market were averse
to price discrimination to some extent in all treatments, this effect could overweigh the
benefits of discrimination when the markets are too close.
Finally, some of the control variables are correlated to the decisions of our subjects.
We find learning effects in some of the situations: namely, first consumers increased
their demands at the uniform price over time (models 3, 4), second consumers in-
creased their demands at the lower price, and firms discriminatedmore frequently – all
pointing towards the standard rational benchmark. We also considered math grade in
school, understanding of the rules of the game, previous experience of participating in
economic experiments and being enrolled in either a business or an economics program
as proxies for rational behavior. None of them mattered consistently, apart from the
understanding of the rules being marginally significant for some choices.
3.4.2 Estimation of the model
We gained important insights into the behavior of our subjects by using non-
parametric comparison tests and regression analysis earlier in this section. Non-
parametric comparisons lacked power though, and regressions assumed a linear re-
lationship between outcome variables and explanatory variables. Now we are going
to estimate our structural model and explore the decisions of consumers and firms in
further depth.
To account for any observed behavior not captured by the model, we add an error
term to consumer preferences:11
Uεi (qi , pi , p j , εi)  ui (qi , pi) +
(
ρi∆i (pi , p j , γi) + εi
)
piqi . (2)
The error termallows for deviations from rational behavior that are not explained by the
model (for instance, inequality aversion towards the firm). If εi is negative, consumer
i is willing to buy less than the model predicts; if positive, his demand would be
higher. We assume that εi is normally distributed with mean αi and variance σ2i .
The assumption about the parameter γ being the same for both consumers is relaxed,
11In equation 1 the reciprocation term is defined as the difference between the firm’s actual profit and
its profit given the consumer’s payoff-maximizing demand. Since the latter term does not depend on the
actual purchased quantity, it does not matter for the consumer’s maximization problem. For simplicity,
we drop it hereafter from the utility function.
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allowing for different individual levels γi .
The estimation procedure finds the error mean αi , its variance σ2i , the reciprocity
parameter ρi and the “selfishness” weight γi that maximize the log likelihood func-
tion ln Li (pi , p j , αi , σi , ρi , γi) 
∑40
k1 lnPr[qik  q |pi , p j , αi , σi , ρi , γi] for the observed
choices of consumer i in 20 periods for each of the price pairs (pi , p j). The detailed
estimation procedure is described in Appendix C.4. We continue to assume that in Part
Info treatment subjects were completely selfish in forming their reference point and
γ  1, leaving us with three parameters to estimate for each consumer. On top of that,
in No Info treatment we assume that the reciprocity parameters are equal to zero and
estimate only the mean and the variance of the error term.
The parameters estimated for each individual consumer are plotted in Figures 3.4,
3.5 and 3.6.

























Figure 3.4: The distributions of individual maximum likelihood estimates of the error
mean α across consumer types and treatments.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the distributions of the parameters associated with the
error term εi . We observe in Figure 3.4 that in all treatments for all consumer types
the error mean α has its mode at zero, but the distributions tend to be negatively
skewed. The standard deviation of the error term is presented in Figure 3.5. There is
nonnegligible variance of the individual consumer choices, potentially associated with
learning. The error is more centered around zero and less dispersed in the No Info
treatment, meaning that the information treatments added more noise to the choices,
which cannot be explained by the model.
Figure 3.6 shows the individual estimates of the fairness parameters. The reciprocity
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Figure 3.5: The distributions of individual maximum likelihood estimates of the stan-
dard deviation of the error σ across consumer types and treatments.





















































(b) “Selfishness” parameter γ.
Figure 3.6: The distributions of individual maximum likelihood estimates of ρ and γ
across consumer types and treatments.
parameter ρ is very close to zero for all subjects in the information treatments. It is
more dispersed in Part Info treatment than in Full Info treatment. For those subjects
with positive ρ in Full Info treatment, we could estimate theweight γ put on consumer’s
own payoff in his reference point. Two thirds of those subjects in the role of consumer
1 had γ  1, thus focusing solely on their own payoff they could get at the lower price
(see Figure 3.6b). For the rest of the consumers on the first market γwas approximately
equal to zero, putting the whole weight on the lower payoff of the other consumer. The
distribution of γ among the subjects in the role of consumer 2 is similar: there are no
interior values of the weights; however, there are slightly more subjects concernedwith
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the payoff of the other consumer on the market.
Furthermore, we pooled the data to evaluate the average parameters for each con-
sumer type across different treatments. We had 32 subjects in each treatment in each
role, making decisions for two pricing schemes in 20 periods, with a total of 1280
observations per cell. Maximum likelihood estimates are presented in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Estimated parameters of the structural model
treatment consumer α σ ρ γ




Part Info 1 0.0044 0.1745 0.0001
(0.0063) (0.0036) (0.0000)
2 -0.0399 0.1223 0.0001
(0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0000)
Full Info 1 -0.0581 0.2373 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0000) (.)
2 -0.0422 0.1547 0.0001 0.9175
(0.0097) (0.0032) (0.0000) (0.0967)
The average error mean α has small values, all negative except for the average
consumer 1 in Part Info treatment. The error was closer to 0 and less dispersed (smaller
σ values) for consumer 2 in all treatments. The reciprocity parameter ρ was very close
to 0 in all information treatments. Due to its very small value for consumer 1 in Full Info
treatment, the respective weight γ could not be identified. For consumer 2, γ was close
to 1, thus making the subjects primarily concerned with their own potential payoff as
their reference point. All in all, the results of the estimation suggest that the consumers
were behaving very close to the rational benchmark in our experiment, more so in the
role of consumer 2. Any deviations we observe cannot be explained by reciprocity in
the framework of the model, but are rather captured by the error term.
3.5 Discussion
Weobserved that, contrary to our expectations, information treatments didnot affect
the behavior of consumers in our experiment. They acted very close to the predictions
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of the standard theory; in some situations consumers did deviate from the rational
benchmark and tended to buy less, but it could not be explained by our reciprocity
model. Why did we fail to replicate the finding that third-degree price discrimination
can trigger reciprocal reactions?
First, our calibration of the model in the experiment often led to large differences
between the consumer’s and the firm’s payoffs. Consumer 1 always earned less than
the firm under price discrimination and the majority of uniform prices (in some cases,
if the secondmarket was small, he could earnmore with a uniform price than the firm).
Consumer 2 always earned less than the firm, in some rounds much less if the size
of his market was calibrated to be small. The average earnings from the experiment
are laid out in Figure 3.7. This inequality was perceived as unfair by some of the
subjects: when we asked for informal feedback in the questionnaire at the end of the
experiment, roughly 12% of the consumers complained that they were treated unfairly
in comparison to the firms. It could have shifted the focus from horizontal comparison
between buyers’ payoffs to vertical comparison between the seller and the buyer. This






















Figure 3.7: Average earnings in the experiment (in experimental currency units)
Thus, we could speculate that inequality averse preferences (for instance, Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999) account for our results. However, at this point we should recall the
difference in average demands in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Consumer 1 bought less than
predicted by the standard approach in all treatments when facing a higher discrimina-
tory price, but behaved perfectly in linewith standard predictionswhen given the same
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price. This could still be in line with inequality aversion for very small uniform prices;
however, with an average uniform price consumer 1 earned less than the firm. Thus,
his average demand at uniform prices should have been lower than selfish-rational,
but it was not the case. Moreover, if consumers acted only out of inequality aversion
towards the firm, the demand of consumer 2 at each price would be lower than the
rational benchmark. This is not the case: consumer 2 bought less for a uniform price,
butwas selfish-rationalwith a lower price. This observation contradicts pure inequality
aversion since the gap between the payoffs of consumer 2 and the firm was still large
under price discrimination, so an inequality averse consumer 2 would be willing to
reduce it.
A different choice of the reference point could be another potential explanation for
the observed consumer behavior. Themodelwe applied assumed that consumersmake
self/other comparisons, i.e. compare their own prices to those of the other consumer
on the market within each pricing scheme. For instance, when consumer 1 decides how
much to buy at a higher discriminatory price, the lower price of consumer 2 serves as a
reference point for him. Analogously, the reference point for the demand of consumer
1 at the uniform price is this price itself. However, consumers could well compare
their own prices between pricing schemes (self/self comparisons): i.e. when consumer
1 buys at a discriminatory price, he considers his own potential uniform price as the
reference point. In turn, his discriminatory price could be the reference point for his
demand at the uniform price.
Although self/other comparisons are considered to have a greater effect on per-
ceived price unfairness in the literature (Xia et al., 2004), self/self comparisons were
unintentionallymade salient in our experiment. Sincewe used the strategymethod, the
consumers made their decisions for two different prices on one screen (see Appendix
C.3). Shifting the reference point to one’s own price in combination with reciprocal
preferences could explain average demands of the consumers (refer back to Figures 3.1
and 3.2): consumer 1 punished the firm for price discrimination since his price was
higher than the uniform price, but behaved selfish-rationally under uniform pricing.
Respectively, consumer 2 punished the firm for the uniform price since he could get a
lower one under price discrimination, and behaved rationally when he got this lower
price. The difference between own prices was equally salient in all treatments. It could
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potentially explain why consumer 1 punished the firm even in No Info treatment. An-
other piece of suggestive evidence can be taken from the regression analysis in Table
3.1: the model in column (1) shows that the demand of consumer 1 at the discrimina-
tory price depends on the size of the second market a2 in all treatments, including No
Info. Neither the standard approach nor the model we used predicts that this demand
should depend on a2 inNo Info treatment. The fact that it does suggests that the uniform
price, being the only piece of information about the other market in No Info treatment,
did affect the demand of consumer 1 at the discriminatory price.
Finally, one feature of our experimental designwas the duration and the complexity
of the experiment. While thedecisionwas relatively easy for the consumers, the subjects
in the role of the firm took more time to figure out the their pricing strategies, this
leading to longer waiting times between rounds for the consumers. The decisions were
made repeatedly for 20 rounds, the instructions and payoff structures were relatively
complex, andmany consumers had to wait between rounds – it all made roughly 13.5%
of our subjects complain in the questionnaire that the experiment was long, repetitive
and boring. Admittedly, it was not the best environment for emotional choices like an
angry reaction to a higher price. It likely contributed to the consumer choices being
very close to the rational benchmark.
3.6 Conclusion
We tested the predictions of the model in Chapter 2 in a laboratory experiment with
three treatments varying the amount of information consumers possess about each
other. Contrary to previous empirical studies, we were not able to replicate consumer
antagonism to price discrimination. The subjects in the role of consumers displayed
very little deviations from selfish-rational behavior, and the respective optimal pricing
choices were anticipated by the subjects in the role of the firms.
Wechose to employ the strategymethodand repeated interactions in our experiment
in order to estimate the parameters of the model on every single market, and thus to
be able to arrive at the optimal pricing strategy for every firm. Unfortunately, this
design choice came at a cost of not finding consumer resistance to price discrimination.
It raises the question of whether it is possible for the researchers to estimate optimal
third-degree price discrimination at the level of individual firms without distorting
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consumer reactions to it. First, distributional fairness between the consumers and the
firms seemed to play a role in shaping our results, despite our efforts to make it as non-
salient as possible. It is not clear to what extent this consideration extrapolates to the
real markets, but researchers should be aware of it at least in the laboratory. Second,
our experimental design might have induced the consumers to act more rationally.
Using direct response instead of the strategy method could provoke more emotional
purchasing decisions at the cost of less data at the individual level. Third, along
with the strategy method, we in fact practiced dynamic pricing in our experiment by
repeating the market interactions, potentially contributing to the relative salience of
self/self price comparisons. It delivers an important insight for the firmswho intend to
estimate the demands of their consumers with the help of dynamic pricing and practice
price discrimination at the same time.
Despite the observed rationality of the subjects in our experiment, our approach
made another step towards understanding optimal pricing with behavioral constraints.
It is left for future research to explore how fairness concerns of the consumers impact the
profitability of other pricing practices. For instance, second-degree price discrimination
and auctions are also widespread ways to redistribute consumer surplus, while they
might be perceived as fair since the consumer has more influence on the price he gets
compared to third-degree price discrimination. An empirical investigation of consumer
reactions to different pricing practices would contribute to our understanding of the
firm’s choices between them.
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4 The determinants of gender bias in student evaluations
of teaching
4.1 Introduction
It has been long known that women fare worse economic outcomes than men on
multiple dimensions. The gender pay gap, albeit having decreased over the past
years, is estimated to be about 20% in the US (Blau and Kahn, 2017). Between 20
and 30% of all senior management positions globally were held by women in the
past decade.12 Among many other factors contributing to the observed disparities,
gender-based discrimination has been offered as an explanation by a broad spectrum
of studies. Research has investigated the gender bias against women in employment
decisions (Goldin and Rouse, 2000, Neumark et al., 1996), product markets (Ayres
and Siegelman, 1995, List, 2004) and politics (Eyméoud and Vertier, 2017). Extensive
reviews of experimental literature on gender discrimination can be found elsewhere
(Riach and Rich, 2002, Rich, 2014, Bertrand and Duflo, 2017, Neumark, 2018).
One particularly persistent example of the gender gap concerns the position of
female faculty in academia. Being a woman is associated with decreased academic
rank both in Europe and the United States. In the USmen outearn women in all faculty
ranks. The current gender pay gap constitutes almost 20% and has not budged over
the last ten years.13, 14 Women are less likely to get tenure (Weisshaar, 2017), apply for
and receive fewer research grants (Ley and Hamilton, 2008, van der Lee and Ellemers,
2015) and publish fewer papers (Jagsi et al., 2006, Larivière et al., 2013, West et al.,
2013). Besides possible differences in the productivity and inherent preferences to
work in the competitive environment of the academia, one potential factor contributing
to the gender disparities is the gender bias observed in student evaluations of teaching
(SET). The evaluations are widely used in hiring and promotion decisions and thus
indirectly affect future academic career. Female faculty has consistently been evaluated
12Grant Thornton, Women in Business: Building a Blueprint for Action (2019). Ac-
cessed at https://www.grantthornton.global/en/insights/women-in-business-2019/women-in-
business-report-2019/ on 24-07-2020.
13American Association of University Professors, The Annual Report on the Economic Status of the
Profession, 2019–20. Accessed at https://www.aaup.org/report/annual-report-economic-status-
profession-2019-20 on 27-07-2020.
14European Commission, She Figures 2018. Accessed at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/
she-figures-2018_en on 27-07-2020.
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worse than their male colleagues, observed both in university SET (Wagner et al., 2016,
Fan et al., 2019, Funk et al., 2019) and online evaluations (Arceo-Gomez and Campos-
Vazquez, 2019,Rosen, 2018). Two recent studies byBoring (2017) andMengel et al. (2019)
found a robust gender penalty in student evaluations of teaching, primarily driven by
male students, sustained after controlling formeasures of teaching effectiveness such as
student grades and self-study hours. This fact combined with women’s responsiveness
to student feedback (Buurman et al., 2018) might explain whywomen spendmore time
on teaching activities and less on research (see Santos and Dang Van Phu, 2019), in
turn, impeding their own success in academia.
Is it pure discrimination that drives the observed gender differences in SET, or are
there underlying differences in teaching unobserved by the researcher? We attempt to
answer this question by proposing a laboratory experiment, which varies the gender of
the instructor exogenously andminimizes the differences in teaching style, allowing us
to inferwhether thediscrepancy in evaluations stems fromdiscrimination. The teachers
in our experimentwillmake a video lecture consisting of a short self-introductory video
and narrated slides, following the approach by Chisadza et al. (2019). On top of that,
we exogenously vary the quality of the lecture to see how evaluations respond to it
depending on the gender of the teacher. Additionally, as a way to overcome potential
gender bias in SET, we propose a subtle intervention that communicates the effect
of evaluations on the teacher’s well-being to the students. The teachers will have
the possibility to earn a monetary prize based on the student evaluations from the
experiment. This possibility will be either not mentioned or explicitly stated to the
students before they proceed to the evaluations. Finally, in the controlled laboratory
environment we will be able to measure the students’ attention to the lecture and the
evaluations and observe whether this channel contributes to gender bias in SET.
First, our study will contribute to the experimental literature trying to identify the
gender bias attributable to discrimination in SET. While field data is essentially impor-
tant for policy-making, it is not possible to disentangle discrimination from unobserv-
able differences in teaching quality and/or style in observational data. The famous
experiment by MacNell et al. (2015) manipulated the perceived identities of real male
and female instructors in an online course. Despite the small sample size, the study
detected gender bias in evaluations on several dimensions. However, the experiment
65
was not double-blind, potentially leading the instructors to behave differently when
assigned a different displayed gender role. Burnell et al. (2020) found gender bias in
evaluations for a hypothetical hiring decision in academia, where the students had to
read the text of a potential lecture, only knowing the name of the lecturer. An interac-
tion of gender and age biaswas detected in two experimentswith narrated slides, which
were manipulating the stated identity of the lecturer (Arbuckle and Williams, 2003) or
his/her voice (Doubleday and Lee, 2016). Our approach is closest to the deception-
free experiment conducted by Chisadza et al. (2019) in South Africa: the authors used
narrated slides with a picture of a real lecturer attached to the bottom corner, and
manipulated the race and gender of the lecturer. Surprisingly, they did not find gender
bias against female lecturers; on the contrary, students evaluated women higher than
men. The authors speculate that the dominance of female teachers in high school in
SouthAfricamight have affected the expectations of the subjects, whowere all first-year
students in economics. We hope to avoid this effect by recruiting students with diverse
educational backgrounds and by selecting the subject of the lecture to be mathematical
since women are typically expected to underperform in sciences comparative to men
(see Reuben et al., 2014). Another caveat of the study by Chisadza et al. (2019) lies in
the treatment variation of the lecturer’s gender: since there was only one lecturer per
treatment, the treatment differences might have been driven by the differences in the
instructors’ personal characteristics. In fact, the treatment effects vanish when authors
control for teacher’s accent. We intend to recruit 4 different lecturers in each treatment
condition in order to reduce the variance in their verbal and non-verbal attributes of
teaching.
Second, to our knowledge, our study is the first to measure the response of the
gender bias in SET to exogenous variation in the quality of teaching. Instead of relying
on proxies of teacher’s productivity such as student performance, we can directly
control for teaching quality and estimate its effect on the evaluations depending on the
gender of the lecturer. On the one hand, wewill learnwhether it is good or bad teachers
who suffer from the gender bias in SET. On the other hand, our experiment contributes
to the debate about the validity of SET as a measure of teaching effectiveness. While
still being widely accepted in academia, student evaluations of teaching are criticized
by a growing body of literature. One can think of the famous Dr. Fox effect (Naftulin
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et al., 1973) as one of the first hints that student evaluations do not necessarily reflect
the real quality of teaching. In fact, the Dr. Fox experiment was extended by Ware and
Williams (1975)who hired the same actor to perform a lecture under different treatment
conditions: one dimension varied the quality of the content, and the other dimension
varied the seductiveness of the lecturer. The result was disturbing: content affected
the evaluation scores only under low seductiveness, while a highly seductive teaching
style received high ratings irrespective of the content. Moreover, experiments have
shown that judgements of very short content-free videos of the lecturers (Ambady and
Rosenthal, 1993, Babad et al., 2003) or first impressions of their personality after a brief
encounter (Clayson and Sheffet, 2006) can predict a major fraction of variance in the
subsequent SET. The fact that verbal and non-verbal attributes of teaching style affect
student evaluations much more than the actual content not only questions the validity
of SET per se, but also creates distorted incentives for the teachers. For instance, some
professors seem to teach strategically to boost their SET scores, but harm the follow-on
achievement of their students in more advanced classes (Carrell and West, 2010, Braga
et al., 2014). Our study will reveal whether women fall prey of the relative importance
of affect in student evaluations.
Third, one of our treatments proposes a solution to overcome gender bias in SET by
making its effect on the teacher’s payoff clear for the students. An average university
student is unlikely to be aware of the incentive structure in academia. An explicit
communication of the implications of SET scores for hiring and promotion decisions
couldmake students evaluate their teachersmore carefully. With growing awareness of
the genderdiscrepancies in SET, universities start considering affirmative actionpolicies
to narrow the gap. For example, at the time of writing this paper, VU Amsterdam was
considering to introduce a correction for the evaluation scores of female faculty basedon
the estimates of Mengel et al. (2019). We are aware of two experiments on the gender-
related interventions into SET: Boring and Philippe (2017) and Peterson et al. (2019)
nudged the students to be unbiased against women in their evaluations and observed
a significant reduction of the gender gap. Our intervention is incentive compatible and
much less suggestive, while still having the potential to induce the students to evaluate
female teachers more objectively.
Finally, our study is related to the literature on attention to discrimination. The
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field experiment by Bartoš et al. (2016) was the first to show that the applications of
minorities receive less attention on the job market and the rental market. Lahey and
Oxley (2018) observed that employers spend less time on the resumes of young black
applicants in a laboratory experiment with eyetracking. By measuring how much
time the students spend on the SET questions in our experiment, we will be able to
infer whether they invest less effort into the evaluation of female teachers and whether
this channel contributes to gender bias in SET. This channel is related to attention
discrimination, but measures selective deliberation on the experience with the teachers
rather than selective information acquisition as in the two aforementioned experiments.
We will control for information acquisition by the students by taking the amount of
notes taken during the lecture as a proxy for their attention to the lecture.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the experimental
design, Section 4.3 states the hypotheses and outlooks for data analysis, and Section
4.4 concludes and provides suggestions for further research. Instructions, the scripts
of the lectures and the questionnaires can be found in Appendix D.
4.2 Experimental design
The participants of our experiment will act either as teachers or as students. The
subjects in the role of the teachers will prepare a 20-minute video lecture for the
students. The subjects in the role of the students will watch this videolecture, take an
incentivized test based on its content and thereafter evaluate the teacher.
4.2.1 Timeline of the experiment
Phase 1: Teachers. In the first phase of our experiment, we will recruit 16 subjects
for the role of teachers among the PhD students of University of Munich, excluding
those at the chair for behavioral and experimental economics. Their task will be to give
a 20-minute lecture on the numeral system of the ancient Maya (in English language).
The topic is chosen to be related to mathematics since it is one of the fields where
women are typically perceived to perform worse than men. We will ask the teachers
to briefly introduce themselves, while being videotaped, and to read the script of the
lecture prepared by us. The self-introduction video, and the audio record of the script
along with the slides prepared by us will then be presented to the students to keep
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the non-verbal differences in teaching style minimal, following Chisadza et al. (2019).
Depending on the treatments described below, the slides and the scripts will differ.
We are going to keep the pace of reading the script the same across treatments. Each
teacher is going to receive a fixed payment of 20 Euros and a chance to win the prize of
50 Euros, explained in detail in the next subsection.
Phase 2: Students. The second phase of the experiment will take place at the
laboratory, with all subjects being in the role of the students. The laboratory experiment
will consist of several parts. The instructions for each part will be given after the
previous part has ended.
First, each subject will privately watch the prepared video lecture and take a test on
its content. The test consists of 10 questions related to conversion of Mayan numerals
into the decimal numeral system and simple algebraic operationswithMayan numbers.
The time limit will be set to 20 minutes, and subjects will earn 1 Euro for each correct
answer. We will provide the subjects with pens and paper for their notes during the
lecture and the test.
After the test, we will ask the students to evaluate their teachers in a question-
naire. Different characteristics of teaching will be evaluated on a 5-point Likert scale.
They include the overall impression of the lecture, the quality of the presentation, the
motivation of the lecturer, etc. (see the questionnaire in Appendix D.3). Most ques-
tions are equivalent to those asked in SET at the University of Munich. The students
will be aware that the evaluation is anonymous and the teachers are going to receive
aggregated feedback scores. Since teaching in our experiment is primarily aimed at
delivering information for the subsequent test (the so-called teaching-to-the-test), the
evaluation takes place after the test is completed. Only thereafter it will be possible for
the students to assess whether the lecture was adequate.
The evaluation will be followed by Raven’s progressive matrices test, aimed at
measuring the cognitive abilities of the subjects. The test consists of 8 tasks to identify
a symbol that fits a given pattern. Each correct answer will be rewarded with 50
cents. Finally, a questionnaire on demographic characteristics and outcomes related
to cognitive abilities (such as the grade for mathematics in high school), as well as
additional evaluation questions about the lecture, will complete the experiment. The
questionnaire canbe found inAppendixD.4. The evaluation itemson this questionnaire
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are related to the seductiveness of the teacher and long-term benefits of the lecture,
discussed in detail in the next sections. These types of questions are not typical for
university SET, but are of interest for our research, thereby we decided to ask them at
the end of the experiment. It is explicitly stated that the teacher does not learn the
answers to these questions, and they do not affect the evaluation of the teacher in the
preceding part of the experiment.
We intend to conduct the experiment in the Research Lab at VU Amsterdam. The
participants in the role of the students are going to be recruited from the subject pool
of the laboratory. We will invite approximately the same number of female and male
participants to create a balanced sample. The total number of subjects in the role of
students will amount to 256 (statistical power is discussed in the next section). The
subjects for the role of the teachers are intentionally recruited at a different university
and a different level of “seniority” to avoid any information spillovers. We expect the
experimental sessions to last about one hour and the average payment to be about 15
Euros.
4.2.2 Treatments
Our study is a 2×2×2 factorial design. Three dimensions of our treatment variation
include the teacher’s gender, the quality of teaching and the transparency of teacher’s
incentives, summarized in Table 4.1. Each subject in the role of a studentwill participate
in only one treatment. There will be 32 subjects in each treatment condition (256 in
total).
Table 4.1: Treatment variations in the experiment
Transparency of incentives
PrizeInfo NoPrizeInfo
Quality of teaching HighQ Male/Female Male/Female
LowQ Male/Female Male/Female
Teacher’s gender. We randomly assign our students to either female or male lectur-
ers. To minimize the differences besides gender, the teachers are going to be recruited
among white non-native English-speakers of similar age. Courses at VU Amsterdam
are frequently taught by PhD students in English language, so our sample of teachers
will be to some degree similar to the ones students usually encounter. We intentionally
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keep the race fixed since it is also known to affect student evaluations, while our study
focuses only on gender effects. A small photograph of the lecturer will be attached to
all lecture slides to remind students of the teacher’s gender. Tomake sure that potential
treatment differences are driven not only by the appearance or accent of a particular
teacher, we intend to recruit 8 male and 8 female subjects to perform as lecturers.
Quality of teaching. In order to exogenously vary the quality of teaching, we will
present two versions of the slides and the script. In HighQ treatments, the lecture is
designed to be helpful for the follow-on test, is well-structured and introduces many
practical examples. The slides present all important information from the script and
are animated to ease the visual perception of the mathematical content. In LowQ
treatments, we intentionally degenerate the quality of the script by presenting the
content in a messier way, leaving out some examples and adding chunks of irrelevant
information. The slides are changed accordingly and the animation is left out. The
complete scripts of the lecture along with the slides in both treatments can be found
in Appendix D.2. To avoid experimenter demand effects, we will make each teacher
participate in only one quality treatment condition. Thus, we will have 4 female and 4
male teachers in each of the two treatments.
Transparency of incentives. As mentioned above, the teachers have the possibility
to win a prize of 50 Euros. This prize is given to the teacher who receives the highest
average score15 according to the student evaluations in our experiment. Our last treat-
ment variation concerns the transparency of this prize to the students. In NoPrizeInfo
treatment, the students are unaware of how the teachers are paid. In PrizeInfo treat-
ment, the experimenter communicates the existence of the prize to the students before
they start with their evaluations. In either of the treatments, we will show the same
records of the teachers (either high or low quality). To make the chances of winning
the prize equal, we will give two separate prizes for HighQ and LowQ teachers and
guarantee the same number of evaluations for each teacher. Since there are 4 teachers
and 32 students in each treatment condition, and the records of the same teachers are
shown in PrizeInfo andNoPrizeInfo treatments, the record of each teacher will be shown
to 16 students.
The instructions for the experiment are presented in Appendix D.1.
15The average score is taken over all evaluation questions and over all treatments, in which the
respective teacher’s records were shown.
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4.3 Hypotheses and outlooks for data analysis
This section elaborates on our expected results and the methods of empirical analy-
sis. To test Hypotheses 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, we are going to analyze the following outcome
variables (refer to the questionnaire in Appendix D.3):
– the average score on all evaluation items;
– subjective grade for the lecture;
– subjective grade for the teacher.
Hypothesis 4.1. Female teachers receive lower evaluation scores than male teachers in
all treatment conditions.
We intend to replicate the gender bias prevalent in previous studies on SET. Al-
though the experiment by Chisadza et al. (2019) found a reverse effect, we expect our
results to be in linewith the other literature sincewe select amale-dominated discipline
and add more variance both to the pool of the lecturers and to the pool of the students.
We are going to estimate the gender bias in each of the four treatment cells separately:
HighQ and LowQ treatment conditions combined with PrizeInfo and NoPrizeInfo treat-
ment conditions. The bias might shrink or disappear in some of the treatments (see
further hypotheses below), but on averagewe expect the evaluations of female lecturers
to be at least weaklyworse than those of their male counterparts. We expect this to hold
for all three outcome variables mentioned above. Even though the subjective grade for
the lecture is not directly related to the teacher, previous studies have found that female
teachers fare worse scores also on the evaluation items not related to the instructor (see
Mengel et al., 2019). We will apply pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests16 in each treatment
cell to each of the three outcome variables of female versus male teachers.
Hypothesis 4.2. Poorer quality of the lecture affects evaluation scores negatively, with
this effect being stronger for female teachers.
On the one hand, the variation of the lecture content serves as amanipulation check:
naturally, lower quality of teaching should result in poorer evaluations, at least on the
16As a robustness check, we are going to use the Epps-Singleton test: unlike the MWU test, it is able
to detect non-locational shifts in the distribution.
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lecture-related items. On the other hand, relying on the results of psychological exper-
iments, we expect this relationship to be stronger for women than for men. Ware and
Williams (1975) showed that highly seductive (i.e. confident, humorous, gesticulating)
teachers receive high evaluations irrespective of the content they deliver, while content
mattered only under low seductiveness. Although the differences in teaching are min-
imized in our experiment, we hypothesise that male teachers are implicitly associated
with a more seductive teaching style as female teachers. In this case, female lecturers
would be punished more in SET for poorer lecture quality. We will be able to control
for the perceived seductiveness of the teacher by including additional items evaluating
different dimensions of teacher’s seductiveness into the questionnaire at the end of the
entire experiment (refer to Appendix D.4).
To estimate the treatment effect of quality, we are going to compare the same three
evaluationmeasures as above inHighQ versus LowQ treatments usingMann-WhitneyU
test, and then compare the size of the treatment effect for women and men. Naturally,
we expect a difference in the overall average score and the subjective grade for the
lecture; whether the subjective grade for the teacher is also affected by variations in
lecture quality, remains an empirical question.
Hypothesis 4.3. The communication of teachers’ incentives lowers the gender bias in
evaluation scores.
By announcing inPrizeInfo treatments that the teachers are competing for amonetary
reward based on SET, we appeal to students’ fairness and expect them to invest more
cognitive resources into the evaluation of both female and male teachers. We speculate
that one potential channel of gender bias in SET is more emotional or less careful
evaluation of female teachers. For instance, one semantic analysis of a large mass of
online evaluations revealed that female professors receive more comments on their
appearance and personality and are referred to less respectfully (Arceo-Gomez and
Campos-Vazquez, 2019). Our intervention might push the students to invest more
effort into the questionnaires, potentially leading to more objective grades and less
gender bias. Note that this not the only possible channel that could be activated by our
intervention: e.g., the knowledge of the prize might induce the students to reciprocate
and give higher evaluations to the teachers they liked the most, and consequently
exacerbate the gender bias. However, we expect fairness and objectiveness to be the
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dominant channel in our setting.
We will compare the difference in female andmale evaluation scores between Prize-
Info and NoPrizeInfo treatments using Mann-Whitney U test. The three outcome mea-
sures stay the same as in Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2. Most of all we are interested in the
improvements in the subjective grade for the teacher and the overall average score.
Hypothesis 4.4. Students spend less time on the evaluations of female teachers com-
pared to male teachers, this difference being less pronounce in PrizeInfo treatments.
They also pay less attention to the lectures given by female teachers in comparison to
male teachers.
In line with the findings of Bartoš et al. (2016) and Lahey and Oxley (2018), we
expect that the students pay less attention both to the lecture and the evaluation of
female teachers. As discussed above, inattention to evaluation, or selective deliberation,
might be mitigated by the intervention in PrizeInfo treatment. To assess attention to
evaluation, pairwiseMann-WhitneyU tests will be applied to the time that the students
spend on the screen with the evaluation of their female or male teachers (separately
in each treatment condition). We will then compare the treatment effect of teacher’s
gender across PrizeInfo and NoPrizeInfo treatments. Attention to the lecture will be
compared using Fisher’s exact test on a binary variable indicating that a student took
notes during the lecture (in each treatment condition).
Statistical power of Mann-Whitney U tests was calculated using the simulation
method proposed by Campos-Mercade (2018). We took the data from Chisadza et al.
(2019) as a baseline: the authors found that male teachers received an average score
of 3.745 points on a 5-point Likert scale with a standard deviation of 0.0419. Since the
treatment differences in that experiment went in an unexpected direction (probably
because of experimental design features we discussed in the introduction), we refer to
the estimates of Mengel et al. (2019) to calculate our expected treatment effect. The
authors estimated that male students evaluated female instructors 20.7% of a standard
deviationworse thanmale instructors, and female students did so by 7.6%. It translated
into 0.2 points and 0.07 points on Likert scale, respectively. Since our student sample
will be gender-balanced, the average treatment effect is expected to be roughly 0.13
Likert scale points. This is also consistent with the treatment effects found by Chisadza
et al. (2019), though their differences had an opposite sign. Combinedwith the expected
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baseline evaluations, a small sample of 5 students per treatment condition would thus
be enough to achieve the statistical power of 98%. To estimate the effect of quality
treatments, we refer to the study by Ware and Williams (1975). They found that low
seductiveness combined with poorer quality of content resulted in a drop of evaluation
scores from 48.7 to 35.5 points on a different scale, or a difference of 86.6% of a standard
deviation. Applied to the baseline standard deviation of 0.0419 found by Chisadza
et al. (2019), we derive an expected treatment effect of 0.036 points on the Likert scale.
Sample size of 32 students per treatment would yield statistical power of roughly 91%.
We have no expectation to what extent our PrizeInfo treatment will influence evaluation
scores since this kind of intervention in SET was not previously studied. Thus, we
decided to have 32 subjects in each treatment condition. A 2 × 2 × 2 design implies 8
treatment cells, resulting in a sample of 256 subjects in total.
Apart from non-parametric comparison tests, we want to prove the robustness of
our results by regression analysis. We will estimate two following OLS regression
models with robust standard errors clustered on teacher level:
yi  β1 f emale + β2LowQ + β3 f emale × LowQ + β4Xi + εi ; (3)
yi  β1 f emale + β2PrizeIn f o + β3 f emale × PrizeIn f o + β4Xi + εi . (4)
The outcome variables encompass three evaluation scores used to test Hypotheses
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, as well as the time spent on the questionnaire (Hypothesis 4.4). Variable
f emale is the dummy of the lecturer’s gender, and variables LowQ and PrizeIn f o
are the respective treatment dummies. The vector of control variables Xi includes the
gender of the student, his academicmajor, his grade formathematics in high school and
the score on the Raven’s test. We intentionally do not include the student performance
on the test in the experiment since it might be influenced by our treatments. Among the
control variables, we expect to find significant effects of the gender of the student on the
evaluations: previous literature has shown that male students rate female professors
worse than female students do (see e.g. Chisadza et al., 2019, Mengel et al., 2019). We
will run an additional specification of the two models with the interaction between the
student’s and the teacher’s gender. Apart from that, the measures of cognitive ability
are likely to be positively correlated to the performance on the test, which, in turn,
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might be correlated with the evaluation scores.
Both models 3 and 4 will be estimated on pooled data from all treatments; the
choice of the models was motivated by the easiness of interpretation of the coefficients.
For the sake of completeness, we are going to run an OLS regression on pooled data
with all possible interactions between the treatment dummies and teacher’s gender (the
reference group is male teachers in HighQ NoPrizeInfo treatment):
yi  β1 f emale × LowQ × PrizeIn f o + β2 f emale × Hi ghQ × PrizeIn f o+
+ β3 f emale × LowQ × NoPrizeIn f o + β4 f emale × Hi ghQ × NoPrizeIn f o+
+ β5male × LowQ × PrizeIn f o + β6male × Hi ghQ × PrizeIn f o+
+ β7male × LowQ × NoPrizeIn f o + β8Xi + εi .
(5)
As a robustness check, we are going to estimatemodels 3, 4 and 5 as tobit regressions
when the outcome variable is the average score over all evaluation items; and ordered
logit regressions when the outcome variables are subjective grades for the lecture or
the teacher.
4.4 Discussion and conclusion
We proposed an experimental design to investigate the determinants of gender
bias in student evaluations of teaching in a controlled laboratory environment. We
exogenously vary the gender of the teacher and the quality of the teaching material.
Additionally, we designed a non-invasive intervention to mitigate the gender bias in
SET (if any) by explaining the incentives of the teachers to the students. By measuring
the time spent on the evaluation forms, we can detect how much of the gender bias is
attributed to selective deliberation.
Although the focus of our study has been on the context of academia, its results
could have potential implications for evaluation procedures outside the universities.
For instance, some companies regularly ask their employers to evaluate their team
leaders, who later receive this feedback. Feedback systems are widely used in many
online environments (for an example of gender-based discrimination on an online
platform, see Bohren et al., 2019).
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One caveat of our experimental design is that we trade some features of the natural
classroom environment for the control over the treatment variations in the laboratory.
For instance, our experiment implies no interaction between students and teachers,
which is an important part of student-teacher relationship in the field. Therefore,
students will certainly feel less attached to the teachers in the laboratory; however, it
is not clear in which direction it will drive the gender bias. It is also not common for
the students in the lab to evaluate the lecturers, so we can expect some noise in their
responses. To make the decision more relevant for the students, we announce that the
teachers will learn their average evaluation scores – just like they do in the field. The
evaluation procedure will unlikely be perceived as the central part of the experiment,
so we expect the student responses to be a good measure of their real perceptions of
the teachers.
There are many open questions around the gender bias in SET not covered by our
study. First, there is a whole universe of potential affirmative action policies that can be
tested both in the lab and in the field. For example, the upward correction of the SET
scores for female faculty proposed by some universities is a double-edged sword: on
the one hand, it reduces the gender gap in SET, and on the other hand, it is not incentive
compatible. Besides, if the students are aware of this policy, theymight evaluatewomen
even worse.
Second, in our study we fully focus on the behavior of students. However, the
behavior of teachers in presence of gender bias in SET deserves particular attention. To
our knowledge, there is only observational evidence (Carrell andWest, 2010, Braga et al.,
2014) and no experimental studies that identify strategic teaching aimed at increasing
the evaluation scores. This behavior might be even more prevalent in presence of real
teaching prizes: just like we gave a prize for the teacher with the best evaluations in our
experiment, university teachers also frequently compete for financial and non-financial
teaching awards. The reaction of the teacher to these incentives might depend on the
gender. The response of teachers to affirmative action is also of crucial importance.
Third, apart from gender, there many other dimensions that potentially influence
subjective evaluations, such as race, age, look, etc. Race and ethnicity have been found
to affect SET both in the lab and in the field (Chisadza et al., 2019, Reid, 2010, Wang
and Gonzalez, 2020). It would be interesting to investigate how these factors interplay
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between teaching quality and the discipline.
Last but not least, could gender bias in SET result from asking the wrong questions?
By design, our experiment was primarily concerned with teaching-to-the-test and so
was the evaluation procedure. However, the goals of teaching in the field are much
broader than preparing the students for an exam. For example, improving students’
skills, influencing their way of thinking, helping them approach problems in life and
building bridges between other disciplines are among them. Nevertheless, the evalua-
tion questionnaires used at the universities are largely evaluating teaching-to-the-test
rather than “teaching-for-life”. We are not aware of any study trying to make the
evaluation questions reflect these important aspects of teaching. One could imagine
that women are more intrinsically motivated to contribute to the students’ knowledge
rather than achieve high evaluation scores in the current system, which does not reflect
this contribution to the full extent. We included some of the items evaluating the global
benefits of teaching into the questionnaire in Appendix D.4; although the design of the
evaluation procedure is not the focus of our study, wewill at least be able to seewhether
the gender bias is present on those dimensions in our simple setting. We also speculate
that the results of any evaluation would be different if it was conducted several years
after the course rather than directly after it. An evaluation delayed in time wouldmake
it possible to assess the long-term benefits of teaching. The intertemporal effects of
student evaluations of teaching and their interaction with gender bias are left for future
research.
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Appendix A Two Heads are Better than One: Teams and
Individuals in Standard Auction Formats
A.1 Regression tables
Table A.1: Profit in first-price auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual -2.048∗∗ -3.486∗∗ -2.937∗∗ -2.559∗
(0.875) (1.509) (1.303) (1.345)
Period -0.0717 -0.0717 -0.0717
(0.0467) (0.0468) (0.0469)
Individual*Period 0.221∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111)












Constant 3.953∗∗∗ 4.419∗∗∗ 2.110 0.676
(0.197) (0.297) (2.547) (3.449)
Observations 792 792 792 792
R2 0.0152 0.0177 0.0892 0.106
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered onmatching group level). ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Bids in first-price auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individual 2.663∗ 2.719∗∗ 2.848∗∗ 2.164 1.237 4.584 3.693 2.781
(1.573) (1.382) (1.364) (1.439) (1.316) (3.453) (3.385) (3.255)
Value 0.824∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Individual*Value -0.00117 -0.00384 -0.00819 -0.00780
(0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0264)
Period 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.402∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.185) (0.186) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
SPA error 0.130∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.0476) (0.0531) (0.0473) (0.0529)
Risk -0.0497∗ -0.0575∗ -0.0497∗ -0.0575∗
(0.0281) (0.0317) (0.0280) (0.0316)
Cognitive -1.600∗∗ -2.252∗∗∗ -1.590∗∗ -2.240∗∗∗
(0.653) (0.704) (0.658) (0.696)
Female 0.339 0.357
(2.220) (2.208)




Individual*Period -0.296 -0.296 -0.295
(0.337) (0.338) (0.338)
Constant -1.020 -1.051∗∗ -2.700∗∗ 9.291∗ 27.33∗∗∗ -3.682∗∗∗ 8.369∗ 26.38∗∗
(0.705) (0.418) (1.321) (4.997) (10.03) (1.022) (4.831) (10.25)
Observations 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 792
R2 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.852 0.860 0.838 0.852 0.861
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group
level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Prices in first-price auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual 4.842 5.422 6.717 4.613 1.743 0.191 -1.576
(3.521) (3.539) (4.376) (4.111) (4.438) (4.315) (4.238)
Value 0.831∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(0.0548) (0.0536) (0.0595) (0.0583) (0.0392) (0.0412) (0.0400)
Individual*Value 0.00120 -0.0108 -0.0709 -0.0628
(0.0774) (0.0787) (0.0737) (0.0780)
Period 0.380 0.391 0.389 0.113 0.114 0.109
(0.292) (0.289) (0.290) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157)
SPA error 0.237 0.249∗∗ 0.232 0.242∗∗
(0.146) (0.116) (0.148) (0.119)
Risk -0.102∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.100∗ -0.106∗∗
(0.0576) (0.0462) (0.0570) (0.0457)
Cognitive -2.872∗ -4.358∗∗∗ -2.791∗ -4.279∗∗∗
(1.672) (1.568) (1.683) (1.578)
Female 0.684 0.677
(4.882) (4.864)




Individual*Period 0.486 0.484 0.492
(0.524) (0.525) (0.521)
Constant 19.76∗∗∗ 16.97∗∗∗ 37.74∗∗∗ 73.94∗∗∗ 19.15∗∗∗ 40.84∗∗∗ 77.11∗∗∗
(2.982) (3.343) (7.135) (16.71) (1.746) (7.634) (15.56)
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 264
R2 0.481 0.486 0.517 0.530 0.487 0.518 0.531
GLS random effects regression, data collapsed on market level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered on matching group level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Profit in English auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual -0.672 -3.885 -3.590 -4.134
(1.243) (2.399) (2.662) (2.700)
Period -0.304 -0.304 -0.304
(0.248) (0.248) (0.249)
Individual*Period 0.714∗ 0.714∗ 0.714∗
(0.380) (0.382) (0.383)












Constant 6.904∗∗∗ 8.274∗∗∗ 2.059 -1.333
(0.656) (1.565) (5.432) (7.501)
Observations 528 528 528 528
R2 0.000511 0.00372 0.0148 0.0208
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered on matching group level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Prices in English auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual -7.120 -7.226 -6.389 -6.843 15.98∗ 16.19∗ 15.43∗
(7.853) (8.024) (7.890) (7.777) (8.495) (8.555) (8.840)
Value 0.772∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.151) (0.155) (0.160) (0.0839) (0.0830) (0.0897)
Individual*Value 0.180 0.182 0.170 0.166
(0.170) (0.175) (0.182) (0.180)
Period 0.712 0.712 0.706 2.394∗∗ 2.393∗∗ 2.389∗∗
(0.745) (0.753) (0.759) (1.103) (1.114) (1.123)
SPA error -0.118 -0.137 -0.135 -0.152
(0.148) (0.155) (0.145) (0.152)
Risk 0.000663 0.0197 -0.00280 0.0158
(0.0857) (0.0929) (0.0838) (0.0897)
Cognitive 0.193 0.562 0.0950 0.491
(1.383) (1.707) (1.302) (1.677)
Female 5.495 5.706
(9.408) (9.634)




Individual*Period -3.099∗∗ -3.099∗∗ -3.101∗∗
(1.244) (1.255) (1.264)
Constant 10.02 6.413 5.713 -3.047 -6.110 -5.499 -13.41
(6.587) (6.736) (7.511) (23.46) (6.163) (9.997) (26.19)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
R2 0.432 0.437 0.444 0.444 0.459 0.467 0.467
GLS random effects regression, data collapsed on market level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered on matching group level). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Emotions associated with winning an auction
Dependent variable
Neutrality Happiness Sadness Anger
Individual -0.0351 -0.0272 0.0144∗∗ 0.00985
(0.0271) (0.0176) (0.00709) (0.0125)
Winner -0.00843 0.0112∗∗ -0.00479 -0.00317
(0.00609) (0.00468) (0.00605) (0.00408)
Individual*Winner -0.00805 -0.00656 -0.000756 -0.0120∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.00554)
Constant 0.650∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0795∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.00678) (0.00300) (0.00863)
Observations 1500 1500 1500 1500
R2 0.00519 0.00765 0.00508 0.00102
Dependent variable
Surprise Fear Disgust Valence
Individual 0.00633 -0.000877 0.00546 -0.0471∗∗
(0.00543) (0.000807) (0.00511) (0.0215)
Winner -0.00415∗ 0.000377 0.000776 0.0177∗∗∗
(0.00248) (0.00135) (0.00252) (0.00475)
Individual*Winner 0.00505 -0.000942 0.00661 0.000616
(0.00523) (0.00137) (0.00492) (0.0175)
Constant 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.00170∗∗ 0.00755∗∗ -0.0225∗∗
(0.00417) (0.000762) (0.00300) (0.0109)
Observations 1500 1500 1500 1500
R2 0.00485 0.00123 0.0111 0.0103
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses (clustered on matching group level).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: The effect of emotions on future bids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual 2.819 2.345 2.879 2.842 2.209
(1.931) (1.810) (1.836) (1.840) (1.663)
Value 0.834∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0105) (0.0106)
Individual*Value -0.00240 -0.00561 -0.00346
(0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0211)
Period 0.0421 0.0420 0.0395 0.0396 0.0396
(0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.163) (0.163)


















Constant -1.898 6.479 -1.152 -1.104 7.070
(1.468) (4.780) (1.274) (1.228) (5.212)
Controls No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1375 1375 1375 1375 1375
R2 0.902 0.908 0.902 0.902 0.907
GLS random effects regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses
(clustered on matching group level).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.2 Instructions
Below we provide the instructions in TEAM FPA treatment (in German).
Willkommen beim Experiment und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!
Bitte sprechen Sie von nun an nicht mit anderen Teilnehmern des Experiments.
Allgemeines zum Ablauf
Dieses Experiment dient der Untersuchung von ökonomischem Entscheidungsver-
halten. Sie können dabei Geld verdienen. Dieses wird Ihnen im Anschluss an das
Experiment privat und in bar ausbezahlt.
Das gesamte Experiment dauert etwa 2 Stunden und besteht aus 4 Teilen. Zu Beginn
jeden Teils erhalten Sie detaillierte Instruktionen. Die Teile sind unabhängig voneinan-
der; Entscheidungen in einem Teil haben keine Auswirkungen auf Ihren Verdienst
in einem anderen Teil. Die Summe Ihrer Einkommen aus den 4 Teilen ergibt Ihren
Gesamtverdienst aus dem Experiment. Dieser wird Ihnen nach Abschluss des vierten
Teils mitgeteilt und am Ende des Experiments in bar ausbezahlt.
Wenn Sie nach den Instruktionen oder während des Experiments Fragen haben,
heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen
und Ihre Fragen privat beantworten. Der sprachlichen Einfachheit halber verwenden
wir nur männliche Bezeichnungen.
Während des Experiments werden Sie bzw. die anderen Teilnehmer gebeten,
Entscheidungen zu treffen. Sie werden dabei zum Teil mit anderen Teilnehmern
interagieren. Das heißt, sowohl Ihre eigenen Entscheidungen als auch die Entschei-
dungen der anderen Teilnehmer können Ihre Auszahlung bestimmen. Diese ergibt
sich entsprechend der Regeln, die im Folgenden erklärt werden.
Während Sie Ihre Entscheidungen treffen, wird am rechten oberen Rand des Bild-
schirms eine Uhr herunterlaufen. Diese bietet Ihnen eine Orientierung, wie viel Zeit
Sie für Ihre Entscheidung benötigen. Manchmal ist diese Zeitrestriktion bindend,
manchmal nicht. Details werden weiter unten erläutert. Die Informationsbildschirme,




In den Teilen 1-3 des Experiments sprechen wir nicht von Euro, sondern von Punk-
ten. Diese werden am Ende des Experiments in Euro umgerechnet. Der Wechselkurs
für die Umrechnung wird am Anfang jedes Teils bekanntgegeben. In Teil 4 sprechen
wir von Euro.
Für Ihr pünktliches Erscheinen erhalten Sie 4 e zusätzlich zu dem Einkommen, das
Sie während des Experiments verdienen können.
Anonymität
WirwertendieDaten ausdemExperiment nur imAggregat aus undverknüpfenNa-
men nie mit den Daten aus den Experimenten. Am Ende des Experiments müssen Sie
eine Quittung über den Erhalt des Verdienstes unterschreiben, die nur der Abrechnung
dientundkeineVerknüpfungmit IhremVerhalten imExperiment zulässt. Währenddes
ExperimentswerdenVideoaufnahmenangefertigt. DiesedienendemForschungszweck
des Experiments. Verhalten Sie sich einfach ganz natürlich.
Hilfsmittel
An Ihrem Platz finden Sie einen Kugelschreiber. Bitte lassen Sie ihn nach dem Ex-
periment am Tisch liegen.
Gruppen
Im Experiment werden Sie ein Mitglied in einer von sechs Gruppen sein. Jede
Gruppe besteht aus drei Mitgliedern. Die Zuteilung in die Gruppen erfolgt zufällig.
Die Gruppen bleiben über das gesamte Experiment hinweg unverändert.
Teil 1
Wechselkurs
Der Wechselkurs in Teil 1 ist: 3 Punkte = 1 Euro
Auktionen
Teil 1 besteht aus zwölf unabhängigen Auktionen. In jeder Auktion bieten Sie in
Ihrer Gruppe für ein Gut, das einen bestimmten Wert für Sie bzw. Ihre Gruppe hat.
Drei Gruppen werden für jede Auktion zufällig verbunden, um für ein Gut zu bieten.
Wir nennen das einen Markt (bestehend aus drei Gruppen á drei Mitglieder).
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Jedes Gruppenmitglied erhält eine einmalige Anfangsausstattung von 10 Punkten.
Wert des Gutes
Jede Gruppe erhält zu Beginn jeder Auktion die Information über den Wert des
Gutes. Dieser Wert wird für jede Gruppe auf einemMarkt unabhängig bestimmt; d.h.,
es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass er in derselben Auktion für verschiedene Gruppen un-
terschiedlich ist. Der Wert für jede Gruppe wird zufällig zwischen 0 und 100 Punkten
gezogen. Dabei ist jeder Wert zwischen 0 und 100 gleichwahrscheinlich (wobei 0 und
100 auch möglich sind). Jede Bietergruppe kennt ihren eigenen Wert, aber nicht die
Werte der beiden anderen Gruppen auf dem Markt.
Entscheidungsfindung
In diesem Teil wird jede Gruppe ein Gebot abgeben. Jede Gruppe entscheidet sich
gleichzeitig für ein Gebot. Die Entscheidung innerhalb der Gruppe erfolgt in zwei
Stufen:
In der ersten Stufewerden Sie individuell umeinenVorschlag für dasGruppengebot
gefragt. Sie haben 30 Sekunden Zeit, einen Vorschlag in der Mitte des Bildschirms
einzugeben und auf “Weiter” zu klicken. Nachdem alle Gruppenmitglieder Ihrer
Gruppe den Vorschlag eingegeben haben, startet die zweite Stufe.
In der zweiten Stufe hat die Gruppe 180 Sekunden, um sich auf eine gemeinsame
Entscheidung zu verständigen. Eine Entscheidung ist nur dann gültig, wenn von
den drei Gruppenmitgliedern jeweils exakt dieselbe Entscheidung eingegeben wird
(Entscheidungen Ihrer Gruppenmitglieder sehen Sie im rechten Teil Ihres Bildschirms).
Innerhalb der 180 Sekunden können Sie und die anderen Gruppenmitglieder ihre
Entscheidungen so oft anpassen, wie Sie wollen. Sie können Ihre Entscheidungen mit
den anderen Gruppenmitgliedern auch diskutieren – diese Diskussion erfolgt über ein
Chat-Fenster im linken Teil des Bildschirms.
Für den Chat gelten folgende Regeln: (i) deutschsprachige Konversation; (ii) keine
Beleidigungen, Drohungen oder ähnliche Verstöße gegen die Etikette; (iii) keine Infor-
mationen, die es erlauben würden Sie zu identifizieren (z.B. Sitzplatznummer, Namen,
Geschlecht, Studienrichtung etc.). Wenn Sie gegen diese Regeln verstoßen, werden Sie
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aus dem Experiment ausgeschlossen.
Der Chat soll Ihnen helfen, sich innerhalb der Gruppe zu koordinieren. Wenn es
eine Gruppe nicht schafft, innerhalb von 180 Sekunden eine gemeinsame Entscheidung
zu treffen, wird ein Gebot von 0 angenommen.
Gebote müssen immer ganzzahlig sein. Das Höchstgebot beträgt 110 Punkte.
Alle Informationenfinden Sie dann auch auf demBildschirm, derwie folgt aussehen
wird:
	
Im oberen Bereich des Bildschirms sehen Sie Ihre Identifikationsnummer (ID) in
Ihrer Gruppe (z.B.“Ihre ID in Ihrer Gruppe ist Mitglied 2”). Ihre ID wird für das
gesamte Experiment beibehalten.
Auf der linken Seite des Bildschirms sehen Sie ein Chat-Fenster, in dem Sie mit
den anderen Teilnehmern Ihrer Gruppe Nachrichten austauschen können. Geben Sie
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hierzu in das violette Feld unten links Ihre Nachricht ein und drücken Sie dann die
Eingabetaste (Return/Enter). Ihre Eingabe wird dann an den Computer übermittelt
und im grauen Bereich des Fensters erscheinen. Die anderen Teilnehmer Ihrer Gruppe
sehen dann IhreNachricht und auch Sie sehen dieNachrichten der anderen Teilnehmer
Ihrer Gruppe oberhalb des violetten Eingabe-Feldes. Wichtig: Wenn Sie eine Nachricht
senden möchten, drücken Sie in jedem Fall Eingabetaste (Return/Enter), so dass der
von Ihnen geschriebene Text im grauen Bereich erscheint.
Auf der rechten Seite des Bildschirms sehen Sie die Vorschläge der Mitglieder Ihrer
Gruppe für das Gebot. Wenn Sie sich dafür entscheiden, Ihr Gebot zu ändern, können
Sie dies in der Mitte des Bildschirms tun. Ihr Gebot wird geändert, wenn Sie ein neues
Gebot in das Eingabefeld in derMitte eingeben und auf “Bestätigen” klicken. Ihr neues
Gebot wird dann rechts auf dem Bildschirm Ihr altes Gebot ersetzen.
Auszahlungen
Die Gruppe mit dem höchsten Gebot der drei Gruppen gewinnt die Auktion. Sie
bezahlt für das Gut als Preis ihr Gebot. Jedes Gruppenmitglied verdient also in dieser
Auktion:
Auszahlung jedes Gruppenmitglieds = Wert des Gutes – das Gebot seiner Gruppe
Zum Beispiel: Die drei Gruppengebote sind 80, 60, 40; die Gruppe, die 80 Punkte
geboten hat, gewinnt die Auktion. Jedes Mitglied dieser Gruppe erhält den Wert des
Gutes und bezahlt 80 Punkte.
Wenn alle drei Gruppen 0 geboten haben, wird das Gut nicht verkauft. Wenn zwei
oder drei Bietergruppen das gleiche, höchste Gebot (größer 0) abgegeben haben, wird
zufällig bestimmt, welche Gruppe das Gut erhält und bezahlt.
Wenn eine Gruppe das Gut in einer Auktion nicht erhält, verdient diese Gruppe in
dieser Auktion nichts.
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Jedes Gruppenmitglied behält allerdings die Anfangsausstattung von 10 Punkten
(mit einer Ausnahme: siehe weiter unten).
Feedback und weitere Auktionen
Ist eine Auktion beendet, startet eine neue Auktion mit exakt den gleichen Regeln.
Es gibt insgesamt 12 Auktionen in diesem Teil des Experiments. In jeder Auktion wer-
den die sechs Bietergruppen im Raum wieder zufällig neu zu zwei Märkten zusam-
mengewürfelt. Die drei Mitglieder einer Gruppe bleiben dabei aber unverändert.
Am Ende des Experiments wird eine Auktion zufällig als auszahlungsrelevant aus-
gelost. Ihre Auszahlung aus Teil 1 ergibt sich aus den Punkten, die Sie in dieser Auktion
verdient haben (also: Wert minus Gebot, wenn Ihre Gruppe die Auktion gewonnen hat;
oder null, wenn IhreGruppe dieAuktion nicht gewonnen hat) plus dieAnfangsausstat-
tung von 10 Punkten.
Achtung!
Sie können auch Verluste in einer Auktion machen. Wenn Ihre Gruppe mit einem
Gebot gewinnt, das über demWert des Gutes liegt, dannmachen Sie Verluste! Verluste
werden von Ihrer Anfangsausstattung abgezogen (und wenn diese nicht reicht: von
Gewinnen aus anderen Teilen des Experiments).
Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Ein Experimentleiter
kommt dann zu Ihnen, um Ihre Fragen zu beantworten.
Teil 2
Wechselkurs
Der Wechselkurs in Teil 2 ist: 3 Punkte = 1 Euro
Auktionen
Teil 2 besteht aus nur einer Auktion. In dieser Auktion bieten Sie in Ihrer Gruppe
für ein Gut, das einen bestimmten Wert für Sie bzw. Ihre Gruppe hat. Drei Gruppen
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werden wiederum für die Auktion zufällig verbunden und bilden einen Markt, um für
ein Gut zu bieten.
Jedes Gruppenmitglied erhält eine einmalige Anfangsausstattung von 10 Punkten.
Wert des Gutes
Jede Bietergruppe erhält zu Beginn die Information über denWert desGutes. Dieser
Wert wird für jede Gruppe auf einem Markt unabhängig bestimmt; d.h., es ist sehr
wahrscheinlich, dass er für verschiedene Gruppen unterschiedlich ist. Der Wert für
jede Gruppe wird zufällig zwischen 0 und 100 Punkten gezogen. Dabei ist jeder Wert
zwischen 0 und 100 gleichwahrscheinlich (wobei 0 und 100 auch möglich sind). Jede
Bietergruppe kennt ihren eigenenWert, aber nicht dieWerte der beiden anderen Grup-
pen auf dem Markt.
Entscheidungsfindung
In diesem Teil wird jede Gruppe ein Gebot abgeben. Jede Gruppe entscheidet sich
gleichzeitig für ein Gebot; es gibt keine Wiederholung. Die Entscheidung innerhalb
der Gruppe erfolgt wieder in zwei Stufen:
In der ersten Stufewerden Sie individuell umeinenVorschlag für dasGruppengebot
gefragt. Sie haben 30 Sekunden Zeit, einen Vorschlag in der Mitte des Bildschirms
einzugeben und auf “Weiter” zu klicken. Nachdem alle Gruppenmitglieder Ihrer
Gruppe den Vorschlag eingegeben haben, startet die zweite Stufe.
In der zweiten Stufe hat die Gruppe 180 Sekunden, um sich auf eine Entscheidung
zu verständigen. Eine Entscheidung ist nur dann gültig, wenn von den drei Grup-
penmitgliedern jeweils exakt dieselbe Entscheidung eingegebenwird (Entscheidungen
Ihrer Gruppenmitglieder sehen Sie im rechten Teil Ihres Bildschirms). Innerhalb der
180 Sekunden können Sie und die anderen Gruppenmitglieder ihre Entscheidungen
so oft anpassen, wie Sie wollen. Sie können Ihre Entscheidungen mit den anderen
Gruppenmitgliedern auch diskutieren – diese Diskussion erfolgt über ein Chat-Fenster
im linken Teil des Bildschirms.
Für den Chat gelten folgende Regeln: (i) deutschsprachige Konversation; (ii) keine
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Beleidigungen, Drohungen oder ähnliche Verstöße gegen die Etikette; (iii) keine Infor-
mationen, die es erlauben würden Sie zu identifizieren (z.B. Sitzplatznummer, Namen,
Geschlecht, Studienrichtung etc.). Wenn Sie gegen diese Regeln verstoßen, werden Sie
aus dem Experiment ausgeschlossen.
Der Chat soll Ihnen helfen, sich innerhalb der Gruppe zu koordinieren. Wenn es
eine Gruppe nicht schafft, innerhalb von 180 Sekunden eine gemeinsame Entscheidung
zu treffen, wird ein Gebot von 0 angenommen.
Gebote müssen immer ganzzahlig sein. Das Höchstgebot beträgt 110 Punkte.
Ende der Auktion
Die Gruppe mit dem höchsten Gebot der drei Gruppen gewinnt die Auktion. Sie
bezahlt für dasGut als Preis das zweithöchste Gebot amMarkt. Jedes Gruppenmitglied
verdient also in dieser Auktion:
Auszahlung jedes Gruppenmitglieds = Wert des Gutes – zweithöchstes Gebot am Markt
Beispiel: Die drei Gruppengebote sind 80, 60, 40; die Gruppe, die 80 Punkte geboten
hat, gewinnt die Auktion. JedesMitglied dieser Gruppe erhält denWert des Gutes und
bezahlt 60 Punkte.
Wenn alle drei Gruppen 0 geboten haben, wird das Gut nicht verkauft. Wenn zwei
oder drei Bietergruppen das gleiche, höchste Gebot (größer 0) abgegeben haben, wird
zufällig bestimmt, welche Gruppe das Gut erhält und bezahlt.
Wenn eine Gruppe das Gut in einer Auktion nicht erhält, verdient diese Gruppe in
dieser Auktion nichts.
Jedes Gruppenmitglied behält allerdings die Anfangsausstattung von 10 Punkten
(mit einer Ausnahme: siehe nächster Absatz).
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Achtung!
Sie können auch Verluste in dieser Auktion machen. Wenn Ihre Gruppe einen Preis
bezahlt, der über dem Wert des Gutes liegt (= wenn das zweithöchste Gebot höher ist
als der Wert des Gutes und Sie die Auktion gewinnen), dann machen Sie Verluste! Ver-
luste werden von Ihrer Anfangsausstattung abgezogen (und wenn diese nicht reicht:
von Gewinnen aus anderen Teilen des Experiments).
Es gibt nur eine Auktion in Teil 2.
Zusammenfassung
Nur zwei Dinge ändern sich im Vergleich zu Teil 1:
- Es gibt nur eine Auktion.
- Der Gewinner der Auktion bezahlt das zweithöchste Gebot amMarkt für das Gut.
Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Ein Experimentleiter
kommt dann zu Ihnen, um Ihre Fragen zu beantworten.
Teil 3
Wechselkurs
Der Wechselkurs in Teil 3 ist: 40 Punkte = 1 Euro
Jede Gruppe erhält eine Ausstattung von 100 Punkten pro Mitglied. Ihre Gruppe
kann jeden Betrag zwischen 0 und 100 Punkten (wobei 0 und 100 auch möglich sind)
in eine riskante Anlage investieren und den Rest behalten. Mit R bezeichnen wir
die Menge an Punkten, die Ihre Gruppe in die riskante Anlage investiert. Mit 50%
Wahrscheinlichkeit wird der Betrag R mit 2,5multipliziert; mit 50%Wahrscheinlichkeit
geht der Betrag R verloren. Jedes Gruppenmitglied erhält also aus dem Investment en-
tweder 2, 5 × R oder nichts mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit. Jedes Gruppenmitglied
behält den Betrag 100 − R, der nicht investiert wurde.
Entscheidungsfindung
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Die Entscheidung innerhalb der Gruppe erfolgt wieder in zwei Stufen, wobei es sich
um dieselbe Gruppe wie in Teil 1 und 2 handelt.
Inder ersten StufewerdenSie individuell umeinenVorschlag fürden zu investieren-
den Betrag R gefragt. Sie haben 30 Sekunden Zeit, einen Vorschlag in der Mitte des
Bildschirms einzugeben und auf “Weiter” zu klicken. Wenn Sie keinen Vorschlag
machen, bevor die Zeit abgelaufen ist, werden Sie ohne Vorschlag automatisch auf die
zweite Stufe weitergeleitet.
In der zweiten Stufe hat die Gruppe 120 Sekunden, um sich auf eine Entscheidung
über den zu investierenden Betrag R zu verständigen. Eine Entscheidung ist nur dann
gültig, wenn von den drei Gruppenmitgliedern jeweils exakt dieselbe Entscheidung
eingegeben wird (Entscheidungen Ihrer Gruppenmitglieder sehen Sie im rechten Teil
Ihres Bildschirms). Innerhalb der 120 Sekunden können Sie und die anderen Grup-
penmitglieder ihre Entscheidungen so oft anpassen, wie Sie wollen. Sie können Ihre
Entscheidungenmit den anderenGruppenmitgliedern auchdiskutieren –dieseDiskus-
sion erfolgt über ein Chat-Fenster im linken Teil des Bildschirms.
Für den Chat gelten folgende Regeln: (i) deutschsprachige Konversation; (ii) keine
Beleidigungen, Drohungen oder ähnliche Verstöße gegen die Etikette; (iii) keine Infor-
mationen, die es erlauben würden Sie zu identifizieren (z.B. Sitzplatznummer, Namen,
Geschlecht, Studienrichtung etc.). Wenn Sie gegen diese Regeln verstoßen, werden Sie
aus dem Experiment ausgeschlossen.
Der Chat soll Ihnen helfen, sich innerhalb der Gruppe zu koordinieren. Wenn es
Ihre Gruppe nicht schafft, innerhalb von 120 Sekunden eine gemeinsame Entscheidung
zu treffen, verdie-nen Sie in Teil 3 kein Geld.
DerComputerwirdnacheiner gültigenEntscheidungsfindungdie Investmententschei-
dung simulieren, und Sie erfahren, wie viel Sie verdient haben.
Teil 4
In diesem Teil bitten wir Ihre Gruppe 8 Probleme zu lösen. Alle haben die gleiche
Struktur.
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Sie sehen einen Kastenmit einer Matrix, d.h. ein rechteckigesMuster verschiedener
Symbole. Jede Matrix hat 3 Reihen und 3 Spalten. Das Symbol in der rechten unteren
Ecke fehlt. Unter der Matrix sind 6 Symbole zur Auswahl. Genau eines passt in das
Muster und sollte das leere Feld ersetzen. Hier ist ein Beispiel.
Die korrekte Lösung ist “Nummer 5”. Die Aufgabe Ihrer Gruppe ist es, das korrekte
Symbol zu identifizieren. Sobald Siemit einem Problem fertig sind, erscheint das näch-
ste Problem auf dem Bildschirm. Sie können allerdings nicht zu früheren Problemen
zurückkehren, sobald Sie eine Lösung bestätigt haben. Pro korrekte Lösung erhält
jedes Gruppenmitglied 50 Cent. Falls die Antwort falsch sein sollte, bekommen Sie
nichts.
Die Entscheidung innerhalb der Gruppe erfolgt wieder in zwei Stufen:
In der ersten Stufe werden Sie individuell um einen Vorschlag für die korrekte
Symbolnummer gefragt. Sie haben 30 Sekunden Zeit, einen Vorschlag in der Mitte
des Bildschirms einzugeben und auf “Weiter” zu klicken. Wenn Sie keinen Vorschlag
machen, bevor die Zeit abgelaufen ist, werden Sie ohne Vorschlag automatisch auf die
zweite Stufe weitergeleitet.
In der zweiten Stufe hat die Gruppe 60 Sekunden, um sich auf eine Entscheidung
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über die korrekte Symbolnummer zu verständigen. Eine Entscheidung ist nur dann
gültig, wenn von den drei Gruppenmitgliedern jeweils exakt dieselbe Entscheidung
eingegeben wird (Entscheidungen Ihrer Gruppenmitglieder sehen Sie im rechten Teil
Ihres Bildschirms). Innerhalb der 60 Sekunden können Sie und die anderen Grup-
penmitglieder ihre Entscheidungen so oft anpassen, wie Sie wollen. Sie können Ihre
Entscheidungenmit den anderenGruppenmitgliedern auchdiskutieren –dieseDiskus-
sion erfolgt über ein Chat-Fenster im linken Teil des Bildschirms.
Für den Chat gelten folgende Regeln: (i) deutschsprachige Konversation; (ii) keine
Beleidigungen, Drohungen oder ähnliche Verstöße gegen die Etikette; (iii) keine Infor-
mationen, die es erlauben würden Sie zu identifizieren (z.B. Sitzplatznummer, Namen,
Geschlecht, Studienrichtung etc.). Wenn Sie gegen diese Regeln verstoßen, werden Sie
aus dem Experiment ausgeschlossen.
Der Chat soll Ihnen helfen, sich innerhalb der Gruppe zu koordinieren. Wenn es
Ihre Gruppe nicht schafft, innerhalb von 60 Sekunden eine gemeinsame Entscheidung
zu treffen, verdienen Sie für das betreffende Problem kein Geld.
Am Ende von Teil 4 erfahren Sie, wie viele Probleme Ihre Gruppe korrekt gelöst hat.
Bevorwir Ihnen IhrenVerdienst in bar ausbezahlen, bittenwir Sie noch einen kurzen
Frage-bogen auszufüllen. Dann endet das Experiment.
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Appendix B Optimal third-degree price discrimination
and reciprocity: A theoretical model
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Consumers maximize their utility functions (1) with respect to the purchased quantity.






− p1q1 + ρ1∆1(p1, p2, γ)(p1q1 − p1(1 − p1))
The kindness term ∆1 is constant with respect to q1, so I can substitute for it later. The
solution to the maximization problem:
q1  1 − p1 + ρ1∆1(p1, p2, γ)p1 (6)

















Recall the definition of the kindness term:
∆1(p1, p2, γ)  (1 − p1) −
(1 − p1)2
2





(1 − p2) −
(1 − p2)2
2
− p2(1 − p2)
)
+

















































+ (1 − γ)
(
(1 − p1) −
(1 − p1)2
2
− p1(1 − p1)
)]
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Substituting for ∆1 and ∆2 in (6) and (7) and simplifying yields the formulas in Propo-
sition 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.




p1q1(p1, p2) + p2q2(p1, p2),
where q1(p1, p2) and q2(p1, p2) are the demand functions defined by Proposition 2.1.
I solve this problem numerically for each combination of parameters, with a2 ranging
from 0.05 to 1 with a step of 0.05, γ ranging from 0 to 1 with a step of 0.05, ρ1 and ρ2
from 0 to 5 with a step of 0.1. First, I solve first-order conditions:
∂π(p1, p2, a2, ρ1, ρ2, γ)
∂p1
 0
∂π(p1, p2, a2, ρ1, ρ2, γ)
∂p2
 0.
In each of the 1092420 cells, I obtain several solutions in real numbers. Second, for each
solution I check second-order conditions:
∂2π(p1, p2, a2, ρ1, ρ2, γ)
∂p21
< 0
detHπ(p1, p2, a2, ρ1, ρ2, γ) > 0,
where H is the Hessian of the profit function. If a solution satisfies second-order condi-
tions, I store it in a vector of potential candidates for optimal prices. Finally, I check the
length of this vector in each cell. In every cell there exists only one price pair (length
of 2), being the unique solution to the optimization problem. Mathematica code of this
proof can be found in the input cells [3] and [4] in Appendix B.2.
Proof of Propositions 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.
To prove comparative statics, I evaluate the partial derivatives of the interpolated
equilibrium prices with respect to the four parameters. Among the values of the
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partial derivatives on the grid, I look for positive or, respectively, negative values that
correspond to the specified range of parameters. For instance, Proposition 2.3 claims
that the derivative of p1 with respect to ρ2 is non-negative for a2 ≥ 0.55. Thereby, I
restrict the grid to the parameters that satisfy the latter condition, and search for any
negative values of ∂p1/∂ρ2. When I find no negative values on the grid, I claim that the
derivative is non-negative for a2 ≥ 0.55. Refer to Mathematica input cells [6]–[12] for
the proof of Proposition 2.3; input cells [13], [14] for the proof of Proposition 2.4; and
input cells [15], [16] for the proof of Proposition 2.5 in Appendix B.2.
There is one case in Proposition 2.3 where I find several positive values of the partial
derivative of p2 with respect to ρ2 on the respective parameter grid. Namely, this
happened for some values of ρ2 given a2  0.5, ρ1  0 and γ  1 (see input cells [8],
[9] and output cell [9]). Inspecting this case closer and looking at the optimal price on
the second market, I find that p2  0.25 if a2  0.5, ρ1  0 and γ  1 irrespective of
the value of ρ2 (refer to input cell [10] and output cell [10]). Thus, the derivative of
p2 with respect to ρ2 should be equal to zero in all of these cases. Now let us look at
the estimates of the partial derivative in output cell [11]: some of them are precisely
equal to 0, and some of them are very close to 0 within the neighborhood of 10−15.







PayoffL[q2_,p2_]=a2 q2-a2 q2^2/2-p2 q2;
PayoffF[q1_,q2_,p1_,p2_]=p1 q1+p2 q2;
















In[2]:= (*RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES// FULL INFO treatment*)
recipH[q1_,p1_]=p1 q1-p1 demandHNoInfo[p1];



















In[3]:= (*Solve first-order conditions for each combination of




In[4]:= (***Check second-order conditions***)





























Print["Number of cells with non-unique solutions=",notunique]
Print["Number of cells with non-existent solutions=",notexist]
Number of cells with non-unique solutions=0
Number of cells with non-existent solutions=0




























In[6]:= (*Proof: p1 decreases in rho1*)






Print["Condition: γ>0 & ρ1-ρ2≤3.5"]





Condition: γ>0 & ρ1-ρ2≤3.5
















































Out[10]= {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25,
0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25,
0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25,
0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25,


















8.326672684688674‘*10-16, -1.3877787807814457‘*10-16, 0.‘, 0.‘,
0.‘, 0.‘, 0.‘, 0.‘, -9.25366554216378‘*10-17,
-1.388049831324567‘*10-16, 2.77528651101977‘*10-16,
-4.629543276513104‘*10-17, 9.25366554216378‘*10-17}


















In[13]:= (*Proof: p1 increases in a2*)
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Print["Condition: γ ≥0.4 and ρ1≥ρ2 and a2≥0.1"]





Condition: γ ≥0.4 and ρ1≥ρ2 and a2≥0.1






















In[15]:= (*Proof: p1 decreases in gamma*)






Print["Condition: a2<1 and ρ1>0"]
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Condition: a2<1 and ρ1>0




In[16]:= (*Proof: p2 increases in gamma*)







Print["Condition: 0.55≤a2<1 and γ ≥0.2 and ρ2>0 and ρ1-ρ2≤3"]






Condition: 0.55≤a2<1 and γ ≥0.2 and ρ2>0 and ρ1-ρ2≤3





Appendix C Optimal third-degree price discrimination
and reciprocity: Experimental evidence
C.1 Proofs of hypotheses
Theoretical foundations behind Hypotheses 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
To obtain consumer demands given the two pricing schemes, we evaluate the de-
mand functions presented in Proposition 2.1 at (pPD1 , p
PD





resulting functions of parameters a2, ρ1, ρ2 and γ correspond to qPDi (Full In f o) and
qPDi (Full In f o), respectively. If we evaluate these functions at γ  1, we will arrive at
qPDi (Part In f o) and q
PD
i (Part In f o). Evaluating them at γ  1, ρ1  ρ2  0 gives us
the demands in No Info treatment. To estimate the treatment effects, we evaluate and
simplify the respective differences. First, let us provide the basis for Hypothesis 3.1.
qPD1 (Full In f o) − q
PD
1 (Part In f o) 
1
16
(1 − a2)(4 − a2)(1 − γ)ρ1 (8)
qPD1 (No In f o) − q
PD
1 (Part In f o) 
1
16
(1 − a2)(3 − a2)ρ1 (9)
qPD1 (No In f o) − q
PD
1 (Full In f o) 
1
16
(1 − a2)(−1 + 4γ − a2γ)ρ1 (10)
Recall that a2 < 1 by construction. Difference (8) is always nonnegative, and positive
if γ < 1 and ρ1 > 0. Difference (9) is always nonnegative, and positive if ρ1 > 0.
Difference (10) is nonnegative if γ ≥ 14−a2 , and positive if the latter condition is non-
binding and ρ1 > 0.
qPD2 (Full In f o) − q
PD
2 (Part In f o) 
1
16a2
(1 − a2)(1 − 4a2)(1 − γ)ρ2 (11)
qPD2 (No In f o) − q
PD
2 (Part In f o) 
1
16a2
(1 − a2)(1 − 3a2)ρ2 (12)
qPD2 (No In f o) − q
PD
2 (Full In f o) 
1
16a2
(1 − a2)(a2 + γ − 4a2γ)ρ2 (13)
Hypothesis 3.2 is derived analogously. Difference (11) is always nonpositive since
we restricted a2 ≥ 0.5 in the experiment, and negative if γ < 1 and ρ2 > 0. Difference
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(12) is nonpositive as well, and negative when ρ2 > 0. Difference (13) is nonpositive if
γ ≥ a24a2−1 , and negative when the latter condition is non-binding and ρ2 > 0.
Finally, it is obvious that the demands of both consumers should not differ acrossNo
Info and Part Info treatments when they are charged the same price. In both treatments
the model predicts rational demands since the kindness terms would amount to zero
in Part Info treatment. The rest of Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4 compares the demands under
Full Info and No Info treatments.
qUNI1 (Full In f o) − q
UNI
1 (No In f o) 
a2(1 − a2)(1 + a2 + a22)(1 − γ)ρ1
2(1 + a2)3
(14)
qUNI2 (Full In f o) − q
UNI
2 (No In f o)  −
(1 − a2)(1 + a2 + a22)(1 − γ)ρ2
2(1 + a2)3
(15)
Difference (14) is always nonnegative, and positive if γ < 1 and ρ1 > 0. Difference
(15) is always nonpositive, and negative if γ < 1 and ρ2 > 0. The comparison of con-
sumer demands across the three treatments and the two pricing schemes is complete.
Theoretical foundations behind Hypothesis 3.5.
To assess the attractiveness of price discrimination for the firm in each treatment,




UNI and the treatment-specific qPDi , q
UNI
i into the firm’s profit function.
Consequently, we evaluate the relative benefits of price discrimination πPD −πUNI and
compare them across treatments.

























We assume that in Part Info treatment γ  1. Since relative attractiveness of price
discrimination in Full Info treatment decreases in γ, the attractiveness of price discrim-
ination in Part Info treatment will be lower or equal to that in Full Info treatment, all
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other parameters being held constant.
Second, consider now the relative gain from price discrimination in Part Info treat-
ment. It is linear in both reciprocity parameters, decreasing in ρ1 and increasing in ρ2


















(3a2 − 1)(1 − a2) > 0. (17)
The absolute value of (16) is higher than (17), meaning that the relative profitability
of price discrimination decreases in ρ1 faster than it increases in ρ2. If we assume that
ρ1 > ρ2, it guarantees that price discrimination is strictly more attractive in No Info
treatment than in Part Info treatment since we assume ρ1  ρ2  0 in No Info treatment.
The only comparison that remains open is Full Info versus No Info treatment. The
latter treatment shuts down the effect of two reciprocity parameters and γ simultane-
ously. Relative attractiveness of price discrimination is (weakly) decreasing in γ and ρ1
and increasing in ρ2. The sum of the three effects would depend on certain parameter
values, making the assessment of the relative attractiveness of price discrimination
more difficult.
Recall that the predicted share of price discriminating firms in No Info treatment
amounts to 1 since the behavior of consumers is expected to be selfish-rational. Thereby,
it puts an upper bound on the rates of price discrimination in Full Info treatment: they
can be either also equal to 1 or lower, depending on the parameters. The share of price
discriminating firms in Part Info will thus be the lowest in our experiment.
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C.2 Instructions
Paper-based instructions for all subjects in Full Info treatment are provided below
(in German).
Herzlich willkommen beim Experiment und vielen Dank für Ihre
Teilnahme!
Bitte sprechen Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr mit den anderen Teilnehmern.
Der sprachlichen Einfachheit halber werden im Folgenden männliche Bezeichnun-
gen verwendet; diese schließen sowohl männliche als auch weibliche Teilnehmer mit
ein.
Allgemeines zum Ablauf
Dieses Experiment dient der Untersuchung von ökonomischem Entscheidungsver-
halten. Sie können dabei Geld verdienen, das Ihnen im Anschluss an das Experiment
privat und in bar ausbezahlt wird. Während des Experiments werden Sie darum ge-
beten, Entscheidungen zu treffen. Zum Teil werden Sie dabei mit anderen Teilnehmern
interagieren. Dasheißt, dass sowohl Ihre eigenenEntscheidungenals auchdieEntschei-
dungen der anderen Teilnehmer Ihre Auszahlung beeinflussen können. Diese ergibt
sich entsprechend bestimmter Regeln, die im Folgenden erklärt werden.
Das gesamte Experiment dauert etwa 90 Minuten. Während Sie Ihre Entscheidun-
gen treffen, wird am rechten oberen Rand des Bildschirms eine Uhr herunterlaufen.
Diese bietet Ihnen eine Orientierung, wie viel Zeit Sie für Ihre Entscheidungen benöti-
gen.
Bezahlung
Während des Experiments berechnen sich Verdienste nicht in Euro, sondern in
Punkten. Am Ende des Experiments werden die Punkte, die Sie verdient haben, in
Euro umgerechnet und Ihnen privat und in bar ausbezahlt. Der Wechselkurs für die
Umrechnung beträgt: 150 Punkte = 1 Euro
Zusätzlich zu dem Einkommen, das Sie während des Experimentes verdienen kön-
nen, erhalten Sie 6 ď für Ihr pünktliches Erscheinen.
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Anonymität
Die Daten aus dem Experiment werden ausschließlich anonym ausgewertet. Am
Ende des Experiments müssen Sie eine Quittung über den Erhalt des Verdienstes un-
terschreiben. Diese dient nur der Abrechnung und wird nicht dazu verwendet, Ihre
persönlichen Daten mit Ihren Entscheidungen zu verknüpfen. Ihr Name kann zu
keinem Zeitpunkt mit Ihrem Verhalten im Experiment kombiniert werden.
Hilfsmittel
An Ihrem Platz finden Sie einen Kugelschreiber. Bitte lassen Sie diesen nach dem
Experiment auf dem Tisch liegen.
Sollten Sie nach den Instruktionen oder während des Experiments noch Fragen
haben, drücken Sie bitte den roten Knopf auf Ihrer Tastatur (F11). Der Experimentleiter
wird dann zu Ihnen kommenund Ihre Fragen privat beantworten. Wenn Sie keineHilfe
mehr benötigen, drücken Sie einfach erneut auf den roten Knopf.
Ablauf des Experiments
Märkte
Zu Beginn des Experiments wird Ihnen zufällig eine Rolle zugewiesen: Verkäufer
oder Käufer. Diese Einteilung bleibt über das gesamte Experiment hinweg bestehen.
Zu Beginn jeder Runde werden alle Teilnehmer zufällig in Gruppen eingeteilt, die jew-




Der Verkäufer kann ein Gut an beide Käufer auf seinem Markt verkaufen. In jeder
Runde entscheiden die Käufer, welche Menge des Gutes sie kaufen möchten. Der
Verkäufer entscheidet, zuwelchenPreisen erdasGutverkauft. DieEntscheidungsmöglichkeiten
von Verkäufern und Käufern sind im Folgenden ausführlich erklärt.
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Entscheidung des Verkäufers
Zu Beginn jeder Runde wählt der Verkäufer zwei Preise für die zwei Käufer auf
seinem Markt. Dabei kann er immer aus zwei Preispaaren auswählen.
Der Verkäufer hat 120 Sekunden Zeit, sich für eines der zwei gegebenen Preispaare
zu entscheiden.
Entscheidung der Käufer
Jeder Käufer entscheidet sich, welche Menge des Gutes er kaufen will.
Der Käufer trifft diese Entscheidung für beide möglichen Preise, die der Verkäufer
von ihm verlangen kann (es gibt also zwei Entscheidungen pro Runde). Erst nach der
Entscheidung erfährt jeder Käufer, welchen Preis der Verkäufer tatsächlich festgesetzt
hat. Nur die Menge, die zum tatsächlich festgesetzten Preis gewählt wurde, wird
für die Berechnung der Auszahlungen berücksichtigt. Allerdings weiß der Käufer
zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung natürlich noch nicht, welcher der Preise tatsächlich
gewählt wurde und welche seiner Mengenentscheidungen relevant ist. Daher sollte
der Käufer in jeder Situation alle Mengenentscheidungen sorgfältig bedenken, da jede
einzelne potenziell relevant für seine Auszahlung werden kann.
Die Käufer haben ebenfalls 120 Sekunden Zeit, um sich für Mengen zu entscheiden.
Verdiensttabellen
Käufer und Verkäufer können ihre möglichen Verdienste in Tabellen auf dem Bild-
schirm ablesen, wenn sie ihre Entscheidungen treffen.
Eine Beispieltabelle für den Käufer sieht aus wie folgt:
In dieser Tabelle kann der Käufer die möglichen Verdienste abhängig von der von
ihm gewählten Menge für die zwei möglichen Preise ablesen. Je höher der Preis ist,
den der Käufer erhält, desto niedriger sind die möglichen Verdienste.
Betrachten Sie die Beispieltabelle oben. Der Käufer kann hier zwischen denMengen
0, 5, 10, ..., 80wählen. Diese stehen in der ersten Zeile. Die folgenden zwei Zeilen zeigen
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die Verdienste des Käufers für die zwei möglichen Preise in dieser Runde: 5 und 6.
Außerdem erfährt der Käufer die Preise, die der Verkäufer für den anderen Käufer
auf seinemMarkt festlegen kann, und erhält eine weitere Tabelle, die den Verdienst des
anderen Käufers für diese Preise zeigt.
Der Verkäufer erhält alle Informationen aus den Tabellen, die die Käufer auf seinem
Markt erhalten. Eine Beispieltabelle für den Verkäufer sieht dabei wie folgt aus:
Die Tabelle zeigt die möglichen Verdienste abhängig von der Entscheidung von
Käufer 1, wenn er einen Preis von 5 erhält.
Die erste Zeile zeigt diemöglichenMengen, dieKäufer 1 kaufen kann. Die zugehöri-
gen Verdienste von Käufer 1 stehen in Zeile 2. In der dritten Zeile steht der Verdienst
des Verkäufers aus dem Verkauf des Gutes an Käufer 1.
Der Verdienst des Verkäufers aus dem Verkauf an Käufer 1 entspricht dem Preis für
Käufer 1 multipliziert mit der Menge, die Käufer 1 kauft. Betrachten Sie erneut das
Beispiel oben. Bei einem Preis von 5 für Käufer 1 und einer gekauften Menge von 30
für diesen Preis, ergibt sich der Verdienst aus dem Verkauf des Gutes an Käufer 1 als
5*30 = 150. Diese Zahl findet der Verkäufer in der untersten Zeile.
Der gesamte Verdienst des Verkäufers in einer Runde entspricht der Summe, die er
aus dem Verkauf des Gutes an die zwei Käufer in seinem Markt verdient:
Verdienst = Preis für Käufer 1 * Menge von Käufer 1 +
+ Preis für Käufer 2 * Menge von Käufer 2
Beachten Sie, dass der Verdienst des Verkäufers von den gekauften Mengen ab-
hängt. Je mehr die Käufer zu einem bestimmten Preis kaufen, desto mehr verdient der
Verkäufer.
Feedback in einer Runde
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Nachdem der Verkäufer und die zwei Käufer auf einemMarkt ihre Entscheidungen
getroffen haben, erfahren sie ihre jeweiligen Verdienste in dieser Runde.
Feedback für den Verkäufer
Am Ende der Runde wird dem Verkäufer angezeigt, welche Mengen er jeweils tat-
sächlich verkauft hat. Darüber hinaus erfährt er sowohl seinen Verdienst aus dieser
Runde als auch die Verdienste der beiden Käufer.
Feedback für den Käufer
AmEnde der Runde erfährt der Käufer, welchen Preis der Verkäufer für ihn tatsäch-
lich festgelegt hat undwelcheMenge er dementsprechend gekauft hat. Darüber hinaus
erfährt er auch seinen Verdienst aus dieser Runde sowie den Preis, den der Verkäufer
für den anderen Käufer auf dem Markt festgelegt hat.
Weitere Runden
Ist eine Runde beendet, so werden die Märkte zufällig neu zusammengestellt und
es startet eine neue Runde mit exakt demselben Ablauf. Die Rollen (Käufer bzw.
Verkäufer) bleiben dabei unverändert. Die Preisoptionen und Tabellen ändern sich
dagegen von Runde zu Runde. Nehmen Sie sich daher in jeder Runde die Zeit, die
Preisoptionen und Tabellen zu studieren.
In diesem Experiment gibt es insgesamt eine Proberunde und 20 Runden. Die
Proberunde ist weiter unten erklärt.
Auszahlungen
Am Ende des Experiments wird eine der 20 Runden zufällig als auszahlungsrele-
vant ausgewählt (die Proberunde kann nicht ausgewählt werden). Ihre Auszahlung
ergibt sich aus den Punkten, die Sie in der ausgewählten Runde verdient haben. Die
Verdienste aus allen anderen Runden sind nicht auszahlungsrelevant.
Proberunde
Die Proberunde gibt Ihnen Gelegenheit, sichmit demAblauf der folgenden Runden
und mit dem Aufbau der Bildschirme vertraut zu machen.
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Zunächst erfahren Sie Ihre Rolle (Käufer bzw. Verkäufer). Wie oben bereits erklärt,
behalten Sie diese Rolle für den Rest des Experimentes.
Im Anschluss sehen Sie einen Beispielbildschirm. Anhand dieses Beispielbild-
schirmswird Ihnennoch einmal genau erklärt, welche Informationen Sie in jeder Runde
bekommen, wo Sie diese auf dem Bildschirm finden, und wie Sie Ihre Entscheidungen
treffen können.
Danach haben Sie die Gelegenheit, Ihre Entscheidungen einmal probeweise zu tref-
fen. In dieser Proberunde erfahren Sie nicht, welche Entscheidungen die anderen Teil-
nehmer auf Ihrem Markt getroffen haben, sondern erhalten stattdessen ein zufälliges,
computergeneriertes Feedback. Diese Runde ist nicht auszahlungsrelevant, sondern
dient nur dazu, Sie mit der Entscheidungssituation vertraut zu machen. Sie haben
dafür 120 Sekunden Zeit.
Wenn die Proberunde zu Ende ist, startet das aus 20 Runden bestehende Experi-
ment. Danach bitten wir Sie, noch einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen.
Sollten Sie während der Proberunde oder während des Experimentes eine Frage
haben, drücken Sie den roten Knopf auf Ihrer Tastatur (F11). Der Experimentleiter
wird dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Fragen privat beantworten.
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C.3 Screenshots
Figure C.1: Screen of consumer 1 in No Info treatment
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Figure C.2: Screen of consumer 1 in Part Info treatment
119
Figure C.3: Screen of consumer 1 in Full Info treatment
120
Figure C.4: Screen of the firm in all treatments
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C.4 Likelihood function
The choices of the consumers in our experiment were discrete: consumers could
pick quantities from {0, 5, 10, ..., 75, 80}. Following Cox et al. (2007), we calculate the
threshold values of the error term at which optimal choices change. We define εqi as
the threshold where consumer i is indifferent between buying q and q +5, all else being
equal:
Uεi (q , pi , p j , ε
q
i )  U
ε
i (q + 5, pi , p j , ε
q
i ).
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5pi
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is optimal for consumer i not to buy anything from the firm. For any q ∈ {5, 10, ..., 75},




i ). Finally, consumer i prefers to buy 80 if
εi ∈ (ε75i ,∞). The probability of purchasing q can be determined using the cumulative
distribution function of the normal distribution with mean αi and variance σ2i :
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if q  80.
(18)
These probabilities, in turn, determine the likelihood function:
Li (pi , p j , αi , σi , ρi , γi) 
40∏
k1
Pr[qik  q |pi , p j , αi , σi , ρi , γi].
Maximizing its logarithm, we arrive at the desired parameter estimates.
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Appendix D The determinants of gender bias in student
evaluations of teaching
D.1 Instructions
Below we provide the paper-based instructions for the subjects in the laboratory.
This text was handed out in PrizeInfo treatments; in NoPrizeInfo treatments, the text
highlighted in red was missing.
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not talk to other participants from now on.
This experiment analyzes economic decision making. During the experiment you
and the other participants will make decisions and you will earn money. The amount
of money you earn depends only on your own decisions and is determined by the rules
that will be explained in these instructions. At the end of the experiment your total
profit will be paid to you privately in cash. You will additionally receive 6 Euros as a
show-up fee.
The whole experiment will last about 60 minutes. If you have any questions after
reading the instructions please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to
you and answer your questions privately. All participants receive the same instructions.
The other participants will neither during nor after the experiment learn howmuch
you earned. We never link names and data from experiments. At the end of the
experiment you will be asked to sign a receipt regarding your earnings which serves
only as a proof for our sponsor. The latter does not receive any other data from the
experiment.
While you make your decisions, a clock at the top of your computer screen will run
down. This clock will inform you regarding how much time you still have to make
your decision.
The experiment consists of three parts. You will receive instructions for each part
after the previous part has ended.
Part 1
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In the first part of the experiment, you will watch a 20-minute videolecture on a
mathematical topic and then take a test on its content. The test consists of 10 questions.
You will earn 1 Euro for each correct answer, and nothing for incorrect answers. You
can take up to 20minutes to complete the test. Please press the button “SUBMIT”when
you are ready. If you do not press “SUBMIT” before 20 minutes run out, you will not
earn anything in this part of the experiment. You will learn howmany of your answers
are correct in the end of the experiment.
There is a pen and two sheets of paper on your table. Feel free to use them to take
notes during the videolecture and the test if you wish to do so. One sheet is for your
notes during the lecture, and the other one is for your notes during the test. We ask you
to leave the pen and the paper on your table when the experiment ends. Your notes
will not affect your earnings, will not be transferred to anyone and will be destroyed
when our study is completed.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand. We ask
you to put on the headphones now. When the videolecture is over, you may take them
off.
Part 2
We ask you to complete a short evaluation questionnaire on the lecture from Part
1. We hired 8 instructors to prepare the videolecture equivalent to the one that you
saw. After all sessions of our experiment are completed, we will tell the instructors
their personal average evaluation scores on each question. The average is taken over
the evaluations of all participants who saw the respective lecture. Your evaluation thus
stays anonymous.
We will give a prize of 50 Euros to the instructor that receives the highest average
evaluations in our experiment.
You have 5 minutes to complete the evaluation form.
Part 3
In this part, we ask you to solve a series of 8 problems. All have the same structure.
You see a box with a matrix, i.e. a rectangular pattern of different symbols. Each
matrix has 3 rows and 3 columns. The symbol in the bottom right corner is missing.
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Below the matrix, there are 8 symbols to choose from. Only one of them fits the pattern
and should go into the bottom right corner of the matrix. Here is an example:
The correct solution is symbol number 5. The task for you is to choose the correct
symbol. After you have done that for one problem, the next problem appears on the
screen. You cannot go back to earlier problems, once you have submitted the solution.
For every correct solution, you will earn 50 Euro-cents. For every incorrect solution,
youwill earn nothing. Youwill have 60 seconds for every problem. If you do not submit
any solution to a problem before the time runs out, it is assumed that the solution to
this problem is incorrect.
After Part 3 is completed, we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire on the screen.
Then you will learn howmany problems you have solved correctly and howmuch you
have earned. In addition, you will learn your score on the test and your corresponding
earnings from Part 1. The sum of your earnings in Part 1 and Part 3 will be your
total earnings from the experiment. Only you but no other participant will receive the




The text highlighted in blue and the slides in blue frames are present only inHighQ
treatment. The text highlighted in red and the slides in red frames are present only in
LowQ treatment. The rest of the script and the slides is identical in both treatments.
Video ON
Hello everyone! My name is %Johannes% and I am going to give you a lecture on
the numeral system of the ancient Maya. This lecture will be followed by a short test,
where you will solve 10 problems on Mayan numbers. You are welcome to use your
pens and paper to make notes during the lecture and the test. At the end of this crash
course you will become a pro in mathematics of the Maya civilization. So, let us start!
Video OFF: slides on the screen
[the slides are animated in HighQ treatment and not animated in LowQ treatment]
The Mayan numeral system
A CRASH COURSE
In this lecture I will explain you the basics of the Mayan numeral system. We will
start with the history, learn how Mayan numbers look like, compare them with our
numbers and calculate some examples.
Introduction and historical facts
1
Maya math
• the Maya civilization flourished 
between 250 A.D. and 900 A.D.

• advanced in arts, 
culture, architecture, astronomy

• developed an efficient number 
system

• the mathematical concept of 
zero - one of the earliest known
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The Maya civilization started out in Central America thousands of years ago. It
experienced the peak of its development from 250 A.D. to 900 A.D. During this time,
the Mayas made impressive advancements in arts, culture, architecture, mathematics
and astronomy. They developed an efficient numeral system of their own, possibly
one of the world most advanced at the time. It allowed the Maya to do the elaborate
calculations needed to make precise astronomical predictions. The precision of their
observations along with their astronomical and calendrical record keeping were aston-
ishingly accurate. One of the great intellectual accomplishment of theMayawas the use
of the mathematical concept of zero. They were one of the only ancient civilisations to
use it, and the appearance of the zero in Maya inscriptions is one of the earliest known




• our number system is decimal (base-10): each place = a power of 10

• 10 symbols to represent any number: 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
• example:

3205 = 3×1000 + 2×100 + 0×10 + 5×1 = 
  =   3×103  +  2×102 + 0×101 + 5×100
Our number system
Base 10
• our number system is decimal (base-10): each place = a power of 10

• most widespread numeral system in the world

• 10 symbols to represent any number: 





Before we dive into the world of Mayan numbers, let us have a closer look at the
number system we use today. Our numeral system is decimal, or base ten. It means
that the digit in each position is a power of 10. Our number system was designed as
base 10 simply because 10 equals the number of our fingers. Many numeral systems of
ancient civilizations use ten and its powers for representing numbers, including Brahmi
numerals, Greek numerals, Hebrew numerals, Roman numerals, and Chinese numer-
als. The numeral system we use today stems from Hindu-Arabic system, which was
invented between the 1st and 4th centuries by Indianmathematicians. Arabic numerals
were introduced to Europe in the 10th century by Arabic-speakers of North Africa. The
European acceptance of the numerals was accelerated by the invention of the printing
press, and they became widely known during the 15th century. In this system we have
10 symbols (or 10 digits), with which we can write down any number. Let us have
a look at the following example: the number 3205. The digit 3 denotes the number
of thousands contained in this number. The digit 2 denotes the number of hundreds.
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The digit 0 denotes the number of tens, and the digit 5 denotes the number of ones.
A thousand, a hundred and ten are all powers of 10. One thousand is equal to 10 to
the power of 3, one hundred is 10 to the power of 2, and ten is 10 to the power of 1. If








• Mayan number system is vigesimal (base-20): each place = a power of 20





• Mayan number system is vigesimal (base-20): each place = a power of 20

• Vigesimal systems are used by some ethnic groups in Africa, America, Asia

• Traces of base 20 in European languages






What about the Mayan numbers? Unlike us, the Maya used 20 as the base for their
numeral system. Such a system is called vigesimal. Scholars believe that they chose 20
to be the base because it is the combined total of fingers and toes. Vigesimal systems
are still used in different corners of the world: for example, among Yoruba people in
Africa, Alaska Natives in America, Burushaski people in Pakistan and Chukchi people
in Siberia. We can also find traces of base 20 inmany European languages. For example,
in English, Slavic languages and German the names of the two-digit numbers from 11
to 19 consist of one word, but the names of the two-digit numbers from 21 on consist
of two words. In French, twenty is used as a base number in the names of numbers
from 70 to 99. Twenty is also used as a base for some numbers in Danish, Albanian,
Georgian,Welsh and ScottishGaelic languages. Now let us return to theMayan system.
To represent any possible number, the Maya had only three symbols. The shape of a
conch shell denotes 0; a dot denotes 1; and a horizontal bar denotes 5. Thus, every five
dots are equal to one bar.
Our numbers vs. Mayan numbers
1
Place value
• place value: the value of a number is determined by the place in which it 
appears

• we write numbers in increasing order from right to left

23 
• Mayas wrote numbers in increasing order from bottom to top
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Another difference of the Mayan numeral system is the place value. When we write
down numbers, the value of a digit is determined by the place in which it appears. In
our decimal system, the place values are powers of 10, in increasing order from right
to left. For example, look at the number 23. The digit 3 represents the number of ones,
and the digit 2 to the left of it represents the number of tens. Thus, 2 has a higher
place value as 3. The Mayas wrote their numbers in increasing order from the bottom
to the top. Here you see the number 23 written in the Mayan system. The bottom row
has 3 dots that correspond to 3 ones. One dot in the top row has a higher place value:
namely, it denotes the number of 20-s. It might seem natural to you that the value of
the digit depends on its position; however, there are numeral systems for which it is not
the case. For instance, in Roman numbers a digit has only one value: I means one, V
means five, X means ten and C a hundred (however, the value may be negated if placed
before another digit). The problem with such systems is that when numbers get larger,
new symbols must be invented. This makes writing large numbers difficult because so
many new symbols need to be memorized. In contrast, the existence of place value in
the Mayan numeral system allowed them to write down any number with the help of
only three symbols.
From 0 to 19
1
Mayan numbers
Now let us count from 0 to 19 using Mayan numerals. Zero is a shell, one is one
dot, two is two dots, three is three dots, four are four dots, and then we move to five –
five is a bar. To produce six, we throw a dot on the top of the bar. One bar and one dot
equals to 5 plus 1, equals to 6. Adding another dot yields seven, then eight, then nine,
and then we reach ten – which is two bars. Remember that two bars are two times 5,
which equals 10. Putting additional dots on the top of these two bars, we get 11, 12,
13, and 14, respectively. Fifteen corresponds to three bars, or three times 5. By adding















Convert Mayan numbers to decimal More numbers...
37 =29 =20 =
50 = 123 = 308 =
Now I want you to learn how to read larger numbers inMayan numeral system. Let
us consider an example of how to convert a Mayan number into the decimal system.
Here we see 2 bars at the bottom level and 3 dots at the top level. I will call the bottom
level “level 0” since its place value corresponds to ones, which are 20 to the power of 0;
and the top level “level 1” since its place value corresponds to 20s, or 20 to the power
of 1. Recall that two bars represent number 10; and three dots are number 3. So, we
have 10 at level 0 and 3 at level 1, which amounts to 10 times 1 plus 3 times 20, which is
equal to 10 plus 60, which is equal to 70. The number we saw on this picture is equal
to 70. Let us look at the following examples. Here we see number 20 – a dot at the
top corresponding to one base of 20 and a zero at the bottom level. Number 29 has the
same dot above and the Mayan number 9 below. Number 37 also has one dot at the top
since it can only fit one base of 20. The remainder of 17 is drawn at the bottom level:
three bars with two dots. Now look at the number 50. It contains two 20s, that is why
two dots are drawn on the top level. Apart from it, it contains a 10, which is drawn on
the bottom level as two bars. Next to it you see a larger number – 123. Six 20s fit into
this number, so we draw a bar with a dot on the top. Three dots are left as a remainder
on the bottom. Finally, number 308: it contains 15 bases of 20, so three bars appear on






















Convert Mayan numbers to decimal
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Here is an example of a larger number with more levels. At level 0 we have two bars
and four dots, which is 14. At level 1 there is a zero, at level two there is one dot. It
corresponds to 14onesplus zero twenties plus one 400. 14plus 0plus 400 addsup to 414.




























Convert Mayan numbers to decimal ...and some more numbers
414 = 2012 = 9999 =
Finally, here is a very large number with four levels. Two bars and a dot at level 0
mean 11; three bars with three dots at level 1 mean 18. There is a zero at level 2 and two
dots at level 3. It translates to 11 ones, 18 twenties, zero 400s, and two 8000s. 11 plus
360 plus 0 plus 16000 is a total of 16371. Here are some examples of larger numbers
with more levels. Look at the number 414. At the lowest level we have two bars and
four dots, which is 14. In the middle there is a zero, at the top there is one dot. It
corresponds to 14 ones plus zero twenties plus one 400. The next number is 2012. It
consists of 12 on the bottom level, zero 20-s in the middle and five 400s on the top. By
the way, you might recall that the Maya are credited for predicting the end of the world
in year 2012. Around 300 B.C., Mayan priests designed a calendar known as the Long
Count, which identified each day by counting forward from a base point calculated to
fall on August 11, 3114 B.C. A single cycle of the Long Count calendar lasts roughly
5126 solar years, meaning that it is slated to end on a date correlating to December 21,
2012. Popular culture has latched on to theories that the close of the calendar’s current
cycle corresponds to the end of the world in the Mayan belief system. However, no
cataclysm happened and now you know how to write down year 2012 in the Mayan
numeral system. Now let us look at the last example, a larger number: 9999. It has one
dot on the top level, which corresponds to one 8000, or one 20 to the power of 3. 4 dots
at the lower level denote four 400s. The Mayan 19 on the next lower level is the number
of 20s, and a remainder of 19 is on the bottom level. Now you are able to understand




2 goes to the top
17 goes to the bottom
1
Convert decimal numbers to Mayan
• Write 57 in Mayan? Divide it into powers of 20: 20, 400, 8000, 160000, ...

• Can be divided by 20

• 57/20 = 2 + remainder of 17
Convert decimal numbers to Mayan
General rule
• Divide the number into powers of 20: 1, 20, 400, 8000, 16000, ...

• Divide the number by the largest possible power of 20

• Write the integer quotient in Mayan at the top

• Divide the remainder by the largest possible power of 20

• Write the integer quotient in Mayan one level lower

• Proceed until the remainder is not divisible by 20; write it in Mayan at the 
bottom
Now suppose that you want to solve a reverse problem: you have a number in the
decimal system, and you want to convert it into the Mayan system. So, how would
you write it down? To figure out the Maya equivalent of any number, you need to
decompose it into the powers of 20, which are 20, 400, 8000, 160000 and so on. Let us
start with a simple example and try to write down number 57. First, we look at it and
ask: what is the maximum possible power of 20 that 57 can be divided with? In this
case, 57 is a small number and it can only be divided by 20. In the next step, we divide
57 by 20, which gives us 2 and a remainder of 17. Getting 2 after division means that
there are two 20s in our number 57; therefore we can draw two dots on the top level
of the Mayan number. The remainder of 17 denotes 17 ones, and it goes to the bottom
level of the Mayan number. Here we are: number 57 in Mayan consists of two 20s at
the top and 17 ones at the bottom. First, we look at our number and ask: what is the
maximum possible power of 20 that this number can be divided with? We divide our
number with this largest possible power of 20 and write down the resulting integer
quotient as a Mayan number at the top level. In the next step, we take the remainder
of this division and divide it by a smaller power of 20. Again, the resulting integer
quotient is written down at the level below. The remainder is again divided by another
smaller power of 20, and so on. We repeat this procedure until the remainder is not
divisible by 20, and write down this remainder at the very bottom. Now I am sure you
can convert any number back and forth between Mayan and decimal numeral systems.
132
Example: a larger number
2012
5 goes to the top
0 goes lower
12 goes to the bottom
1
Convert decimal numbers to Mayan
• Write 2012 in Mayan? Divide it into powers of 20: 20, 400, 8000, 160000, ...

• First divide by 400:

• 2012/400 = 5 + remainder of 12

• Divide the remainder by 20:

• 12/20 = 0 + a remainder of 12
Let us have another example and convert number 2012 into Mayan system. Again,
we look at the powers of 20 that could fit into 2012. In this case, 400 is the maximum
possible divisor. We start by dividing 2012 with 400. It gives us 5 plus a remainder
of 12, meaning that our number contains five 400s. Therefore, we can draw 5 or a
horizontal bar at the top level. Now we go one level lower and divide the remainder of
12 by the next power of 20, which is 20 in our case. Since 12 is less than 20, the result
of this division is 0 plus a remainder of 12. We write zero or a shell at the level below.
Finally, the last remainder of 12 goes to the bottom level – two bars and two dots. This
is the result: 2012 in Mayan consists of five 400s, no 20s and 12 ones.
Example: a very large number
9999
1 goes to the top
4 goes lower
19 goes to the bottom
19 goes lower
1
Convert decimal numbers to Mayan
• Write 9999 in Mayan? Divide it into powers of 20: 20, 400, 8000, 160000, ...

• First divide by 8000:

• 9999/8000 = 1 + remainder of 1999

• Divide the remainder by 400:

• 1999/400 = 4 + a remainder of 399

• Divide the remainder by 20:

• 399/20 =19 + a remainder of 19
Finally, I want you to write down a very large number in Mayan: let us take 9999.
First, which power of 20 can you divide with? Can you divide it by 20? Yes. 400?
Yes. 8000? Also yes, but not more. So let us divide 9999 by 8000. It gives us 1 and a
remainder of 1999. We draw one dot on the top. Then we move one level lower and
divide the remainder of 1999 by the next power of 20, which is 400. 1999 divided by 400
is 4 plus a remainder of 399. We draw 4 dots one level below. Next step: we divide 399
by 20, and this is equal to 19 plus a remainder of 19. So we draw 19 one level below – 3
bars and 4 dots. And the remainder of 19 is left on the bottom – also 3 bars and 4 dots.
9999 in Mayan system is ready: one 8000, four 400s, 19 twenties and 19 ones. Now I am
















In the last part of this lecture, we will have a look at two simple operations with
Mayan numbers: addition and subtraction. First, let us look at addition. To add any
Mayan numbers, you simply put together the symbols at each level. Here is an example:
two dots plus a bar with two dots. The sum is simply the bar at the bottom and all
the dots combined at the top; or a bar with 4 dots. Ready! We performed addition
without converting the Mayan numbers into the decimals. But if you want to, you can
check: this is a 2, this is a 7, and the total is a 9. Another example: 4 dots plus two bars
with 2 dots. When we add up, we pile the bars at the bottom, and throw all dots on
them. This would leave us with 2 bars and 6 dots. However, remember that the Maya
converted each 5 dots into a bar. So, the final result will be 3 bars with 1 dot. Here are
the corresponding decimals: 4 plus 12 equals 16. The last example with more levels:
let us add 3 bars with a dot and a bar with 4 dots. We pile all bars together and throw
all dots on top; it leaves us with 4 bars and 5 dots. 5 dots turn into a bar, so now we
have 5 bars. And now remember that every 4 bars constitute a 20: 4 times 5 is 20. We
can wipe out 4 bars from this level and convert them into a dot on the upper level. The
respective decimal numbers: 16 plus 9 equals 25. You have seen that Mayan addition
was a relatively simple matter of adding up dots and bars. Now you might find it
even more visual and intuitive than operations in our own numeral system. We have
evidence of Maya’s working with sums up to the hundreds of millions, and with dates
so large it took several lines just to represent them. Despite not possessing the concept
of a fraction, they produced extremely accurate astronomical observations using no
instruments other than sticks and were able to measure the length of the solar year
to a far higher degree of accuracy than that used in Europe. Their calculations were
extremely close to the modern value of slightly more than 365 days.
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Subtracting Mayan numbers Subtracting Mayan numbers
• remove the symbols at each level!
- =
279
Last but not least, let us subtract some Mayan numbers. Subtraction works in the
same manner: you take away the symbols at each level. An example: a bar with 4 dots
minus a bar with 2 dots. You take away the bar and you take away 2 dots; 2 dots are
left. 9 minus 7 equals 2. Another example: 3 bars with 1 dot minus 2 bars with 2 dots.
You take away the two bars and you can take away one dot easily, and now you have
another dot to take away, but there are no dots left. Now you can convert one bar into
5 dots and take one dot away; it leaves you with 4 dots. 16 minus 12 equals 4. A final
example with more levels: two bars on the bottom and three dots on the top minus
two bars with two dots at the bottom and one dot on the top. Here you just do the
subtraction at each level separately. Starting at the bottom, you wipe out two bars, and
you need to take away two dots more, but nothing is left at this level. What you do is
you take one dot from the top and convert it into 4 bars at the lower level – because 4
bars constitute a 20. Now you can convert one bar into 5 dots and take away the two
dots, which leaves you with the Mayan 18 at the bottom. Now let us look at the top
level. We started off with 3 dots, transferred one of them onto the lower level, and now
we subtract one dot from the remaining two, which leaves us with one dot on the top.
The subtraction is over. The first number was 70, the second number was 32, and the
result is 38. If there are not enough dots in the first term, you can convert one bar into 5
dots. It will give you the necessary amount of dots you can subtract from. If you need
to subtract larger Mayan numbers with more levels, you just do the subtraction at each
level separately by wiping out the respective amount of bars and dots. In case there are
not enough dots or bars at some level, you can simply transfer one dot from the level
above and convert it into bars or dots at the level below.
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1
The crash course is completed! 
Ready to take the quiz?
Now the lecture onMayan numeral system has come to an end. I thank you for your
attention. Now you are able to read and write Mayan numbers and perform simple
operations on them. When this video ends, you will start to take a test on Mayan
numbers. I wish you good luck and hope that you enjoyed this crash course!
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D.3 Evaluation questionnaire
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please
select one answer per row.
The lecture is well-structured. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
strongly disagree→
← strongly agree
I learned something useful and important. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The lecture covered the content of the follow-on test. . . . . . . . .
Subjective grade for the lecture: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
lowest grade→
← top grade
The instructor presents the subjectmatter in an understandable
way. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
strongly disagree→
← strongly agree
The instructor appears to be competent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The instructor appears to be well-prepared. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The instructor is motivated and enthusiastic about the topic.




D.4 Questionnaire at the end of the experiment




- Your grade for mathematics in the last school year
- How would you evaluate your general mood today?
- How would you evaluate your mood during the experiment?
Please also state to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Your answers will not be known by your instructor. Your answers will not affect the
evaluation of your instructor that you completed in Part 2 of the experiment.
- I enjoyed the lecture.
- The instructor was confident.
- The instructor was humorous.
- The instructor was friendly.
- The instructor was charismatic.
Now imagine that you look back at this lecture 5 years from now.
- This lecture substantially improved my skills and/or knowledge.
- This lecture changed my way of thinking.
- This lecture helped me approach important problems in my life.
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